One of the more straightforward Platonic dialogues about the good life and how it is essentially different from and incomparably superior to the 'merely' pleasurable life--the life of a tyrant, for example. However, the point in the dialogue where Callicles capitulates and gets on board with Socrates' rather swift identification of "better" pleasures with "good" pleasures and lesser pleasures with "bad" pleasures got me scratching my head for a bit. It seems to me that Callicles as a hedonist was in a position to claim that lesser pleasures are not strictly speaking 'bad' (contra Socrates), even if they are liable to cause harmful viz painful consequences in the long run. This is because the removal of or cessation of such harms could very well bring relief or pleasure to the subject. In my opinion, the last of the three objections to hedonism, i.e. that since pain and pleasure as contraries can co-exist in one body but not good and bad contraries, therefore pleasure cannot be identified with the good--is the most convincing.
Socratic eschatology leaves one to wonder--perhaps it requires an inhumanly magnanimous soul to not only be able to indulge all 'wrongdoing' to their hearts' content without a shred of remorse, but also to openly embrace the consequences of their actions in this life and beyond?

I throw my token in with Callicles when he said
"By the gods, Chaerephon, I too have been present at many discussions, but I don't believe that any has ever given me so much pleasure as this. If you like to go on talking all day, you are doing me a favor".

I simply can't get enough of these dialogues! I know there are flaws in them, I know that sometimes as (especially in the one on oratory) the protagonist (Socrates) gets all the words in edgewise and our dear antagonists do not make a fun enough defense. But the language is clever and enjoyable. The tone is playful and yet still brings the points home. If Socrates was really like this I believe I really could have gone on listening to him talking all day, if only for the chance to jump in and run over some of his flawed arguments.

n  … for philosophy, Socrates, if pursued in moderation and at the proper age, is an elegant accomplishment, but too much philosophy is the ruin of human life.n

Gorgias is easily one of Plato’s best stand-alone dialogues. Indeed, as others have mentioned, it often reads like a germinal version of the Republic, so closely does it track the same themes. A transitional dialogue, the early know-nothing Socrates of unanswered questions is already gone; instead we get Socrates espousing some of Plato’s key positions on truth and morality.

Socrates descends on a party of rhetoricians, seemingly determined to expose them. He questions Gorgias, a well-known teacher of rhetoric, in the attempt to pinpoint what, exactly, rhetoric consists of. We get the usual Socratic paradoxes: if we ought to be convinced by knowledgeable people—a doctor when it comes to medicine, an architect when it comes to buildings—how can somebody who lacks this knowledge teach the art of convincing?
tt
Gorgias insists that rhetoric is used to accomplish justice. But is Gorgias an expert on justice? No. Are his pupils already just? Neither. And cannot rhetoric be used for unjust ends? Of course. This effectively trips up the old rhetorician. Gorgias’ energetic young pupil, Polus, steps up to defend the old master. He denies what Gorgias said about rhetoric being used to accomplish justice, and instead claims that it is used to gain power.
tt
This brings Socrates to another one of his paradoxes: that powerful orators are actually to be pitied, since inflicting injustice is worse than suffering injustice. Though Polus laughs, Socrates trips him up just as they did his mentor, by getting him to assent to a seemingly unobjectionable proposition and then deducing from them surprising conclusions. (Socrates was not, you see, without his own rhetorical tricks.) Polus finds himself agreeing that tyrants are to be pitied.
tt
At this, Callicles enters the fray, not a rhetorician but an Athenian gentleman and a man of affairs, who plays the same role that Thrasymachus plays in the Republic. He scorns philosophy and insults Socrates. All this highfalutin’ talk of justice and truth and such rubbish. Doesn’t Socrates know that what is right is a mere convention and justice is simply whatever the strong wish? Socrates then embarks on his usual procedure, trying to get Callicles to assent to a proposition that is incompatible with Callicles’ position. Callicles eventually gets confused and tired and gives up, allowing Socrates to finish with a grand speech and a Platonic myth about the judgment of souls.
tt
To the modern reader very little in this dialogue will be convincing. Plato is no doubt right that rhetoric is, at best, neither bad nor good, but is akin to cosmetics or cooking rather than exercise or medicine—the art of pleasing rather than improving people. Yet since we have learned that we cannot trust people to be selfless, disinterested seekers after the truth—as Socrates repeatedly claims to be—we have decided that it’s best to let self-interested parties compete with all the tools at their disposal for their audience’s attention. Heaven knows this procedure is far from perfect and leaves us vulnerable to demagogues. But the world has proven depressingly bereft of pure souls like Socrates.
tt
Also unconvincing is Plato’s moral stance—namely, that those who commit injustice are to be pitied rather than envied. He proves, of course, that the unjust are more deserving of punishment than the just; this was never in doubt. But he does not, and cannot, prove that the unjust are less happy—since a single jolly tyrant would refute his whole chain of reasoning. Indeed, by establishing a moral precept that is so independent of happiness, Socrates falls into the same plight as did Kant in his categorical imperative. This is a serious difficulty, since, if acting justly can easily lead to unhappiness, what is the motivation to do so? The only way out of this dilemma, as both thinkers seemed to realize, was to hypothesize an afterlife where everyone got their just desserts—the good their reward and the bad their castigation. Needless to say I do not find this solution compelling.
tt
Yet you can disagree with all of Plato’s positions and still relish this dialogue. This is because, as usual, the most charming thing about Plato is that he is so much bigger than his conclusions. Though Socrates is Plato’s hero and mouthpiece, Plato also seems to be aware of Socrates’ (and his own) limitations. Callicles is not a mere strawman, but puts forward a truly consistent worldview; and Plato leaves it in doubt whether his own arguments prevailed. He even puts some good comebacks in Callicles’ mouth: “Yes, by the Gods, you are literally always talking of cobblers and fullers and cooks and doctors, as if this had to do with our argument.” By the Gods, he is!

"Who do you think would deny that he himself knows what's just?"

This is Polus' question, not Socrates'. And it's a great question! One of a few questions put forth by him and Callicles that Socrates never really answers. One of the most notable things here is that Socrates does not ask any questions pertaining to the veracity of any of his interlocutors conceptions of justice, and nobody questions Socrates' conception of soul. This dialogue is Plato himself emphatically learning how to write effectively with what is also unsaid, and putting his own theories and ethics into a form of writing that shares more similarities to drama than it does to philosophy.

At the beginning of the Republic, Thrasymachus storms away angry after Socrates' relentless probing proves that he has no idea what justice is (he starts with "Justice is the advantage of the stronger", and furiously gives up after he's reduced to "Justice is minding one's own business", hahaha!). This is perhaps only the most famous encounter with Socrates blatantly coming forth with the question "What is justice?" But here, that question is nearly irrelevant, at least to the interlocutors. Justice is spoken of by all as an understood concept, that there is indeed an inherent good and bad. This is almost never the case outright for Socrates!

What Plato is trying to do here is something completely different, he is caught leading with faith. The other moment where faith enters Plato's Socrates is in the Phaedo, during Socrates' soothsaying to his disciples present at his execution, when he talks about the immortality of the soul. What interests me about both of these moments, in the Phaedo and at the end of the Gorgias (which is essentially implying the immortality of the soul through heaven), is the incongruity of faith and untruth (or, maybe more agnostically and realistically, the unknowable), and how they are and are not at odds with Socrates', and likely Plato's, thought. It's the tendency to condemn writing and poets, yet have the most major and extensive parts of your intercourse deal with their written words and myths.

There are a lot of analogues with the Republic here, but there are so many equally interesting comparisons to be made with Phaedo, too! An example I've considered most is the constant invocation of pleasure and pain here. It's almost as if the Phaedo was specifically referencing the Gorgias when Socrates talks about his final moments in the former--here, in the Gorgias, this is explained at length. It's the feeling of satiating a great hunger, where you feel the pain of the emptiness while you feel the pleasure of filling it simultaneously. This can have analogues in the physical realm, appetites, sex, medicine, but most importantly, in the mind. Its what happens when we learn, or when we learn we are wrong.

I treat my Plato reviews more like journal entries, more self-interested than convincing or appealing to read, but one thing I do hope that I can persuade people to ponder are the dialogues first words:

CALLICLES: This, they say, is how you're supposed to do your part in battle, Socrates

WHAT? Just like so many other dialogues we are introduced to the scene at the very end of a conversation, with Callicles, of all people, exampling Socrates with some military advice. The irony is palpable.

In the Jowett translation (the former was Zeyl):

CALLICLES: The wise man, as the proverb says, is late for a fray, but not for a feast.

While Jowett is, as usual, more poetic, I am willing to think Zeyl's is the more accurate here. I think the minor ironic detail adds a lot to how we consider the rest of the piece. However, as the dialogue proves, no one really comes out of here wise, as the feast on Gorgias' words led to a fray--but perhaps it was the fray that provided wisdom, afterall.

From the Introduction by Chris Emlyn-Jones:

p. xxvii - "For Plato's Socrates, oratory is not an art, since, by his own admission, Gorgias does not aim to produce knowledge of right and wrong, but only to persuade - to produce conviction. Instead of aiming at making people better (he cannot, because his art does not include knowledge of right and wrong), he panders to their desires, like a confectioner tempting children. If you engage in pandering you do not have to know what people really need; all you require is experience of what will satisfy them."

now don't that sound terrifyingly familiar?!

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dZNnq...

Retoriğin ilgi alanı sözler ise, sözlere başvurularak icra edilen tüm sanatların üstünde tutulabilir mi?

Bunun ayrımını yapabilmek için retoriği, düşünsel ve pratik diğer sanatlardan ayırmak için Gorgias, retoriğin bir ikna sanatı olduğunu dile getirir. Hekimin sanatının sağladığı sanata, beden eğitmeninin sağladığı güzelliğe, sarrafın sağladığı zenginliğe retorik tek başına ulaşamaz, ama ona ulaşanları kendine ve topluma hizmet etmeye ikna edebilir. Gorgias’ın kabul ettiği retorik hiyerarşisinde, tüm sanatlar bir şekilde retoriğin ikna edici gücünü uygulamakta, ancak retorik, doğru ve yanlışın ayrımında asıl sanatını konuşturmaktadır. Retoriği kullanan kişi de, gücünün getirdiği sorumluluğa ölçüyle yaklaşmalı, silahını sadece kenti savunmak için kullanacak bir asker gibi, sanatını doğru amaçlara yönelik kullanmalıdır. Sokrates, retoriğin doğru kullanılması üzerine bu konuşma ile en başta yapılan tanım arasında bir çelişkiyi ele almak ister, eğer retorik bir ikna edici sanat ise, ve gücünü bilgiden değil, inançtan alıyorsa; inanca bilgiden daha yatkın bir topluluk karşısında sağlık hakkında yapılacak bir konuşmada, hatibi hekimden daha ikna edici kılacak kadar tehlikelidir. Bir diğer açıdan, konular hakkında yeterli bilgiye sahip izleyiciler söz konusu olduğunda, retoriğin hünerini sergileyebileceği bir alan kalır mı?

“Öyleyse hatip ikna etmekte hekimden daha becerikliyse, bilgisizler önünde konuşan bilgisiz de bilgiliden daha beceriklidir, ikna etmekte.” 459b

Sokrates bu noktada retoriği bir sanat olarak görmemesinin düşünsel temellerini sunmuştur; iyiyi ve doğruyu değil, hoşa gideni ve genel kabul göreni arayan bir görenektir o, arayışındaki safsata düzeyi onu çirkin kılar. Sonucunda akla, adalete ve doğruya yatkın olmayan iknaların kimseye genel bir yararı olabilir mi? Hitabetin verdiği güç ile doğruları aşmanın sağlayacağı anlık haz ve neşe, bu gücü elinde tutanların işine yarar gözükse de, bu sadece bir fantazmadan ibarettir Platon için; nasıl akıldan yoksun biri kendini daha iyi bir hale sevk edecek iyi ve kötüyü ayırt edemez ise, halkını kandıran bir tiran ve çevresindeki hatipler, akla dayanmayan eylemleri ile dünyevi bir hazlar silsilesinden öteye gidemezler. (Gorgias diyalogu içerisinde bu Sokratik temellendirmeyi açıklama yolu yine Sokrates’in ana felsesine, kendini tanımaya yönelmekte. Philebos, Alkibiades, Protagoras’ta da politik güç veya başka şekilde gelebilecek hazların arayışına karşı olmamakla beraber, çıkış noktasının hazzın kendisi değil, kendini tanımakla başlayacak bir bilgi yolculuğu olduğunu savunacaktır – Ne istediğini bilmeyen, hoşuna gideni yapıyor diye, istediği şeyi yapıyor olmaz)

“Erkek ya da kadın, her kim ki dürüsttür, o mutludur; her kim ki doğru yoldan ayrılmış ve kötüdür, o mutsuzdur bence” 470e

Platon’un, dolayısıyla Sokrates’in, retoriği bir sanattan ziyade safsatacılık, dalkavukluk olarak görmesinin altında yatan ana sebep burada hoş ve iyi olanın Platonik yaklaşım nezdindeki ayrımında yatmaktadır. Platon retoriği, diyalektiğin karşısına koyacak, gerçek ve iyi olana dair bir arayıştan ziyade, gerçeğin bir kopyası ve hoş olana dair arayışı temsil ettiği savunulacaktır. Hoş ve iyi arasındaki bu ayrımın mutabakatı için diyalog Sokrates ve Polos arasında devam eder.

Burada retoriğin ikna edici gücünün, bizi beşeri sanat ve eylemlerde daha güçlü bir konuma eriştirmesi nedeniyle, onu doğru kullanan insanın mutluluğuna hizmet ettiğine karşı çıkılacaktır. Retoriğin gücüne başvurularak manipüle edilen gerçekler dünyevi ve bedensel bir hoşluk hali sağlasa da, burada yargıçları ikna eden bir suçlu yasanın kendisini, halkı ikna eden bir tiran da adaletin kendisini manipüle etmekte, kendisini ve başkalarını iyi kılacak olgulara zarar vererek bir ruhsal mutsuzluğa sürüklemektedir kendilerini. Aynı Dostoyevski’nin Raskolnikov’unda da gördüğümüz gibi, yasalar tarafından belirlenmiş cezasından kaçtığımız suçlarımız, ruhumuzun peşini asla bırakmayacaktır Sokrates’e göre.

“Suç işleyen ya da suçluluk duygusunu içinde taşıyan bir insan, her zaman mutsuzdur.” 472e

Yine Kriton’da da görüldüğü üzere Sokrates buradaki sözlerinden yaşamının son gününde de dönmeyecektir zira, nasıl kent onu haksız yere ölüme mahkum ettiyse de, haksızlık eden olmaktansa, haksızlık edilen olmayı yeğleyecektir. Kendisine hücresinin muhafaza edilmeyen açık kapısını gösteren Kriton’a, ‘varlığını borçlu olduğu yasalara bu haksızlığı yapmayacağını’ söylediği gibi, bu ahlaki duruş bedenini ölüme götürecek olsa da, ruhu ve ondan sonra yaşayacak toplum için en doğrusu bu haksızlığı kabullenmek olacaktır.

Diyalogda Gorgias ve Polos’dan sonra konuşmaya katılacak Kallikles, sanırım bütün Platonik diyaloglar arasında Sokrates’in yöntemlerine en agresif direnci gösteren, bu nedenle Gorgias’ı da Platon’un komedi değeri en yüksek eseri haline getiren karakterdir. Kallias, Sokrates’in bu ahlakçı ve uygarlığın devamlılığına dair yaklaşımın karşısına doğa yasalarını ve doğuştan güçlü konumda olanın (doğal halde bedensel, medeni toplumda aristokrat) diğerleri üzerinde hakimiyetini koyacaktır. Sokrates medeniyetin varlığının bu doğal güçleri dengelemekle yükümlü olduğunu açıklayabilmek için büyük çabalara girmek zorunda kalır. Platon’un çizdiği Kallikles’in ortalama bir kast savunucusu 21. Yüzyıl insanını temsil etmediğini söylemek oldukça zor.

Diyalog bu şekilde retoriğin diyalektik ile ayrımı, bir sanat olarak Platon’un ruh hiyerarşisindeki konumu, yasalar ve kent yönetimindeki gücü üzerinden retoriği çeşitli yönlerden değerlendirmiş olur. Sokrates, konuşmasının sonunda bir kez daha Apoloia’da değişmediği konumda görülür;

“Atinalılar, sizi sayar severim, ancak size değil, tanrıya itaat edeceğim.” (Sokrates’in Savunması, 17)

Phaidros’ta Platon doğruluğa ve erdemlerin özüne en yakın ruhların tanrılara en yakın ruhlar olduğunu dile getirmişti, onların at arabaları, Zeus’un ve diğer tanrıların at arabalarının ulaştığı yüksekliklere en rahat ulaşabilenlerdi. Burada itaat edilen tanrılardan kasıt, onların insanlığın yarattığı, tanrısal olanların kopyası olan beşeri yasaların ve geleneklerin üstünde olan doğrulardır daha çok. Bizler retorik gibi yöntemlere başvurarak ancak kendimizi ve çevremizi kandırırız ona göre, bu sadece bizi mutsuz etmekle kalmaz, doğruya ulaşma çabamızı da köreltir. Rousseau bile ideal bir devlet yönetiminin sadece tanrılarda olabileceğini söylecekti, belki de konu devlet yönetimi ve yasalar olunca Platon’un diyalogu, bedenlerin öldükten sonra karşılaşacağı tanrısal bir yargılanma mitine dayandırarak kapatması bu yaklaşıma hizmet etmiştir, kim bilir.

One of Plato’s more mediocre dialogues — a deep dive into rhetoric and discourse, particularly the political kind. What does it mean to persuade? What should we persuade people of?

If you’re at all familiar with Plato’s other works, then Gorgias is largely more of the same. The interlocutors are maybe a little more obstinate than usual. Socrates’ roasts have a little more spice to them. (At times he really goes in for the kill. He’s like “mf can you talk less”)

There *are* some nice new Plato allegories to add to the display case: perforated jars, chefs, touchstones to shine gold, etc.

While some people argue this is like “Republic Lite,” I think the two books are targeting fundamentally different projects and audiences. Gorgias is for someone like Gorgias! It’s not about instructing ambitious young statesman how to construct and orient the ideal (soul or) city in speech. No, this is like the “little red pocketbook” of Platonic thought — I think it answers the question “What should we be talking about these days?” It’s for the normal, apathetic, value neutral type of guy.

We don’t get a massively intricate utopian ideal or even very clear definitions for many of these philosophical concepts (justice, virtue, good). Realistically, Plato presumes we work with what we got — it’s quite a practical approach. Socrates basically gives a simple piece of advice: “Do good things to live a good life. Help others do the same. Even if not readily apparent, good acts will make you a better person.” It’s a gentle prod and reminder to not be a dickhead for the average Joe.

In summary it’s like: doing bad things is bad even if you don’t get caught. Getting punished for bad thing is good even if it hurt. Pleasure isn’t always good. Pain isn’t always bad. We have to do the good pleasure. Discourse is not an art but a fake form of flattery. Most people say what the masses want to hear. Instead we gotta say the truth to give everyone justice in the soul. Justice is virtue moderation courage. We gotta have a ruler who does the good things so we can copy him. I (Socrates) am the only person who see the light and I do the real politic stuff. I know ima die young because the idiots aren’t ready for the wisdom I’m spitting. They’ll send me to trial and say why are you corrupting the youth. I will say that all cures need some pain. Finally I’ll do a little dance and give everyone a storytime about how you do good to have a pretty looking soul and go to an island which is basically heaven and live happily ever after. Philosophy rules and everything else sucks. Don’t forget that. (3.6 stars)

An excellent example of philosophy justifying itself.

Everybody has heard the whole cranky, rather arrogant and patronizing remark made when someone who doesn't read very much or doesn't read for pleasure or instruction feels like scoffing a bit:

"Why are you reading this boring old stuff? Philosophy's good when you're younger, and you don't know anything, but once you become a real adult you should just let that stuff go..."

It's interesting that Socrates calls Gorgias out for basically making that case outright and putting Socrates in his place- or seeming to- by doing so.

Socrates asks him if he thinks a Catamite (the 'catcher' in the boudoir, if you please) is living a good life. Gorgias sputters and says 'no'....Well, says Socrates, if you think that constantly seeking pleasure and satisfaction is all you need, maybe those very desires you have aren't going to be fulfilled and so you're really just constantly, consistently being the butt-boy for your own endless, fruitless pursuit of gratification.

It's always amused me how Socrates gets away with laying the smack down like that...

3.5 ⭐️!

Sacrilegious though it surely is to give Plato such a low rating, Gorgias reminded me of why I disliked reading the Socratic dialogues in school. The content is good but the pace of the argument is awfully slow. One feels that Socrates could have used at least 20% fewer words without conceding his thoroughness.

“En iyi dediklerin en güçlü olanlar mıdır? Ayrıca, en zayıfların da en güçlü olanlara boyun eğmesi mi gerekir? Büyük devletlerin küçük devletleri doğanın verdiği hakla alt ettiklerini söylerken, öyle sanıyorum ki onların daha kudretli ve daha güçlü olduklarını belirtmek istedin. Bu da en kudretlinin, en güçlünün ve en iyinin aynı şey olduklarını ortaya çıkarır. Peki en küçük ve en zayıf olan insan hiç en güçlü olabilir mi? Ya da en iyinin ve de en güçlünün tanımı aynı mıdır?”

Γοργίας = Gorgias (dialogue), Plato, Walter Hamilton (Translator), Chris Emlyn-Jones (Commentary)

Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1960 = 1339, In 149 Pages
‬
Gorgias is a Socratic dialogue written by Plato around 380 BC. The dialogue depicts a conversation between Socrates and a small group of sophists (and other guests) at a dinner gathering.

In the Gorgias, Socrates argues that philosophy is an art, whereas rhetoric is a skill based on mere experience. To Socrates, most rhetoric is in practice merely flattery. To use rhetoric for good, rhetoric cannot exist alone.

It must depend on philosophy to guide its morality, he argues. Socrates therefore believes that morality is not inherent in rhetoric and that without philosophy, rhetoric is simply used to persuade for personal gain. Socrates suggests that he is one of the few Athenians to practice true politics.

تاریخ نخستین خوانش روز دوازدهم ماه ژوئن سال 2008میلادی

عنوان: فن سخنوری گرگیاس؛ نویسنده: افلاتون، مترجم: لطفی کاویانی؛ تهران، کتابفروشی ابن سینا، شماره گذاری صفحات برای هر فصل جداگانه است در243ص؛ و102ص، و7ص، و96ص، و45ص؛ و ...؛

فهرست: فن سخنوری گرگیاس؛ دانایی شارمیدس؛ تقوای منون؛ دیانت اوتیفرن؛ سقراط در زندان کریتون؛ اپولوژی یا محاکمه سقراط؛ نامه؛

گرگیاس یا «جرجیاس»، از نخستین «سوفسطاییان یونان»، و همدوره با «پروتاگوراس» بودند؛ «افلاطون» این اثر خود را، به نام ایشان کرده‌ است؛ «گرگیاس» فرزند «خارمانتیداس» بودند، و در سال چهارصد و هشتاد و هفت پیش از میلاد، در شهر «لئونتینی»، از متصرفات «یونان» در «سیسیل»، زاده شدند؛ «گرگیاس» برادری به نام «هرودیکوس»، و نیز خواهری داشتند، که تندیس او را، پیشکش پرستشگاه خدای «دلفی» کردند؛ «گرگیاس» شصت‌ ساله بودند، که هم‌شهریانش، او را، در سال چهارصد و بیست و هفت پیش از میلاد، به «آتن» فرستادند، تا از «آتنیان» در برابر هجوم «سیراکوزیها»، درخواست یاری کند؛ «گرگیاس» در «آتن» به سخنرانی پرداختند، و به آموزش فنّ سخنوری مشغول شدند؛ نام آورانی همچون «ایسوکراتیس»، «پریکلس»، «کریتیاس»، «آلکیبیادس»، «توسیدید»، «آگاتون»، «کرفون»، «پولوس» و «کالیرس» از شاگردان ایشان بودند؛

تاریخ بهنگام رسانی 23/10/1399هجری خورشیدی؛ 17/09/1400هجری خورشیدی؛ ا. شربیانی