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Update 2020-12-04:
Lesson 1 fear and greed:
“Occasional outbreaks of those two super-contagious diseases, fear and greed, will forever occur in the investing community. The timing of these epidemics will be unpredictable. And the market aberrations produced by then will be equally unpredictable, both as to duration and degree. Therefore, we never try to anticipate the arrival or departure of either disease. Our goal is more modest: we simply attempt to be fearful when others are greedy and to be greedy only when others are fearful.”
• "Inactivity strikes us as intelligent behavior. Neither we nor most business managers would dream of feverishly trading highly- profitable subsidiaries because a small move in the Federal Re- serve's discount rate was predicted or because some Wall Street pundit had reversed his views on the market. Why, then, should we behave differently with our minority positions in wonderful businesses?"
t• "To suggest that this investor should sell off portions of his most successful investments simply because they have come to dominate his portfolio is akin to sug- gesting that the Bulls trade Michael Jordan because he has become so important to the team."
t• "Let me add a few thoughts about your own investments. Most investors, both institutional and individual, will find that the best way to own common stocks is through an index fund that charges minimal fees. Those following this path are sure to beat the net results (after fees and expenses) delivered by the great majority of investment professionals."
t• "If you buy a stock at a sufficiently low price, there will usually be some hiccup in the fortunes of the business that gives you a chance to unload at a decent profit, even though the long-term per- formance of the business may be terrible. I call this the "cigar butt" approach to investing. A cigar butt found on the street that has only one puff left in it may not offer much of a smoke, but the "bargain purchase" will make that puff all profit."
t• "Unless you are a liquidator, that kind of approach to buying businesses is foolish. First, the original "bargain" price probably will not turn out to be such a steal after all. In a difficult business, no sooner is one problem solved than another surfaces-never is there just one cockroach in the kitchen. Second, any initial advan- tage you secure will be quickly eroded by the low return that the business earns."
t• "It's far better to buy a wonderful company at a fair price than a fair company at a wonderful price. Charlie understood this early; I was a slow learner. But now, when buying companies or common stocks, we look for first-class businesses accompanied by first-class managements."
t
t• "A further related lesson: Easy does it. After 25 years of buy- ing and supervising a great variety of businesses, Charlie and I have not learned how to solve difficult business problems. What we have learned is to avoid them."
t"If your actions are sensible, you are certain to get good results; in most such cases, leverage just moves things along faster. Charlie and I have never been in a big hurry: We enjoy the process far more than the proceeds-though we have learned to live with those also."
t"In the final chapter of The Intelligent Investor Ben Graham forcefully rejected the dagger thesis: "Confronted with a challenge to distill the secret of sound investment into three words, we ven- ture the motto, Margin of Safety." Forty-two years after reading that, I still think those are the right three words. The failure of investors to heed this simple message caused them staggering losses as the 1990s began."
t• "We only want to link up with people whom we like, admire, and trust."
t• "One of the ironies of the stock market is the emphasis on ac- tivity. Brokers, using terms such as "marketability" and "liquid- ity", sing the praises of companies with high share turnover (those who cannot fill your pocket will confidently fill your ear). But in- vestors should understand that what is good for the croupier is not good for the customer. A hyperactive stock market is the pick- pocket of enterprise."
t• "Charlie and I feel totally comfortable with this eggs-in-one- basket situation because Berkshire itself owns a wide variety of truly extraordinary businesses. Indeed, we believe that Berkshire is close to being unique in the quality and diversity of the busi- nesses in which it owns either a controlling interest or a minority interest of significance."
t• "Whenever Charlie and I buy common stocks for Berkshire's insurance companies (leaving aside arbitrage purchases, discussed [in the next essay]) we approach the transaction as if we were buy- ing into a private business. We look at the economic prospects of the business, the people in charge of running it, and the price we must pay. We do not have in mind any time or price for sale. In- deed, we are willing to hold a stock indefinitely so long as we ex- pect the business to increase in intrinsic value at a satisfactory rate. When investing, we view ourselves as business analysts-not as market analysts, not as macroeconomic analysts, and not even as security analysts."
t• "In fact, the true investor welcomes volatility. Ben Graham ex- plained why in Chapter 8 of The Intelligent Investor. There he in- troduced "Mr. Market," an obliging fellow who shows up every day to either buy from you or sell to you, whichever you wish. The more manic-depressive this chap is, the greater the opportunities available to the investor. That's true because a wildly fluctuating market means that irrationally low prices will periodically be at- tached to solid businesses. It is impossible to see how the availabil- ity of such prices can be thought of as increasing the hazards for an investor who is totally free to either ignore the market or exploit its folly."
t• "Is it really so difficult to conclude that Coca-Cola and Gillette possess far less business risk over the long term than, say, any com- puter company or retailer? Worldwide, Coke sells about 44% of all soft drinks, and Gillette has more than a 60% share (in value) of the blade market. Leaving aside chewing gum, in which Wrigley is dominant, I know of no other significant businesses in which the leading company has long enjoyed such global power."
t• "Moreover, both Coke and Gillette have actually increased their worldwide shares of market in recent years. The might of their brand names, the attributes of their products, and the strength of their distribution systems give them an enormous com- petitive advantage, setting up a protective moat around their eco- nomic castles. The average company, in contrast, does battle daily without any such means of protection. As Peter Lynch says, stocks of companies selling commodity-like products should come with a warning label: "Competition may prove hazardous to human wealth."
t• "On the other hand, if you are a know-something investor, able to understand business economics and to find five to ten sensibly- priced companies that possess important long-term competitive ad- vantages, conventional diversification makes no sense for you. It is apt simply to hurt your results and increase your risk. I cannot understand why an investor of that sort elects to put money into a business that is his 20th favorite rather than simply adding that money to his top choices-the businesses he understands best and that present the least risk, along with the greatest profit potential. In the words of the prophet Mae West: "Too much of a good thing can be wonderful."
t• "Our stay-put behavior reflects our view that the stock market serves as a relocation center at which money is moved from the active to the patient."
t• "John Maynard Keynes, whose brilliance as a practicing inves- tor matched his brilliance in thought, wrote a letter to a business associate, F.e. Scott, on August 15, 1934 that says it all: "As time goes on, 1 get more and more convinced that the right method in investment is to put fairly large sums into enterprises which one thinks one knows something about and in the management of which one thoroughly believes. It is a mistake to think that one limits one's risk by spreading too much between enterprises about which one knows little and has no reason for special confidence .... One's knowledge and experience are definitely limited and there are seldom more than two or three enterprises at any given time in which I personally feel myself entitled to put full confidence. "
t• "Our equity-investing strategy remains little changed from what it was ... when we said in the 1977 annual report: "We select our marketable equity securities in much the way we would evaluate a business for acquisition in its entirety. We want the business to be one (a) that we can understand; (b) with favorable long-term pros- pects; (c) operated by honest and competent people; and (d) avail- able at a very attractive price." We have seen cause to make only one change in this creed: Because of both market conditions and our size, we now substitute "an attractive price" for "a very attrac- tive price."
t• "
tIf a business is complex or subject to constant change, we're not smart enough to predict future cash flows. Incidentally, that short- coming doesn't bother us. What counts for most people in invest- ing is not how much they know, but rather how realistically they define what they don't know. An investor needs to do very few things right as long as he or she avoids big mistakes.
Second, and equally important, we insist on a margin of safety in our purchase price. If we calculate the value of a common stock to be only slightly higher than its price, we're not interested in buy- ing. We believe this margin-of-safety principle, so strongly empha- sized by Ben Graham, to be the cornerstone of investment success."
Lesson 1 fear and greed:
“Occasional outbreaks of those two super-contagious diseases, fear and greed, will forever occur in the investing community. The timing of these epidemics will be unpredictable. And the market aberrations produced by then will be equally unpredictable, both as to duration and degree. Therefore, we never try to anticipate the arrival or departure of either disease. Our goal is more modest: we simply attempt to be fearful when others are greedy and to be greedy only when others are fearful.”
• "Inactivity strikes us as intelligent behavior. Neither we nor most business managers would dream of feverishly trading highly- profitable subsidiaries because a small move in the Federal Re- serve's discount rate was predicted or because some Wall Street pundit had reversed his views on the market. Why, then, should we behave differently with our minority positions in wonderful businesses?"
t• "To suggest that this investor should sell off portions of his most successful investments simply because they have come to dominate his portfolio is akin to sug- gesting that the Bulls trade Michael Jordan because he has become so important to the team."
t• "Let me add a few thoughts about your own investments. Most investors, both institutional and individual, will find that the best way to own common stocks is through an index fund that charges minimal fees. Those following this path are sure to beat the net results (after fees and expenses) delivered by the great majority of investment professionals."
t• "If you buy a stock at a sufficiently low price, there will usually be some hiccup in the fortunes of the business that gives you a chance to unload at a decent profit, even though the long-term per- formance of the business may be terrible. I call this the "cigar butt" approach to investing. A cigar butt found on the street that has only one puff left in it may not offer much of a smoke, but the "bargain purchase" will make that puff all profit."
t• "Unless you are a liquidator, that kind of approach to buying businesses is foolish. First, the original "bargain" price probably will not turn out to be such a steal after all. In a difficult business, no sooner is one problem solved than another surfaces-never is there just one cockroach in the kitchen. Second, any initial advan- tage you secure will be quickly eroded by the low return that the business earns."
t• "It's far better to buy a wonderful company at a fair price than a fair company at a wonderful price. Charlie understood this early; I was a slow learner. But now, when buying companies or common stocks, we look for first-class businesses accompanied by first-class managements."
t
t• "A further related lesson: Easy does it. After 25 years of buy- ing and supervising a great variety of businesses, Charlie and I have not learned how to solve difficult business problems. What we have learned is to avoid them."
t"If your actions are sensible, you are certain to get good results; in most such cases, leverage just moves things along faster. Charlie and I have never been in a big hurry: We enjoy the process far more than the proceeds-though we have learned to live with those also."
t"In the final chapter of The Intelligent Investor Ben Graham forcefully rejected the dagger thesis: "Confronted with a challenge to distill the secret of sound investment into three words, we ven- ture the motto, Margin of Safety." Forty-two years after reading that, I still think those are the right three words. The failure of investors to heed this simple message caused them staggering losses as the 1990s began."
t• "We only want to link up with people whom we like, admire, and trust."
t• "One of the ironies of the stock market is the emphasis on ac- tivity. Brokers, using terms such as "marketability" and "liquid- ity", sing the praises of companies with high share turnover (those who cannot fill your pocket will confidently fill your ear). But in- vestors should understand that what is good for the croupier is not good for the customer. A hyperactive stock market is the pick- pocket of enterprise."
t• "Charlie and I feel totally comfortable with this eggs-in-one- basket situation because Berkshire itself owns a wide variety of truly extraordinary businesses. Indeed, we believe that Berkshire is close to being unique in the quality and diversity of the busi- nesses in which it owns either a controlling interest or a minority interest of significance."
t• "Whenever Charlie and I buy common stocks for Berkshire's insurance companies (leaving aside arbitrage purchases, discussed [in the next essay]) we approach the transaction as if we were buy- ing into a private business. We look at the economic prospects of the business, the people in charge of running it, and the price we must pay. We do not have in mind any time or price for sale. In- deed, we are willing to hold a stock indefinitely so long as we ex- pect the business to increase in intrinsic value at a satisfactory rate. When investing, we view ourselves as business analysts-not as market analysts, not as macroeconomic analysts, and not even as security analysts."
t• "In fact, the true investor welcomes volatility. Ben Graham ex- plained why in Chapter 8 of The Intelligent Investor. There he in- troduced "Mr. Market," an obliging fellow who shows up every day to either buy from you or sell to you, whichever you wish. The more manic-depressive this chap is, the greater the opportunities available to the investor. That's true because a wildly fluctuating market means that irrationally low prices will periodically be at- tached to solid businesses. It is impossible to see how the availabil- ity of such prices can be thought of as increasing the hazards for an investor who is totally free to either ignore the market or exploit its folly."
t• "Is it really so difficult to conclude that Coca-Cola and Gillette possess far less business risk over the long term than, say, any com- puter company or retailer? Worldwide, Coke sells about 44% of all soft drinks, and Gillette has more than a 60% share (in value) of the blade market. Leaving aside chewing gum, in which Wrigley is dominant, I know of no other significant businesses in which the leading company has long enjoyed such global power."
t• "Moreover, both Coke and Gillette have actually increased their worldwide shares of market in recent years. The might of their brand names, the attributes of their products, and the strength of their distribution systems give them an enormous com- petitive advantage, setting up a protective moat around their eco- nomic castles. The average company, in contrast, does battle daily without any such means of protection. As Peter Lynch says, stocks of companies selling commodity-like products should come with a warning label: "Competition may prove hazardous to human wealth."
t• "On the other hand, if you are a know-something investor, able to understand business economics and to find five to ten sensibly- priced companies that possess important long-term competitive ad- vantages, conventional diversification makes no sense for you. It is apt simply to hurt your results and increase your risk. I cannot understand why an investor of that sort elects to put money into a business that is his 20th favorite rather than simply adding that money to his top choices-the businesses he understands best and that present the least risk, along with the greatest profit potential. In the words of the prophet Mae West: "Too much of a good thing can be wonderful."
t• "Our stay-put behavior reflects our view that the stock market serves as a relocation center at which money is moved from the active to the patient."
t• "John Maynard Keynes, whose brilliance as a practicing inves- tor matched his brilliance in thought, wrote a letter to a business associate, F.e. Scott, on August 15, 1934 that says it all: "As time goes on, 1 get more and more convinced that the right method in investment is to put fairly large sums into enterprises which one thinks one knows something about and in the management of which one thoroughly believes. It is a mistake to think that one limits one's risk by spreading too much between enterprises about which one knows little and has no reason for special confidence .... One's knowledge and experience are definitely limited and there are seldom more than two or three enterprises at any given time in which I personally feel myself entitled to put full confidence. "
t• "Our equity-investing strategy remains little changed from what it was ... when we said in the 1977 annual report: "We select our marketable equity securities in much the way we would evaluate a business for acquisition in its entirety. We want the business to be one (a) that we can understand; (b) with favorable long-term pros- pects; (c) operated by honest and competent people; and (d) avail- able at a very attractive price." We have seen cause to make only one change in this creed: Because of both market conditions and our size, we now substitute "an attractive price" for "a very attrac- tive price."
t• "
tIf a business is complex or subject to constant change, we're not smart enough to predict future cash flows. Incidentally, that short- coming doesn't bother us. What counts for most people in invest- ing is not how much they know, but rather how realistically they define what they don't know. An investor needs to do very few things right as long as he or she avoids big mistakes.
Second, and equally important, we insist on a margin of safety in our purchase price. If we calculate the value of a common stock to be only slightly higher than its price, we're not interested in buy- ing. We believe this margin-of-safety principle, so strongly empha- sized by Ben Graham, to be the cornerstone of investment success."