“My friends,” he announced, “God is necessary to me because he is the only being who is capable of eternal love. My immortality is necessary if only because God would not want to commit an injustice and utterly quench the flame of love for him once it has been kindled in my heart. And what is more precious than love? Love is higher than existence, love is the crown of being, and how is it possible that existence is not subordinate to it? If I have come to love him and have taken joy in my love, is it possible that he should extinguish both me and my joy and turn us into nothing? If God exists, than I am immortal too! Oh, I would very much like to live again! Every minute, every instant of life ought to be a blessing to man. The entire law of human existence consists merely in the fact that man has always been able to bow down before something immeasurably great. If people are deprived of what is immeasurably great, they will cease to live and will die in despair.”
Let me ask you something: is there anything more important than freedom? Is anything to be valued more highly than one’s personal autonomy, one’s ability to choose how one lives with complete liberty? Is it possible to have too much freedom? Here in the West, Freedom of Choice has become our god, and we shall have no other gods before it. To this god we sacrifice our notions of the numinous and transcendent, our continuity with the past, our sense of obligation to those around us and those still to come; and perhaps, ultimately, our very selves. What was conceived in the seventeenth century as the freedom to pursue the Good in one’s own way has now become freedom for freedom’s sake. The existentialists said that man has existence before he has essence; now one might say that man has freedom even before he has existence.
Symptomatic of this is the emergence in our own time of “Wrongful Life” litigation. In some jurisdictions in Europe and the United States, children born with severe disabilities may actually sue their parents for failing to prevent their birth. “You acted irresponsibly,” these children might say, “when you brought me into a life of hardship and suffering without my consent.” But of course, severely disabled children aren’t the only ones who could legitimately say that. Though their suffering may be greater in degree and duration in some instances, it is impossible for anyone to live without some measure of suffering, because suffering, grief, pain, and loss are embedded within life itself. According to tradition, when an Aztec child was born, the midwife would dunk the wailing infant in cold water and declare, “you have come to suffer. Suffer and endure.” Underneath the superficial freedoms in which we take so much pride—freedom to dress how we want, say what we want, choose where to live, what to do for a living, or who to vote for—there lies a far more profound unfreedom: that of existence itself. None of us chose to be born. We were all thrown into this thing without the foggiest idea of what we were in for, and now we’re left to find our bearings and figure out, as best we can, what this mystery is really about. We strive to gain some level of mastery over our lives; we gather up power, wealth, strength, and knowledge, all for this purpose. But the mere fact of our existence, the fact that we are, serves as an eternal reminder of our fundamental powerlessness; a powerlessness that lies at the bottom of all of our strivings.
Why am I telling you this? Because that’s what I think this book is about: the ultimately tautological relationship between freedom and nihilism. The revolutionary cabal which gathers in our nameless Russian town is in rebellion against every inherited notion: religion, monarchy, the military establishment, order, traditional morality, conscience, and even the very distinction between good and evil. They want absolute freedom; total liberation of the ego from everything outside of itself. Consistent with their premises, the leaders of this sect—the mad demagogue Pyotr Verkhovensky, the anarchic prince Nikolai Stavrogin, and the anti-philosopher Kirillov (who is probably the truest nihilist of them all, because he insists that he has no obligation even to the group)--believe in nothing, and want nothing; except, perhaps, to lash out futilely against life, the universe, and everything that is. Like Milton’s Satan, they rebel against the source of their own being, for the purpose of destroying purpose, in a mad gambit to assert their nothingness and become gods of a godless cosmos. Kirillov sees what no one else in the novel does, except perhaps for his three antipodes, Tikhon, Shatov, and Stepan Trofimovich: the only free act is suicide. In an unfree existence, the only means of self-assertion is self-slaughter.
Dostoyevsky wrote this book out of despair. It is a work of prophecy, a jeremiad for the fatalistic logic he saw working itself out in Czarist Russia, and which continues to work itself out in our own time. We have charted our course by the sacred years of liberal revolution: 1689, 1776, 1789, 1848, 1861, 1968(?). Yet whatever their merits, each of these movements has carried a kernel of nihilism. Autonomy for the landowning class in America meant the freedom to renew the conquest and displacement of indigenous peoples. Embedded within the Jacobin fervor of revolutionary France were the September Massacres of 1792 and the Reign of Terror after 1793. The student rebellions and racial activism of the 1960s and 70s in the United States bore their bitterest fruit in the titanic stupidities of Bill Ayers and Assata Shakur. The Arab Spring collapsed in some regions into the apocalyptic death-worship of ISIS. I could go on; but note that I don’t include here the Communist revolutions of the twentieth century, because they turned out not to be liberal revolutions at all; their nihilistic excess overcame their initial idealism.
Were these aberrations within the larger movements of which they were a part, or simply the most radically consistent manifestations of them? Dostoyevsky tends towards the latter view; in his novel, the sophisticated Francophile liberalism of the 1840s, embodied by Stepan Trofimovich, literally begets the nihilistic insanity of Pyotr Stepanovich. Outrageously, certain left-wing intellectuals continue to apologize for the reigns of Castro, Guevara, Hugo Chavez, and the like (defending the likes of Stalin, Mao Zedong, and Pol Pot is now too embarrassing even for them, although it wasn’t 40 years ago). Shortly after Fidel Castro’s death, Tariq Ali was interviewed by the BBC. When presented with a list of Castro’s crimes, he pithily replied that “mistakes were made.” Dostoyevsky would say, “not so fast”. Psychologically speaking, the “mistakes” weren’t really mistakes at all. On the contrary, the atrocities were more consistent with the revolutionary impulse, which has more to do with the perverse human fascination with destruction, malice, and ingratitude than it does with any ostensible political grievance.
When Pyotr Stepanovich clings to the left arm of Nikolai Vsevolodovich and promises to make him king of a ruined world, if only the latter consents to his program, this is not a debate over political methodology; this is Satan tempting Christ in the desert, and Mara tempting Gautama Buddha under the Bodhi tree. It is the battle within the soul, between a life-denying love of self and a self-denying love of God, upon which the fate of the world ultimately depends. The space in which humanity is to survive lies somewhere between these poles. As Stepan Trofimovich suggests, the only resolution of this ontological dilemma lies in Love, which is the true name of God; love of God, and love of God in oneself, the submission that makes us free.