A fairly interesting read indeed when it comes to the question of whether violence is ever justified. The answer, as it turns out, is yes, but the circumstances under which it is justified are complex and require careful consideration. The first half of the article, which focuses on setting up a "moral calculus," can be a bit of a slog to get through. It presents a rather theoretical and perhaps somewhat dry approach to the topic. However, the case studies in the second half more than make up for it. They are very interesting and read much more like a captivating story. It's as if we are drawn into real-life situations where the question of violence and its justifiability becomes palpable. Even in this abridged version, though, there are parts that still manage to feel a bit too long. But overall, it's a thought-provoking piece that makes one stop and think about this age-old and highly controversial topic.
La musica tra quelle antiche pareti ocra, ancora tiepide per il sole, vibrava di una bellezza dolorosa. It was as if the very essence of melancholy had been captured and transformed into sound. The notes seemed to dance along the warm walls, leaving a trail of bittersweet emotions in their wake.
Come uno stillicidio di oscurità estiva che gronda da fiori di rame, the music had a certain heaviness to it, like the slow drip of something precious and yet unknown. It was as if the ancient walls themselves were weeping, mourning the passage of time and the memories that had been lost within their embrace.
The beauty of the music was both captivating and heart-wrenching, pulling at the listener's emotions and taking them on a journey through a world of pain and longing. It was a reminder that even in the midst of darkness, there can be moments of such profound beauty that they leave an indelible mark on the soul.
Vollmann's "Like a Wave that Rises and Falls" stems from his desire to compose a global history of violence over the centuries, proposing a moral calculus to determine if and when it is just to use it. The idea took shape in 1980 when WV was a university student ready to protest with the anti-nuclear movement through non-violence. Soon, the protest was quelled with batons and tear gas, and the group was labeled as violent by the American media. WV thus began to wonder how it was possible to understand when violence is justified, what excuses are acceptable, and how to analyze them.
WV frankly acknowledges the probable failure of his work, well aware that, despite the aspiration for a universally valid calculus, his moral calculus cannot be mathematical but can only be limited to the best he can do.
Explaining this book is like trying to funnel the ocean into a toothpaste tube. It is massive, a jumble of words and concepts, a river in full flow of examples and logical abstractions. The fact that this is the abridged version makes it even more complicated. WV starts by challenging axioms, or self-evident principles that require no proof. He rejects, changes, and disputes them, always trying to keep his propositions as simple and obvious as possible. The prime axiom is Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.
From here, a series of impressive examples and counter-axioms are presented. It ranges from Gandhi (whose call for non-violence, while absolutely admirable, "sins of condescension with the prisoners who suffer the most"); Plato and his conception of moral calculus with three classes of citizens (where WV concludes that any generalization about class life, especially that of slaves, requires exhaustive specifications, but "what these data largely show is the futility of any single definition of class: class as rank, class as wealth, class as prestige, etc. The slaves of the rich were housed and pampered for reasons that we should define as structural rather than personal: it doesn't matter that their owners qualified them as members of the family"); class struggle ("what is class? we ask again. Is it rank, wealth, caste, or status? The local definition is not relevant. Class is, rather simply, the particular mechanism by which power and resources are unevenly distributed within a society, regardless of whether the divisions of the latter are attenuated by numerous gradations […]. Class is the local determinant of social inequality"); Napoleon (and his use of honor and love of country to mobilize the masses); Lycurgus (a Spartan who in exile studied the laws of the Cretans, Ionians, and Egyptians, finding the most rigorous equality as a solution to class struggle: hence the collectivization of land, the banning of all that is superfluous, the sharing of meals in groups of 15 people, so that no one feels free to flaunt wealth or abundance of food; thus, in a precarious but chilling parallel, the Sparta of Lycurgus eerily resembles the Russia of Lenin and Stalin); Lenin and Stalin ("they erected a temple to Fear, because it was this, more than anything else, that held a state together"…); Robespierre (according to whom "the people were so sovereign that they did not have to accept any representative, but only agents or 'commissaires', precursors of the Leninist commissars; how often does history reverse the meaning of words! The blatant failure of Robespierre once again demonstrated that, in practice, a people cannot exercise indivisible power in its own name; that collectivizing and universalizing participation leads to totalitarianism, whose tragic effects are difficult to distinguish from those obtained when the people are systematically deprived of all power and face despotism"); Jefferson (who proposed that power be held by the people but then delegated through political mechanisms); Lincoln (abolitionist… but "if slavery is wrong, to oppose it we must override both the law and the consensus", because we know well that in those confused years few really wanted the end of slavery; "in short, we must transform ourselves into a revolutionary authority of some kind, extending our dominion beyond the limits imposed by tradition. Do we prefer to remain faithful vassals of the pre-existing authority? Then we must wait for a remote utopian future like that of Trotsky, the day when slavery will be legally abolished and with the consent of the majority"). WV finally has to admit that "Lincoln was wrong to prohibit secession, but this pursued widely immoral ends" (i.e., the right to slavery). "The outcome, which neither Lincoln nor the Confederates expected, was positive: the formal elimination of slavery in the United States"; Cortés (whose bloody campaign in Mexico will support the thesis on the defense of territory and the absolute will to lead the infidel Aztecs on the path of the Lord); punishment as a deterrent, often seen in diametrically opposed ways, both as inhibitory for violent behaviors and as radicalizing for those who suffer it.
And so much more...
At the end of the first part, we are faced with Vollmann's "final" moral calculus. There is no point in listing the points that characterize it here, as there are an infinite number of justifications and corollaries to the justifications. The only invitation I can give is to read it, absolutely.
After the moral calculus, the second part begins, which is less substantial and consists of case studies. There are really only a few essays. I can only say that after reading it, I can well understand why the original version of this monumental work consists of 7 different volumes for a total of 3,300 pages. I can also say that in my opinion, this work should have remained as it was. There are too many "missing" parts, and their weight is felt throughout the reading. But how can one not appreciate a work of such magnitude? Even just the intentions and premises are, to say the least, brilliant and visionary.