On a second reading of this work, I found myself enjoying it more. Some advocate it as a great introduction to Nietzsche, but I still hold the view that "Twilight of the Idols" is superior. Nevertheless, there are no complaints here, as the reread was definitely more satisfying. I also read it alongside a companion book that provided analysis for each aphorism, which was a great experience. I didn't rely on it for every aphorism, but it was handy whenever needed.
The quotes within this work offer profound insights. For instance, the statement about the noble self-control involved in praising only where one doesn't agree is thought-provoking. It makes one consider the implications of our praise and how it reflects on our own tastes. Another interesting quote is about the idea that every philosophy is a foreground philosophy, hinting at the hidden depths and possible arbitrariness within each philosophical stance.
However, on my first read, I didn't have the same level of appreciation as I did for some other Nietzsche works. I felt that I didn't grasp as much as I usually do. Still, there were undoubtedly some high points. The quotes, such as "This is not a philosophical race – these Englishmen," and the description of the rank order of philosophers based on their laughter, added to the overall intrigue of the text.
12/17/24 reread
Enjoyed this more on a second read. I know some people recommend this as a good introduction to Nietzsche; I still disagree, "Twilight of the Idols" is better. No complaints though, definitely enjoyed it more on a reread. Also read this alongside a companion book that had analysis for each aphorism—great experience. Didn't use it for each aphorism but great to have whenever needed.
Quotes
It involves subtle and at the same time noble self-control, assuming that one wants to praise at all, if one always praises only where one does not agree: for in the other case one would after all praise oneself, which offends good taste.
Indeed, he will doubt whether a philosopher could possibly have "ultimate and real opinions, whether behind every one of his caves there is not, must not be, another deeper cave-a more comprehensive, stranger, richer world beyond the surface, an abysmally deep ground be- hind every ground, under every attempt to furnish "grounds." Every philosophy is a foreground philosophy-that is a hermits judgment: "There is something arbitrary in his stopping here to look back and look around, in his not digging deeper here but laying his spade aside; there is also something suspicious about it." Every philosophy also conceals a philosophy; every opinion is also a hide out, every word also a mask.
After all, you know well enough that it cannot be of any con- sequence if you of all people are proved right; you know that no philosopher so far has been proved right, and that there might be a more laudable truthfulness in every little question mark that you place after your special words and favorite doctrines (and occasionally after yourselves) than in all the solemn gestures and trumps before accusers and law courts.
The great epochs of our life come when we gain the courage to rechristen our evil as what is best in us.
Thus he once said: "Under certain circumstances I love what is human"-and with this he alluded to Ariadne who was presents -"man is to my mind an agreeable, courageous, inventive animal that has no equal on earth; it finds its way in any labyrinth. I am well disposed towards him: I often reflect how I might yet ad- vance him and make him stronger, more evil, and more profound than he is." "Stronger, more evil, and more profound?" I asked startled. "Yes," he said once more; "stronger, more evil, and more profound; also more beautiful"-and at that the tempter god smiled with his halcyon smile as though he had just paid an enchanting compliment.
1st read
I didn't end up liking this as much as some other Nietzsche I read. I just felt like I didn't grasp a ton of it more than usual at least. Still had some high points, without a doubt.
Quotes
"This is not a philosophical race – these Englishmen."
"I would go so far as to allow myself a rank order of philosophers based on the rank of their laughter – right up to those who are capable of golden laughter. And given that even gods philosophize... I do not doubt that they know a new and super-human way of laughing – at the expense of everything serious!"
"People who were cowardly, apprehensive, and petty, people who thought narrowly in terms of utility – these were the ones despised. But the same can be said about distrustful people with their uneasy glances, about grovelers, about dog-like types of people who let themselves be mistreated, about begging flatterers and, above all, about liars: – it is a basic belief of aristocrats that base peoples are liars. 'We who are truthful' – that is what the nobility of ancient Greece called themselves."