This review presents a rather mixed assessment of a book related to Wittgenstein.

On one hand, it acknowledges that the book does a great job of discussing the basic tenets of Wittgenstein. It seems that the author has a good understanding of the subject matter. However, on the other hand, it criticizes the author for downplaying Wittgenstein's significance. The repeated attempts to attack the subject, point out the meaninglessness of his work, show how his later work disproves the earlier one, or claim that his disciples did more than him, all these aspects are seen as tarnishing what could otherwise have been an excellent book.

The review also mentions that the VSI series is perhaps too short to accommodate so much critical response. This may be a valid point, as the whole "X in 90 Minutes" series seems to suffer from a similar issue. However, the reviewer also admits that maybe they are being too critical themselves.

Despite these criticisms, the review concludes that the book is still worth the read or listen. This shows that there are still some redeeming qualities in the book, despite its flaws.

It is indeed rather obscure. However, a part of the philosophical content studied by this person is precisely indescribable in language. It is precisely this indescribability that has drawn a boundary for this part of the content. And for this reason, not understanding it belongs to the normal state. So I... have fallen into a pit.

This situation reminds us that in the field of philosophy, there are often some profound and mysterious aspects that are difficult to capture and express clearly through ordinary language.

The attempt to describe the indescribable is both a challenge and an opportunity for philosophers.

It forces them to continuously explore new ways of thinking and expressing, and also broadens our understanding and perception of the world.

Although we may sometimes feel frustrated and confused when facing such difficult philosophical problems, we should also maintain an open and curious attitude and continue to strive to understand and explore.

Wittgenstein: A Very Short Introduction (Very Short Introductions #46), A.C. Grayling

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) was an extraordinarily original thinker. His influence extended far beyond the realm of philosophy alone in the twentieth century.

In this engaging Introduction, A.C. Grayling endeavors to make Wittgenstein's thought accessible to the general reader. He does so by meticulously explaining the nature and impact of Wittgenstein's views. Grayling delves into both Wittgenstein's early and later philosophy, highlighting the differences and connections between them.

Moreover, he offers a fresh assessment of Wittgenstein's continuing influence on contemporary thought. This assessment provides valuable insights into how Wittgenstein's ideas still reverberate and shape the intellectual landscape today. Overall, Grayling's work serves as an excellent introduction to the complex and profound thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein's work, especially the Tractatus, is of great significance. Norman Malcolm, one of his chief disciples, emphasized the difficulty of summarizing his thoughts, as they were highly compressed. The Tractatus was published with Russell's introduction, but Wittgenstein was angry as he thought Russell had misunderstood and misrepresented his views. It was the only philosophical book he published in his lifetime, and after its completion, he believed he had solved all the problems of philosophy and turned his attention elsewhere.

The aim of the Tractatus is to show that the problems of philosophy can be solved by understanding how language works. Wittgenstein believed that the proper task of philosophy is to make the nature of our thought and talk clear, as the traditional problems of philosophy are spurious and arise from misunderstandings about language. Central to the Tractatus is the idea that language has an underlying logical structure, and understanding this shows the limits of what can be clearly and meaningfully said.

Wittgenstein's views on language, propositions, and logic are complex. Propositions are different from sentences, and the primary concern in logic is to identify and classify valid forms of inference. His invention of truth tables became standard in logic. Nonsense occurs when a sign or string of signs fails to express a proposition. Ethics, religion, and the "problems of life" lie outside the world and cannot be meaningfully talked about.
Comparing Wittgenstein's views with Russell's is informative. Both believed that the relation between language and world depends on the direct linkage of their simplest elements. Wittgenstein's thesis assumes that language and the world are structured and can be analyzed. The meaning of an expression is what we understand when we understand it. If language-use is a rule-following activity, then language is essentially public.
However, there is a conflict in Wittgenstein's views between the claim that language is logically public and the claim that there cannot be a logically private language. Few philosophers agree with Wittgenstein's basic outlook, mainly because they do not accept his diagnosis of the source of philosophical perplexity. Future generations will determine whether Wittgenstein is one of the great philosophers or just a great personality in philosophy.

CITATIONS

One of Wittgenstein’s chief disciples, Norman Malcolm, has written: ‘An attempt to summarise [Wittgenstein’s work] would be neither successful nor useful. Wittgenstein compressed his thoughts to the point where further compression is impossible. What is needed is that they be unfolded and the connections between them traced out.’

In despair he left the matter to Russell, who eventually arranged publication by agreeing to contribute an introduction. The Tractatus appeared in German in 1921 and in English translation in 1922. When Wittgenstein saw Russell’s introduction he was angry, complaining that even though he and Russell had discussed the book line by line at a meeting in Holland in late 1919, Russell had misunderstood his views and misrepresented them.

The Tractatus was the only philosophical book Wittgenstein published in his lifetime. When it was finished he thought he had solved all the problems of philosophy, and consistently with that view gave up philosophical work and turned his attention elsewhere.

Wittgenstein’s aim in the Tractatus is stated in its preface. It is to show that the problems of philosophy can be solved by coming to a proper understanding of how language works.

Wittgenstein runs against this current. His view is that the proper task of philosophy is not one of engagement with the issues mentioned, for in his opinion they involve illusory problems which arise as a result of misunderstandings about language. The proper task of philosophy, he says, is to make the nature of our thought and talk clear, for then the traditional problems of philosophy will be recognized as spurious and will accordingly vanish.

What is fundamental to the Tractatus is the thought that language has an underlying logical structure, an understanding of which shows the limits of what can clearly and meaningfully be said. The importance of this, in Wittgenstein’s view, is that what can be said is the same as what can be thought.

He puts this point at both the beginning and the end of the Tractatus in the now famous assertion that ‘what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about, we must consign to silence’ (T, p. 3 and cf. T 7).

The issue of these claims for Wittgenstein is that the proper task of philosophy is ‘to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. the propositions of natural science – i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy – and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions’.

‘There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical’ (T 6.522). Here ‘showing’ rather than ‘saying’ is all that is possible.

a proposition is something asserted or proposed for acceptance as true, for example, ‘the table is brown’, ‘this book is about Wittgenstein’, ‘it is raining’. But propositions are not to be confused with the sentences used to express them. A sentence is a grammatically well-formed string of words in any language, written or spoken by someone at a certain time and place. A sentence has only to obey the grammatical rules of the language to which it belongs in order to be a sentence; it does not have in addition to be ‘meaningful’ – strings of words like ‘green ideas sleep furiously’ qualify as ...more

A proposition, on the other hand, is what is asserted when a sentence (more accurately, a declarative sentence) is meaningfully and non-idly used, and therefore propositions and sentences are quite different things.

The primary concern in logic is to identify and classify valid forms of inference. The notions of ‘validity’, ‘form’, and ‘inference’ are the key ones.

Wittgenstein’s invention of truth tables, which became standard in logic, in an early manuscript of the Tractatus.

Here, in a crude preliminary form, is a representation of the two parallel structures: This representation is crude because it does not show how the vertical and horizontal relationships between the two sets of levels work; but it is a useful preliminary sketch.

When a sign or string of signs fails to express a proposition it is nonsense. It is not that such a sign or string of signs says something false; it is that it says nothing at all, for it fails to picture anything in the world and hence has no connection with the world. Wittgenstein includes ‘most of the propositions of philosophy’ in this class. Because this is so, he says at the end of the Tractatus: ‘My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them – as steps – to climb up beyond them.

And because the content of ethics, religion, and the ‘problems of life’ lie outside the world – outside the realm of facts and their constituent states of affairs – nothing can be said about them.

To try to say anything about them is, given the way language works, to fall into nonsense. This does not, as mentioned, mean that ethics and the rest are themselves nonsense. It is only the attempt to talk about them which is so.

A comparison with Russell’s views is informative here. Working from some of the same basic ideas (because of his early collaboration with Wittgenstein) but with empirical considerations expressly in view, Russell likewise argues that the relation between language and world depends upon the fact that the simplest elements of each are directly linked.

it follows that the world is everything that is represented by the totality of true propositions.

A logical picture of facts is a thought.

Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity.

Philosophy does not result in ‘philosophical propositions’ but rather in the clarification of propositions. Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries.

Wittgenstein’s thesis rests on the assumption that language and the world are complex and hence structured, and that therefore their structures can be analysed into their simplest and most basic elements (or at least into simpler and more basic ones).

The meaning of an expression is what we understand when we understand that expression.

But then if language-use is a rule-following activity, and such activity is essentially a matter of public agreement, as Wittgenstein argues, it follows that language is essentially, that is logically, public.

The conflict apparent in Wittgenstein’s views, then, lies between the strong claim that language is logically public, and the weaker claim that there cannot be logically private language.

If one were to specify a single reason why few philosophers agree with Wittgenstein’s basic outlook it would be that they do not accept his diagnosis of the source of philosophical perplexity. Wittgenstein says that problems arise because we misunderstand the workings of our language.

Reflection upon the above, together with the memoirs and biographical essays concerning Wittgenstein, suggests a closing thought. Future generations may or may not judge Wittgenstein to be one of the great philosophers. Even if they do not, however, he is sure always to count as one of the great personalities of philosophy. From our perspective it is easy to mistake one for the other; which he is time will tell.

A Fantastic Read!

This is truly a remarkable piece of writing. It offers a very nice exposition of the most crucial points that were brought up by Wittgenstein in both his earlier and later works. The author has done an excellent job of presenting these ideas in a clear and understandable manner.

Moreover, along with the exposition, there is a clear explanation of the problems and mistakes that were contained within Wittgenstein's works. This adds an extra layer of depth to the analysis and allows the reader to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the subject matter.

The writing style is very readable, making it accessible to a wide range of audiences. Whether you are a philosophy enthusiast or simply someone who is interested in learning more about Wittgenstein's ideas, this article is definitely worth a read.

Overall, it is a fantastic read that provides valuable insights into the works of one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century.

I have some concerns regarding the reason why an introductory book is penned by a thinker who is opposed to the subject.

Although this method can be a worthwhile means to interact with any philosopher, it turns rather strange and uncomfortable when the writer is blatantly from the opposing camp. This creates an ambiguity in the way they handle the subject matter.

I'm not advocating that these texts should be written by blind adherents or that the writer has to accept every assumption of the philosopher under consideration, as that would be equally troublesome.

Notwithstanding his immediate critiques, Grayling does offer a clear overall path of Wittgenstein's developing thought.

However, being submerged in his constant rejections makes the process through which he presents his interpretations somewhat questionable, leaving the reader with a sense of unease.

This situation raises important questions about the objectivity and balance that should be maintained in such introductory works.

Wittgenstein's work is of great significance and has had a profound impact on the field of philosophy.

His ideas are not only very good but also highly critical.

He challenges many traditional philosophical concepts and methods, and presents a unique perspective and way of thinking.

Wittgenstein's work covers a wide range of topics, including language, logic, meaning, and the nature of philosophy itself.

His early work, such as the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus," emphasizes the importance of logical analysis and the relationship between language and reality.

In his later work, he focuses more on the use of language in ordinary life and the role of context in determining meaning.

Overall, Wittgenstein's work is a valuable contribution to the development of philosophy, and his ideas continue to inspire and influence philosophers and scholars today.

Ludwig Wittgenstein is widely regarded as one of the most significant philosophers of the 20th century.

His profound philosophical insights have had a profound impact and have attracted numerous philosophers and writers, especially those within the Anglosaxon philosophical tradition.

For someone like me, without a prior educational background in philosophy, it is extremely challenging to penetrate the complex and often晦涩的 ideas of Wittgenstein or Heidegger.

This introductory book serves as an invaluable guide for readers who are new to Wittgenstein.

The author presents a clear and accessible explanation of his two major works, the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus and the Philosophical Investigations, using language that is easy to understand.

It provides a solid foundation for readers to begin exploring Wittgenstein's philosophy and is indeed the kind of work that I would highly recommend.

Wittgenstein: A Very Short Introduction by A.C. Grayling is an engaging book that aims to introduce the reader to Wittgenstein’s philosophy, covering both his earlier work and that which was published posthumously.

Due to its concise nature, it doesn't delve deeply into the complex concepts and ideas put forward by Wittgenstein. Instead, it presents them in a way that the uninitiated can easily follow. This makes it an ideal book for amateurs who simply want a taste of philosophy. However, for more experienced readers, (I assume) it may not be sufficient, unless they are looking for a quick summary of Wittgenstein’s work.

As an amateur myself, I can attest that I thoroughly enjoyed this book. I like to think that I gained some new knowledge, but going in without prior knowledge meant that some of the concepts were quite foreign to me. I had to spend a significant amount of my own time researching and reading other materials to fully understand them. As a result, it took me longer than expected to finish the book.

The highlight of the book for me was the sections where the author posed questions and made comments on the philosopher’s work. This "dialogue" between the author and Wittgenstein was extremely enlightening and helped me to solidify my understanding of some of the concepts.

Overall, I highly recommend this book to anyone interested in getting into philosophy. It is a relatively light read, despite the need for some external clarification in certain parts, and it was a pleasure to read.

Wittgenstein came from a well-off family. His mother would sometimes invite Brahms or Mahler to visit their home. His brother, Paul the pianist, lost an arm during World War I, and as a result, Ravel and Strauss composed several one-handed piano concertos for him. Wittgenstein was educated at home instead of going to school, which, as it turned out, was a bad decision by his father, causing him to fail to meet the standards required by schools that could have qualified him for renowned universities. So he went to England and entered Manchester University after spending the summer flying kites. However, he never graduated from that university. Instead, he went to Cambridge in 1912.

He was wealthy enough to hire a private train to travel from Manchester to Liverpool. His tour to Iceland was so luxurious that it made other tourists envious. He also had a large collection of neckties.

During World War I, he was captured as a prisoner of war. It was during this time that he completed his philosophical work, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.

After finishing the book, he gave up research on philosophy, believing that all the questions had been answered.

Here are some of Wittgenstein's thoughts from his early work on philosophy: In this world, some things can be expressed, while others cannot. To Wittgenstein, philosophy is about the things that can be expressed.

A proposition is a declarative sentence that is used meaningfully or asserted. A proposition, regardless of the different sentences used to express it, has the same meaning; whereas a sentence, despite having the same structure and words, may have different meanings.

A proposition is the thought expressed by a sentence.

The sentence used to express a proposition should be clearly formulated. For example, 'His lateness is annoying'. The problem is that there is no such thing as 'lateness' in the world (unlike things like tables, houses, etc.).

A proposition must be attached to an object, which can either truly exist (e.g., a table) or subsist (e.g., a dryad).

Wittgenstein used to adopt Russell's paradigm for critiquing language. In Russell's view, "The French King is clever" is incorrect because there are no more French kings, and the term "French King" does not refer to a specific person. If a sentence is partially wrong, it is wrong.

He also adopted Frege's logical form, which is about the inference from the premise to the conclusion. Based on these ideas, he invented the truth table, functors, and an algorithm called propositional calculus. He further enriched the calculus by adding the predicate calculus. His language was described by Russell as "the perfect language".

Based on these thoughts, he constructed the proposition and fact structure and developed the picture theory to examine how languages are related to the world.

A true proposition is a tautology, while a false proposition is a contradiction.

Wittgenstein believed that most philosophical propositions are false, not because they say something false, but because they say nothing at all. That is, they are not related to the world (examples include ethical and religious values).

Wittgenstein examined a world composed of facts, which are the states of affairs of objects.

Wittgenstein's thought has many similarities to Russell's Logical Atomism. He may have been influenced by the Vienna Circle, or perhaps the influence went the other way. His later philosophies were more fragmented rather than systematic works. However, he did have a notable concept called "family resemblance".

I have strangely little to say about my experience reading this book.

I remember picking it up as a quick primer to inform a short story I was writing about a perfectly logical language and the resulting calculability of the truth value of any sentence in that language without needing to know anything about the real world that the language sought to describe.

I don't think much about this book informed that story, and after that it just sort of meandered its way through my mind without touching any of the edges and making its presence felt.

However, it did make me pick up Tractatus with serious intent to read. Watch this space.

Notes: Sentence is a grammatically constructed set of words. Proposition is the idea communicated by a meaningful non-idle sentence. One sentence can have many propositions (e.g., "I have a headache" said by 2 different people). One proposition can be expressed by many sentences (e.g., "it is raining" and "es regnet").

The example of "Present king of France is wise" shows that the apparent logical form of a proposition may not be its real one. Russell tackled this problem by saying there are 3 propositions: 1) there exists a king of France, 2) there is only one (the), and 3) he is wise. Since 1 is false, the proposition is false.

The predicate calculus (the perfect language) of the above proposition can be written as (Ex)(Kx & (y)(Ky -> y=x) & Wy).

The equivalence between constituents of language and the world is at different levels: 1) propositions vs facts, 2) elementary propositions vs state of affairs, and 3) names vs objects. The world is the totality of facts. Language is the totality of propositions. The totality of true propositions is natural science.

Pictorial form is the shared structure between a picture/model and the reality it seeks to model. Anything containing a logical form is a picture. Musical notations are pictures of music. Propositions are pictures of reality.

Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences. Its result is not a philosophical doctrine but an activity that elucidates thoughts. Its result is the clarification of ideas, after which the ladder is discarded and transcended.

Propositions cannot represent logical form; it can only be mirrored in them. So logic gives the structure needed for propositions to connect with reality, but cannot be translated into language. This leads to the question of using language to talk about the rules of language.

Similarly, language is outside religion/ethics, so it cannot represent them, but they manifest in language. The realms of fact and value are different, so science cannot debunk matters of value.

The question of why the world of the moral-agent comes out better is explored. Either morality leads to happiness or happiness is the fundamental moral good. The former is more likely as ethical reward/punishment lies in the action itself, regardless of the consequence/outcome (karma?).

Matters of value concern the world as a whole and not matters of fact within it. I don't experience my own death, so life has no end. Whereof we cannot speak, thereof we must be silent.

Then he refutes everything in Tractatus. Language can't be explained by its denotive theory of naming objects. Instead, language takes the form of many language-games, not just defining/describing propositions.

The example of Saint Augustine/Tractatus shows that pointing to a table and saying the word "table" does not necessarily mean language is developed by naming objects. There are many other possible interpretations.

There cannot be private rule-following as it is a social exercise. Hence, a private language cannot be constructed. If there are no public criteria, there is no difference between rule-following and mere thinking. This leads to the question of whether Robinson Crusoe can construct his own tongue or if Chomsky's semantic structures are relevant.

The concept of "pain" as the learned expression of the natural expression of groaning/wincing is discussed.

Descartes' view that I know my sensory perceptions but not others is compared to Wittgenstein's view that there is no difference between self-ascription and other-ascription. Our labelling of "pain" is a language game, an expression of an internal state playing by the rules agreed by all.

Our ascription of others' internal state, like their pain, is another language game, an expression of our behavior towards them. The ascription says more about our internal state than it does about theirs. But why? If we're all playing by common rules, can't we judge their behavior by the objective set of rules?

Descartes' view that personal experience is the only real meaning, understanding, and knowledge is also refuted. Wittgenstein says we cannot "know" something that cannot be doubted. The language game of knowing what "hand" is and "having hands" has already been believed, so we cannot doubt it.

The statement "Only I know I am in pain. Others can only surmise" is both wrong and nonsense. Others can know, and sometimes we don't. We cannot "know we are in pain"; the most that can happen with certainty is "I am in pain".

Cultural relativity and cognitive relativity are discussed. Cognitive relativity is even more extreme as we cannot perceive of a different form of life if we do not share the context. So even terms like "truth" and "reality" are contextual within our form of life.

There needs to be a shared background against which differences in culture/cognition can be perceived. So the very thing that allows cultural relativity to exist is not itself relative.

I'm not entirely certain about this particular book.

It endeavors to provide an explanation of Wittgenstein.

However, I remain in doubt as to whether it actually accomplished this task.

Moreover, I'm also unsure if it did so in a proficient manner.

The author's attempt to elucidate Wittgenstein's complex ideas might have fallen short in some respects.

Perhaps the explanations were not as clear or comprehensive as they could have been.

Or maybe the book failed to capture the true essence of Wittgenstein's philosophy.

On the other hand, it could be that my own lack of understanding is contributing to my uncertainty.

Nonetheless, until I can further explore and analyze the book, I will continue to have reservations about its adequacy in presenting Wittgenstein's work.