I was deeply engaged in thinking about how remarkably clear and astonishingly simple Wittgenstein actually was. This realization truly excited me, and I felt ready to embark on a direct assault on the Tractatus.

However, Grayling concludes by essentially informing us that Wittgenstein was more poetic than anything else, with very little substantial content and not really much of a philosopher.

Perhaps on one extreme, Grayling could be right, and I should simply pass over Wittgenstein and move on. Or, on the other hand, since Grayling spent the entire book criticizing Wittgenstein, it might imply that the philosophy has been highly oversimplified, and I should largely disregard what Grayling has to say.

In order to have any hope of knowing what to think, I'll have to read more. I need to explore Wittgenstein's works further, as well as other perspectives and interpretations, to form a more informed and comprehensive understanding. Only then can I begin to truly assess the value and significance of Wittgenstein's philosophy.

Good introduction and it effectively helps to clear out misunderstandings. However, I firmly believe that the author is in error regarding the impact Wittgenstein's Tractatus had on logical positivism as a whole. He significantly downplays its influence on the movement, to the extent of reducing the work to a mere historical curiosity. His reasoning is that the ideas of the Vienna Circle differed drastically from Wittgenstein's own views, especially in the areas of ethics and religion. But is this truly what "influence" means to Grayling? By that standard, we might be inclined to say that Hegel's influence on philosophy was at best minimal since mainstream contemporary philosophy is largely a reaction against his writings. However, such an analysis leads us astray from the truth of the matter, which is Wittgenstein's undeniable and profound influence on modern empiricism. Even if we were to comply with Grayling's understanding of "influential impact", dismissing Wittgenstein's Tractatus would be a gross misrepresentation of history.

Nevertheless, Grayling has a comprehensive understanding of Wittgenstein, and his analysis of the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations is indeed excellent. However, one must approach his historical claims with a healthy dose of skepticism.

Without referring to Wittgenstein's actual writings, which are famously dense and hard to expand and interpret, this introduction appears to have captured the essence of his works.

In particular, it highlights the significant shift between his early work and later work, from the Tractatus to the Investigations.

This is a clear and well-written summary that justifies itself effectively and is quite accessible, even for those like me who know little about the philosophy of language or psychology.

Overall, it is worth reading if you want to gain an initial understanding of Wittgenstein.

It provides a good starting point for delving deeper into his complex and influential ideas.

Whether you are a beginner or have some prior knowledge, this summary can offer valuable insights and help you get a foothold in the world of Wittgenstein's philosophy.

So, give it a read and see what you can discover about this important philosopher.

This series of Very Short Introductions doesn't always function as advertised.

Grayling constantly points out the reasons why Wittgenstein is incorrect, and sometimes this comes at the expense of clearly explaining what his theories truly entail.

Moreover, I don't believe this is actually targeted at someone who requires an introduction to Wittgenstein. Instead, it seems to be a set of reflections on him by someone with a profound background knowledge.

I think it would be far better to directly access the source and read Wittgenstein's Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations on your own. (This, in a way, defeats the purpose of this book.)

Perhaps the introductions of those texts by Penguin or Oxford or whichever publisher republished them might provide a critical exegesis of the said thought that I was hoping to obtain from this text.

It's important to note that while these introductions may have their merits, they might not always fulfill the expectations set by the title of the series.

Readers should approach them with a critical eye and be prepared to do further research on their own to gain a more comprehensive understanding of Wittgenstein's complex ideas.

Moreover, language is not something that is complete and autonomous and can be investigated independently of other considerations.

It is intertwined with all human activities and behavior. Our various uses of language derive their content and significance from our practical affairs, our work, our interactions with one another, and with the world we live in. In short, a language is an integral part of the fabric of an all-encompassing 'form of life.'

Ludwig Wittgenstein, one of the most influential thinkers of the 20th century, has had a profound impact on modern thought regarding linguistics and epistemology, often in an indirect way. Grayling's very short introduction initially offers a good overview of Wittgenstein himself, who has an interesting background and personality. His earlier and later philosophies are then explored in detail, represented by his Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations, along with a variety of smaller writings. Perhaps one of the most crucial insights from Wittgenstein's later thought is the undermining of the conventional Cartesian philosophy of mind. Language, as an inherent public phenomenon, embodies structures of thought and cultural constructs, ultimately challenging Descartes' view of language as being fundamental to selfhood.

3,5 stars

This is an extremely good and remarkably clearly written introduction to Wittgenstein. Grayling's prose is precise, enabling him to convey complex ideas in an easily accessible manner.

What is rather peculiar is Grayling's distinct lack of sympathy for Wittgenstein and his unwavering effort to persuade us that Wittgenstein isn't really all that important. One wonders, if that were the case, then why bother writing this book in the first place? It's difficult to determine whether he truly doesn't like Wittgenstein or is simply disappointed in him, perhaps because he feels Wittgenstein should have been capable of achieving more.

Where Grayling really irked me was in his final critical assessment of Wittgenstein. He overstates and strawmans some of Wittgenstein's claims and then dismisses them as nonsensical without fully considering the merits of those views, especially with regard to cognitive relativism. Generally, he uses the final chapter as a platform for his own views, which seem to be informed by a positivist ontology. As a result, Grayling comes across as intolerant and somewhat unable to understand other people's world views.

That being said, when it comes to Wittgenstein's philosophical ideas, this is still a very good and very clear introduction. It provides valuable insights and explanations that can help readers better understand the complex and often challenging work of Wittgenstein.

Indeed, this is a very good and concise introduction to Wittgenstein. It provides a clear and accessible overview of his key ideas and contributions. I would highly recommend it to anyone interested in philosophy or Wittgenstein's work. The author has done an excellent job of presenting complex concepts in a simple and understandable way. I will definitely come back to it later on to refresh my studies and gain a deeper understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophy. It is a valuable resource that I will keep referring to in the future.

One of Grayling's best-written books is truly a remarkable piece of work. It presents a wealth of ideas and perspectives in a captivating manner. However, what is quite interesting is that his opinion of Wittgenstein is actually quite dim. This stands out as a notable aspect within the context of the book. Grayling seems to hold a rather critical view of Wittgenstein's work and contributions. It makes one wonder about the reasons behind this assessment. Perhaps it is due to differences in philosophical approaches or interpretations. Nevertheless, this contrast between Grayling's excellent writing and his less favorable opinion of Wittgenstein adds an element of complexity and intrigue to the overall reading experience. It invites the reader to further explore and analyze both Grayling's views and Wittgenstein's philosophy, thereby deepening one's understanding of the subject matter.

If you're planning to pen a book about Wittgenstein that purports to be an "introduction", then it's essential that you have a solid understanding of what Wittgenstein actually said.

The opening chapter offers a rather dull biography, marred by several biographical inaccuracies.

For instance, the claim that Wittgenstein read "some of Schopenhauer" is a vast understatement. Additionally, the assertion that "He was by no means a scholar; he did not study the classic philosophers carefully" is inaccurate. In fact, Wittgenstein studied Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Goethe, Kant, and others with great care.

Moving on to chapter 2, which focuses on his "early philosophy", Grayling makes some rather controversial statements.

He contends that Wittgenstein's view that the proper task of philosophy is to clarify the nature of our thought and talk, rather than engage with traditional philosophical issues, is a departure from the consensus throughout history. However, this view is not without its flaws.

First, the idea that "engagement" and the belief in "illusory problems" are mutually exclusive is incorrect. Second, just because these problems may be "illusory" does not mean they are not "deeply important".

Grayling also seems to believe that if you don't share his metaphilosophical perspective, then you must not think these issues are important. This is a rather narrow-minded view.

Furthermore, he exaggerates the supposed change in Wittgenstein's thinking from his "early philosophy" to his "latter philosophy". He also ignores the influence of Wittgenstein's early work on Frank Ramsey and misrepresents the relationship between Wittgenstein and the logical positivists.

There are other factual errors as well, such as his claim that for the logical positivists, "metaphysics" was synonymous with "nonsense". In reality, Wittgenstein had a significant influence on Carnap and Schlick.

Grayling's inane remarks and sophomoric criticisms of Wittgenstein's philosophy only serve to further undermine the credibility of his book.

If you truly want to understand Wittgenstein, it's best to skip this book and turn to more reliable sources, such as Peter Hacker.

Why pick Grayling to write this book?


The statement "Anyone reading these large claims would naturally surmise that Wittgenstein is the most influential presence in twentieth-century philosophy. In fact he is not." essentially encapsulates the essence of the book. To be fair, certain parts of it were indeed quite enlightening. However, I truly question the decision of choosing an author who blatantly has a great disdain for Wittgenstein. The majority of people who pick up this book are seeking an introduction to Wittgenstein. But after reading this, a new reader might be discouraged from delving any further. Instead, it would be advisable to try both the books by Ray Monk. Those works offer much better introductions to the subject matter. They provide a more comprehensive and objective view, which is essential for someone new to the study of Wittgenstein.

The book offers a balanced yet overly concise summary of Wittgenstein's work.

The pace is somewhat rushed, and the main issue is that the author's own conclusions are almost self-defeatingly critical rather than constructive.

One almost wonders why one bothered to read the book or why the author bothered to write it if Wittgenstein's work had so little to offer.

The truth is that from this book, one can still gain many insights as long as one thinks beyond the author's conclusions.

Wittgenstein's Tractatus was radical and powerful, although the framework was too rigid to be very useful.

His later work, instead of modifying the earlier one, which must have seemed increasingly restrictive to him, became almost antagonistic and moved to the other extreme.

To this reviewer, the subjective framework of the inconclusive second half of his work was far less useful in advancing the Philosophical Investigations.

This summary book explains the early work well and lays the foundation for readers to consider what more could have been done with those foundations.

Early Wittgenstein had a brilliant and original idea: solutions to at least some philosophical problems depend on the language we have.

However, his own conclusion was different and restrictive: there is only one type of language structure, and this structure can only answer certain types of queries and no others.

Fools, like celebrated thinkers over the centuries, keep going in circles trying to find answers to life's profound mysteries without realizing that the language structure we have prevents any definitive answers to problems that fall outside the realm of natural sciences.

I think the great philosopher was just a few steps away from a new theory that could have yielded even greater results.

The construct he had for a “Language” was inadequate and dissatisfying, as he himself proved, but he was on the right track.

Simplistically put, Wittgenstein's main premise is that the reality we perceive is within the language we have.

Maybe there is something transcendental, like our innermost feelings or the actual universe beyond our perceptions, but not only what we perceive, communicate, share, but also what we modify, alter, or analyze is defined by the structures of the language we use.

Wittgenstein's error was in insisting that the real language is of only one type, based on constructs or “Pictures of Reality” with a truth value of either 0 or 1 when describing various terms and interrelations.

If he had considered different forms of languages, with the one he had as one of the most basic forms, he could have linked what sort of solutions could be attempted within the confines of different forms.

It's easy to understand this when we think about what different programming languages or mathematical systems can do.

There are answers available when we use the right language, and there are problems we can solve if we work on the language in which we pose them.

If we want to build AI, we need a different neural network language.

There are practical and theoretical uses if philosophy works with the language at the base of what can be answered rather than getting lost, like philosophers for many millennia, because they didn't understand the limitations of the tools they were using.

“All I write is False” is a typical example of the things philosophers debated endlessly because they didn't think about the role of the language structure.

Early Wittgenstein shed light on this, which is why he was a genius.

Language allows us to express some model of perceived or artificially formed reality.

To a degree, all our interactions and all but the most basic abilities and knowledge are made possible by our ability to develop and use different types of language.

With a proper study of these forms of language, we will develop tools consciously rather than relying on the accidental evolutions of things like branches of mathematics or programming languages to understand and alter the realities around us.

Some final thoughts on these higher forms: the most basic language, like math, is good in natural sciences, but it too needs to involve randomness rather than relying solely on a truth value of 0 or 1 to appreciate the science at the base of our world.

The fuzziness involved becomes more complex when trying to explain a rule-based system, where the precepts can have truth values assigned not just as 0 or 1 or something in between, but also based on the norms, practices, or regulations of the society the language form is addressing.

For example, natural sciences alone cannot drive railway traffic flawlessly on tracks.

To explain or build such a system, we need a language that assigns truth values arbitrarily set by the makers or the society.

Other forms of languages could include utility values or emotional values and the like.

The “higher” forms would naturally be less objective and more relativistic, but through a systematic study of the structures, one can gain great insights into what is answerable under what language forms.

The book makes one think, which is its utility!

There are very interesting insights into language within this text. It not only provides a detailed exploration of the nature of language but also offers an overview of Wittgenstein's philosophy. This combination is truly beneficial as it helps the reader gain a deeper appreciation of Wittgenstein's Mistress. By delving into the various aspects of language, such as its use, meaning, and limitations, we can better understand the complex ideas that Wittgenstein presented. The overview of his philosophy further enriches our understanding, allowing us to see how his thoughts on language fit into his broader philosophical framework. Overall, this text serves as a valuable resource for anyone interested in language, philosophy, or both.