Boring, absurd, and false - these are the characteristics that form the foundation of the most mindless philosophy to have ever subsisted. It is a philosophy that lacks depth, rationality, and any semblance of truth. It offers no real insights or solutions to the complex problems of life. Instead, it presents a series of banal and illogical ideas that are meant to deceive and mislead. Such a philosophy is not worthy of our attention or consideration. It is a waste of time and energy to engage with it. We should instead focus on seeking out true and meaningful philosophies that can help us to understand the world around us and to live our lives to the fullest.

I have read through this one three times.

The first time was in a hasty manner to get a general feel for it.

Then, I read it twice carefully, with Bertrand Russell's 1922 introductory text in between.

During this last reading, I took some notes and constructed a diagram.

It was this diagram that started to homogenize my scattered thoughts.

At first, I didn't even realize that I was applying Wittgenstein's point 2.1: "We make to ourselves pictures of facts" (9).

Looking at my elementary little diagram, I began to notice something familiar.

This dualistic metaphysics has its root in Kant's transcendental idealism from the Critique of Pure Reason.

For Kant, there are two worlds: the noumenal and the phenomenal.

In my diagram, Kant's noumenal world is analogous to the box labeled WORLD, and the phenomenal world has its analog in the box labeled CONCEPTUAL MODEL.

These names aren't exactly synonymous, but I don't feel like changing them.

The main point is that the noumenal world is reality as it is in itself, and we cannot access it.

We cannot access, for example, the substance of objects.

The phenomenal world, on the other hand, is the reality we experience through our senses.

For Wittgenstein, the main composite object we construct to interact with facts in the noumenal world are pictures.

We picture facts, as he says early on.

But this picture is the amalgamation of thoughts which make up propositions which make up a language.

Yet herein lies one of the main thrusts of the tractatus: how do we assert a logically complete and infallible language with which to deal with phenomena?

This was a major sticking point for me during my first two readings, as it seemed to me (especially at the very end of the text) that the whole argument ended with the destruction of metaphysics.

This I based chiefly on point 6.54: "...he who understands me finally recognizes [my propositions] as senseless...." (82; and, indeed, many critics feel cheated at this point--the end--of the text).

Perhaps, though, this interpretation was due to my heightened skepticism for the usefulness of philosophy these days.

I took a note at some point that says "the purpose of philosophy is to clarify thoughts and nothing more."

And, indeed, one of Wittgenstein's goals is to use Occam's razor to excise any bit of symbolism/grammar/syntax/etc. deemed unnecessary.

Which then causes my question to resurface: what would be left?

Towards the end of the work, it seemed to me that Wittgenstein proposed the area of the mystical being the destination for of Occam's shavings.

But for the sake of argument, let's say we endeavor to list the totality of things that are the case.

We would encounter Russell's paradox, which proves a self-referential error that occurs when trying to assert a set of all possible sets, because said set would have to include itself.

This same type of issue arises when Wittgenstein proposes a language that includes everything that is the case--the facts; the pictures; the symbols.

And even disregarding the paradox of Wittgenstein's friend, could we achieve this infinite language of symbols?

One thinks of Borges's story of the Aleph, a symbol and object in the story used to represent a point of infinite knowledge.

Of its description, the narrator says:

"And here begins my despair as a writer. All language is a set of symbols whose use among its speakers assumes a shared past. How, then, can I translate into words the limitless Aleph, which my floundering mind can scarcely encompass? Mystics, faced with the same problem, fall back on symbols...."

Couple this with Wittgenstein's point 6.45: "The contemplation of the world sub specie aeterni is its contemplation as a limited whole. The feeling that the world is a limited whole is the mystical feeling."

Indeed a "limited whole" is a paradox, an oxymoron.

Yet, in another light, it isn't, for the adjective "limited" really describes our finite cognitive ability, while the "whole" refers to the totality we wish to propose as the complete system.

In conclusion, I propose that the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is the endgame for an attempt at a full system of metaphysics.

As Kant put forth his Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics as an indispensable beginning for any system of metaphysics, Wittgenstein's 82-page tractatus stakes its claim as perhaps the new launching pad.

When we consider the very real limitations of our thinking and our ability to establish a system that encompasses such a transcendental whole, the very last point is properly fitting: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent" (82).

Checkmate.

I read this particular thing at the old Volume II bookstore on Sheridan Road, which is located across from Loyola University Chicago. I was recommended to read it by Father Bill Ellos, S.J., who was a philosophy professor there and I was serving as his teaching assistant.

It was a relatively quick read. Just like all of Wittgenstein's works, it was quite readily accessible.

The Tractatus is somewhat like a philosophical science fiction story. It poses the question: What if Bertrand Russell's logical atomism were actually the case? Wittgenstein then proceeds to draw out the implications. Of course, given the current models of physics, it isn't the case. However, it still makes for a very enjoyable intellectual journey.

Russell was extremely impressed by this tribute. After all, philosophers do like to be taken seriously. As a result, he set the ball in motion, which ultimately gave Wittgenstein, who had hardly any formal training in the field, his career as a philosophy teacher.

Get your P's and Q's ready, folks, because we're in for the ride of our lives.

Or not.

Wittgenstein was living proof that androids were around and functioning during WWI. That at least this single android had a sense of humor dry enough to turn the Mariana Trench into the Mojave Desert, too.

Or was this a joke at all? Let's see.

Most of the numbered propositions were imminently clear and devoted to a single purpose: describing reality.

Language is the big limiter, which should never be a big surprise, but he insists that all reality that is, can be explained clearly.

Unfortunately, Wittgenstein, the big brilliant man that he is, was fundamentally incapable of describing or CLEARLY STATING his philosophy. Or using any object in his philosophy for the purposes of further elucidation.

The resulting numbered tracts and use of Formal Logic were used to numb the biological minds reading it... but there is good news! It did help out with the translation problems for future AIs reviewing this work!

Difficult to read? You have no idea. Really. Or perhaps you do if you use chalkboards. But THIS work of philosophy is the target for that old joke:

"What's the difference between a mathematician and a philosopher?

Mathematicians know how to use an eraser."

The logical problem of describing only physics in any positive way while never coming down hard on absolute statements -- like the way we only hypothesize that the sun will come up tomorrow -- eventually curled around itself in very strange ways, like the problem of including your own description in with the description itself.

It keeps adding to the problem of description, mathematically, until the recursion explodes your head or makes you divide by zero. (Same difference, really.)

It presages, at least in part, Goedel's Incompleteness Theorem. Also, P=NP. As in, is it possible to include the index to your library in with the library itself, or do you need to make a brand new card catalog system every time to include the original index? The time it takes to prove a thing is disproportionately large (or impossible) compared to the FACT OF THE SOLUTION.

This goes beyond logical fallacy. It's a real thing we still deal with. And yet, Wittgenstein throws out the baby with the bathwater at the very end. He makes a beautiful house of cards and claps his hands, making us wake up after the long novel with a classic, "and it was only a dream."

Am I kinda pissed? First by having been bored to tears and misunderstanding a handful of DENSE and OBLIQUE propositions that refer to undefined and objectless other works, unlike the careful analysis he made at the start? Yeah. I am.

And like his reference to covering your right hand with your left while also covering your left with your right, this text attempts to disprove everything -- firmly.

It makes me believe, once again, that formal logic, while glorious in one way, is an absolute horseradish in another.

I recommend this for anyone in love with highly complicated logical mazes and other computer science majors. YOU MUST HAVE A SENSE OF HUMOR OR YOU WILL DIE. Or kill someone. One, or the other.

Wouldn't even know where to begin in truly rating or reviewing this one. Everything I type up seems so pale in comparison to the text itself. So I'll just drop some of the best lines below and relate my experience.

Preface: I believe myself to have found, on all essential points, the final solution of the problems...and the value of this work consists is that it shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved.

3.031/3.032: It used to be said that God could create anything except what would be contrary to the laws of logic. The truth is that we could not say what an ‘illogical’ world would look like. It is as impossible to represent in language anything that ‘contradicts logic’ as it is... to give the coordinates of a point that does not exist.

4.116: Everything that can be thought at all can be thought clearly. Everything that can be put into words can be put clearly.

4.121: What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by means of language. Propositions show the logical form of reality. They display it..... What can be shown cannot be said.

5.471: The general propositional form is the essence of a proposition. To give the essence of a proposition means to give the essence of all description, and thus the essence of the world.

6.521-6.522: The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem... There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical.

These lines are of course isolated from the overall argument and from the text. They can only be experienced in the flow of the text itself. And I have to say I have had few experiences of reading a work like this. The closest has probably been Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus, in which the work is so novel, such a conceptual rupture from how you normally think about the world/other works you've read, that you have to allow yourself to simply experience the book before you worry about comprehension and analysis.

However, what I think they begin to intimate is that Wittgenstein truly believes the simple and logical limits of our language can clearly be shown (and make no mistake the logic and notation in 3-6 and discussion of Russel/Frege gets quite intense) and that once this has been done we can begin to *live rightly.* In doing so we are aware of/open to the mystical reality of the world (as W puts it - not how things are but *that* they are) (which is not to be confused with something remotely substantial - something that could be confused with mythology or theology - but probably something not too dissimilar from Otto's understanding of the numinous. Or even better and probably closer to W, as Denys Turner has shown - the apophatic negativity of medieval thought. Herbert McCabe has also written on this via Wittgenstein). Will be thinking about this for some time to come - and much more secondary reading required! Excited to move into the Investigations next. And last but not least beyond thankful for my good friend Griff for trekking through this with me!

This work by Wittgenstein is truly a profound and thought-provoking piece. The selected lines offer just a glimpse into the depth of his ideas. The concept of the logical limits of language and how it relates to the essence of the world and our understanding of it is both fascinating and challenging. It makes one question the very nature of our communication and the boundaries within which we operate. The idea of the'mystical' aspect of the world that cannot be put into words but makes itself manifest is also quite intriguing. It leaves room for further exploration and interpretation. As I continue to think about these ideas, I look forward to delving deeper into Wittgenstein's work and perhaps gaining a more comprehensive understanding of his philosophy.

When asked in an interview by Clare Parnet about Wittgenstein, Gilles Deleuze declared that Wittgenstein was the "assassin of philosophy."

Nonetheless, between Badious' Being and Event II and Deleuze's work, it becomes evident that Wittgenstein was on par with them, in the sense that he was interested in the same topics.

While Badiou and Wittgenstein share many similarities, both approaching the presentation of sense as an order of logic, Deleuze's relationship with Wittgenstein seems rather strained.

After finishing Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, it is clear that Wittgenstein advocates stepping out of the circular logic of presentation within his propositional language to be silent about the very thing language is meant to speak of, and for this, he fails.

When we see that Elan Vital is central to Deleuze's work, as Badiou rightly states, and understand that this concept is so crucial to Deleuze, we realize that Wittgenstein only formally approaches Deleuze, and the two diverge due to aesthetic reasons related to Wittgenstein's desire for a crystalline purity of logic.

Nonetheless, the two are nearly indistinguishable. We could almost view Logic of Sense as a broader version of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.

But even further, when we recognize that Wittgenstein considered this book a failure and ultimately discarded the Spinozian-like formality of his Euclidean presentation, which led nowhere, we understand that if he had a longer life and broader exposure to issues, perhaps avoiding Russell's influence, he might have been able to grasp the larger subliminal essence of language that he eliminated through his rigid approach.

We all know that language cannot be reduced to logic. This is because language can present inherently contradictory hypotheses.

The ambiguity of language is necessary as it allows for the expression of different ideas and cultures.

The multi-valence in language is not a weakness but a partial resolution of an infinitely resolute difference, which is continuously refined.

In other words, our language changes as our knowledge evolves, reflecting the depths of our understanding and the unfolding of time.

Given Wittgenstein's focus on the determinacy of propositions, we can become more mature by understanding that language contains the seeds of indeterminacy, allowing truth to be presented.

Wittgenstein chased the absolute point of reflection within language but failed to realize that a perfectly logical structure is only possible because of the roughness of language.

We can only experience accepted truth because of the experience of undecided and improper truths.

As Badiou points out using higher math, even with an infinite cardinal, there are uncountable relations that lead to further truths beyond our comprehension.

It is a shame that Wittgenstein stopped here, as his work is mature but only a taste of what could come if we use his methods and discard his naive Euclidean dogmatism of absolute eternal truth.

**"Analysis of a Book on Logical Positivism and Atomism"**

Probably the well-known and best example of logical positivism and atomism is this particular book.

The structure of the book is quite unique. It is written in a declarative style, lacking demonstrations or arguments and references. It only occasionally mentions Russell or Frege. Despite its small size, the scope is huge, covering the entire world, the relation of language with the world, knowledge, the necessity and supremacy of logic, the limits of science, the purpose of philosophy, and more.

Wittgenstein begins the book with a statement about its object being attained if one person reads it with understanding and finds pleasure in it. It ends by denouncing all philosophizing and this very book along with its statements/propositions. He claims that those who understand him will eventually recognize them as senseless after climbing out of, on, and over them, like throwing away a ladder after climbing up.

With the picture theory of language, Wittgenstein attempts to explain the world and our knowledge. He argues that there are similar structures in language and the world that enable one-to-one correspondence, although these structures cannot be presented but only shown. Logic and language must stay within the limits of the expressible world, while most of philosophy, morals, God, aesthetics, the subject, and so on are outside these limits. What is inside this world must be univocal and perfectly clear - logically clear - while on the rest, "one must be silent".

This book firmly adheres to the object/subject ontology, postulates the picture theory of representation as the fundamental form of knowing the world, and takes logical positivism and atomism to extremes. It makes a case for itself by postulating, limiting, excluding, and imposing its logical and atomistic view on the world, language, and knowledge with extreme violence.

Later, Wittgenstein and Heidegger showed that one can actually say a great deal about the structures of the world, language, and our knowledge by stepping outside such a limiting and extreme worldview. Philosophy and thinking are not just about clarifying concepts. Logic is a consequence of the object/subject ontology and the representation theory of knowledge and reigns supreme within this world but not as much outside or in other worlds. The fact that Wittgenstein himself turned against this book later in life further weakens its case.

I can't help but think of the first AI pioneers who failed spectacularly when trying to build their systems/algorithms based solely on such a worldview. In my opinion, Kant's theory of knowledge, even though it is 140 years old, is superior to the one presented in this book. The best aspect of this book, to me, is its acknowledgment and pointing out of the limits of logical positivism and atomism - the last few pages being the most important and delightful.

Screaming, crying. These are the intense emotions that can sometimes overtake us.

When we are faced with overwhelming situations, it is natural to express our distress in such ways. Screaming can be a release of pent-up frustration or anger, while crying can be a cathartic outlet for sadness or pain.

However, it is important to note that these expressions of emotion should not be suppressed. Allowing ourselves to scream and cry can actually be beneficial for our mental and emotional well-being.

It gives us the opportunity to process our feelings and find a sense of relief. So, the next time you feel the urge to scream or cry, don't hold back. Let it out and give yourself the space to heal.

“Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.” This profound statement holds great wisdom. It implies that when we encounter matters or concepts that are beyond our comprehension or the limits of our language to express accurately, it is wiser to remain silent. There are many things in this world that are simply too complex, mysterious, or ineffable for us to put into words. Trying to force an explanation or description of such things may lead to misunderstandings, misinterpretations, or even more confusion. By choosing silence, we show respect for the unknown and the unknowable. We also give ourselves the opportunity to listen, observe, and perhaps gain a deeper understanding in due course. Silence can be a powerful tool for reflection and self-awareness. It allows us to step back from the noise and chaos of the world and tune in to our inner selves. In a world where we are constantly bombarded with information and opinions, the ability to be silent and listen is a precious gift.

Hmmm...how to rate a book you didn't understand at all--that is the question. Maybe like this: (?)

1. Here the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is everything that is the case.

1.1 It is the case because it is the subject of this review.

1.11 This review is determined by facts. In this case, all the facts that I came up with while reading the case.

1.12. The subject cannot include facts that are not the case because the totality of existent facts determines what is the case, and whatever is not the case.

1.121. What is not the case cannot be named because it did not occur and cannot be a state of affairs.

1.2 What is the case--a fact--is the existence of states of affairs.

2. An interpretation of facts is a thought.

2.1 Only logical thoughts can exist.

2.11 What is logical can be thought.

2.112 What can be thought is logical.

2.2 What can be thought is the totality of states of affairs.

2.3 While reading the case many of the states of affairs were caused by interpretations--thoughts--that were not logical.

2.4 Because the thoughts were not logical, the case cannot be said to exist.

3. Therefore, this truth-function proves that Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus does not exist.

4. P'x = ~p'X (d)//N,:Q!

5. \\"Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must pass over in silence.\\"

This convoluted attempt at a review seems to be grappling with the complex nature of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The statements presented, such as those about facts, interpretations, and logical thoughts, are rather abstract and difficult to fully comprehend. It's as if the author is trying to make sense of the book through a series of convoluted logical deductions. However, the conclusion that the book does not exist based on this truth-function is rather bold and perhaps not entirely convincing. Overall, this review leaves the reader with more questions than answers about both the book and the author's understanding of it.

Wittgenstein extends an invitation to us, urging us to embark on an exploration of the enigmatic essence of the universe. He does so through the medium of a book that elicits emotions similar to those evoked by literary masterpieces like Roadside Picnic or Solaris.

Just as these novels have the power to reawaken within us a sense of wonder that has long been dormant beneath the mundane routines of our daily lives, so does the book in question.

The very essence of this book lies in the profound notion that the boundaries of our language act as the constraints of our world. It serves as a reminder that what can be expressed through language represents only a tiny fraction of the vast expanse of what truly exists. There are profound depths that must remain unspoken, for they lie beyond the reach of words, leaving the reader in a state of awe and wonder at the unfathomable nature of the cosmos.

Wittgenstein, in his unwavering pursuit to delineate the boundaries of scientific and linguistic knowledge, reveals the awe-inspiring immensity of the universe. From his perspective, religion delves into the realm of the unsayable, where religious propositions venture beyond the bounds of meaningful expression.

His argument posits that religious language endeavors to capture the transcendent, mystical, and divine aspects of reality—domains that far exceed the limitations of linguistic representation. As a result, religious discourse emerges as inherently ineffable, defying logical analysis.

In this regard, Wittgenstein's stance aligns seamlessly with apophatic theology, also known as negative theology. This theological approach emphasizes the limitations of human language and concepts when it comes to describing the divine or ultimate truth. It contends that the understanding of God or ultimate reality can only be approximated through negation, by stating what they are not, rather than attempting to define them in a positive manner.

Ludwig Wittgenstein is a highly influential philosopher, and his works have had a profound impact on the development of philosophy. One of his pivotal philosophical works requires us to approach it with an open mind.

We must carefully review and ponder on every word and concept presented in this work. It is not an easy task, as Wittgenstein's ideas are often complex and require deep thought and analysis.

By engaging with this work in a serious and thoughtful manner, we can gain a better understanding of Wittgenstein's philosophical perspective and its implications. This, in turn, can help us to develop our own philosophical thinking and expand our intellectual horizons.

In conclusion, Wittgenstein's pivotal philosophical work is a must-read for anyone interested in philosophy. We should approach it with an open mind, carefully review and ponder on it, and strive to gain as much as possible from this valuable intellectual resource.