Lots of information to unpack in this one. I didn't enjoy it as much as Isaacson's biography of Steve Jobs. There could be several reasons for this. Maybe I found the subject matter less interesting. Or perhaps, since the events were before my memory, I didn't relate to it as much. It could also be that his writing style improved and developed in the twenty years between the books. More likely, it's a combination of all three.
I knew very little about Kissinger before reading this. Other than the name and that he was influential in politics at some point, I was in the dark. I didn't know he was a Holocaust refugee, which administrations he'd been involved with, or even what his actual position was.
Isaacson appears to make an effort to balance out the opinions of the man Kissinger was. He takes interviews and documentation from both friends and enemies/rivals. Sifting through this information must have been a laborious process. He admits that finding the truth in the reams of documents created by and about the man is very difficult, considering Kissinger's adeptness at creating misleading information. Whether his assessment of the man is accurate, only time will tell. But he seems to have made an attempt to give as honest a perspective as possible. I'm sure historians for decades to come will debate whether he had a positive or negative effect on American and world politics. Most likely, they will decide he was a combination of both, much like Isaacson's assessment.
An exceedingly thorough biography of a very interesting man is presented here. Kissinger's towering intellect, when combined with his charm and wit, made him an incredibly effective diplomat. He was able to navigate the complex world of international relations with a certain finesse. However, on the other hand, his personal insecurity and scheming made him a toxic person to work with. His amoral approach to international relations led to some extremely unfortunate outcomes.
It seems clear that his brilliance, as well as his penchant for realpolitik, was more suited to a world in which leaders are not answerable to their people. His canny maneuvering worked better for navigating the psychology of individual personalities, as opposed to the moods of whole populations. This perhaps explains some of the controversial decisions he made.
Kissinger has led a fascinating life. Although this biography cuts off in the early 90s, I suspect not much could be added, beyond further (probably embarrassing) texture from the declassified Nixon White House tapes. The book is quite long, but the stories of his years of diplomacy require a fair amount of context and elaboration to have much value. So, its length may be necessary to fully understand the complex man and his impact on the world stage.
Balanced coverage of the great monster is presented, encompassing his remarkable ascent from a penniless immigrant German Jew to a position of permanent influence in the highest echelons globally. His academic pretentiousness, with the longest-ever thesis at Harvard, and his unceasing efforts at persuasion and sycophancy are also detailed. (It should be noted that Kissinger is perhaps the greatest war criminal in American history.) The facts speak for themselves:
Whenever peace — conceived as the avoidance of war — has been the primary objective of a power or a group of powers, the international system has been at the mercy of the most ruthless member of the international community. [A more proper goal is] stability based on an equilibrium of forces.
If I had to choose between justice and disorder, on the one hand, and injustice and order, on the other, I would always choose the latter.
Isaacson offers relatively little editorial. He respects Kissinger's single-mindedness and intellectual prowess, while also revealing his egotism and blandly malevolent wonkishness:
Here was an example of what would become a pattern in Kissinger’s diplomacy: his attempt to mediate a dispute by finding a semantic formulation to finesse differences. In this case it was devising a phrase that linked the bombing halt to the negotiations, without sounding like a condition. Later, at the end of the war, he would search for ambiguous phrases about the demilitarized zone and South Vietnamese sovereignty that could be read differently in Hanoi and Saigon. Sometimes these word games paid off. But usually they opened Kissinger up to accusations that he had left important disagreements unresolved by talking out of both sides of his mouth.
[during the 1970 election, R v N ] At the convention, the Rockefeller forces, with little to lose, sent Kissinger to talk to the Iowa delegation. “It was so novel to me,” he told a reporter at the time. “I’d never met working politicians before. I didn’t attempt to talk their language. I just talked what I knew.” The Iowa delegation voted overwhelmingly for Nixon.
Isaacson downplays the mass chaos and death that Kissinger caused. Moreover, since Isaacson published this, much more has emerged regarding Kissinger's personal responsibility for it. Dr Strangelove wasn't based on Kissinger, but it's impossible not to think of Peter Sellars (or Woody Allen) when reading about the tragic success of this erotomaniacal egomaniac. Hitchens' Trial of Henry Kissinger is far more relevant.