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Book: A War Like No Other: How the Athenians & Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War
Author: Victor Davis Hanson
Publisher: Random House Trade Paperbacks; Annotated edition (12 September 2006)
Language: English
Paperback: 416 pages
Item Weight: 471 g
Dimensions: 15.52 x 2.21 x 23.34 cm
Country of Origin: USA
Price: 1385/-
“Was Athens—or Greece itself—destroyed by the war? An entire industry of classical scholarship once argued for postwar Hellenic “decline,” and the subsequent tide of fourth-century poverty, social unrest, and class struggle as arising after the Peloponnesian War. Victorians, in turn, felt the loss was more a “what might have been,” a conflict that had ended not just the idea of Athens but “the glory that was Greece” itself and the Hellenic civilizing influence in the wider Mediterranean…”
From 431 to 404 a war raged across the Greek world from Sicily to the eastern Aegean, today ’ s modern Turkey, now known as the Peloponnesian War.
Such violence was not an extraordinary feature of Greek life, as Homer’s great poems tell and as the philosopher Heraclitus soon after proclaimed (c. 500) – ‘war is the father of all things ’.
The war between Athens, ‘leader of the Delian League of allied city-states and colonies’ against Sparta, ‘leader of the
Peloponnesian League’ pitted a prevailing Navy against one of the most overriding infantry forces in history.
Preceding this clash, Athens had defeated a Persian invasion force, at the Battle of Marathon. A decade later a much larger Persian invasion force suffered key setbacks and defeats at Thermopylae, where 300 Spartans distinctively fought to the last man.
Then at Salamis, the Persians were dealt a major naval defeat against the Athenian Navy and in conclusion at Plataea the Persian army was defeated on land, before downsizing and ultimately abandoning the campaign.
For the next half-century, both states followed an anti Persian policy and supported any anti Persian activities in the eastern Mediterranean, allowing for an sporadic peace to exist between Athens and Sparta. In order to fight the Persians at sea, the Athenians formed the Delian League by exercising progressive control over the members of the league.
Athens renovated this coalition into an empire, exacting tribute from its members. From the money extracted from her client states, Athens built herself into a city, which was the envy of the Hellenistic world.
And a fleet of 300 triple banked galleys each of these triremes was manned by a crew of a hundred and seventy professional oarsmen.
The city-state of Corinth had been the overriding maritime power prior to the Persian Wars. And as Athens’ power grew, her Navy outnumbered the Corinth fleet three-to-one and began to inflame rebellion in their colonies and intrude on its trade routes in a sequence of small conflicts lasting 15 years, known as the first Peloponnesian War.
Sparta opposed Athens and defeated the Athenian army in one non decisive engagement, while Athens continued to expand her naval power. One significant development during this period was the rebuilding of Athens’ walls on a grand scale, with an elongated causeway connecting Athens with the port city of Piraeus, allowing Athens to be completely supplied by sea, if an invading army would destroy the surrounding countryside and farmland.
This antagonistic period ended with the so-called ‘30 year’s peace’ between the two city-states, which would last for less than half of its intended duration. Despite this peace, antagonism between Athens and Corinth continued and in 431 BC Corinth productively convinced Sparta and the Peloponnesian League to declare war on Athens, with the goal of ending the swelling Athenian Empire.
The first phase of the second Peloponnesian War, commonly referred to as plainly the Peloponnesian War is known as Archidamian War. Here, Sparta pursued a policy of pillaging the countryside around Athens.
In an attempt to provoke a pitched battle, the Athenians had anticipated the Spartan strategy and had organized a continuous flow of grain shipments from Egypt and colonies on the Aegean and Black Sea coasts. The Athenian strategy was to barricade the Peloponnesian Peninsula from any trade and supplies, while opportunistically raiding Sparta's allies.
Initially the Athenians seemed to be maintaining the upper hand in this asymmetric war of attrition that had been carefully planned for years by the Athenian statesman Pericles.
The population from the surrounding countryside poured in behind the safety of the Athenian walls in the early stages of the war. This had been taken into account in advance and wealthy Athens had more than enough food flowing into the crowded city to feed everyone.
What had not been taken into account were the tainted grain shipments carrying plague, which speedily spread through the overloaded city.
Initially the city was pliant, inspired by the magnetic rhetoric of Pericles. An estimated one in four Athenians succumbed to the plague, including Pericles and his sons, before it had run its course.
At the height, mercenaries refused to fight for Athens and even the Spartans ceased to campaign near Athens for fear of catching the plague.
Ironically the extraordinarily planned Athenian blockade of the Peloponnese had protected Sparta and its allies from receiving any of the plague-tainted grain. The Athenian survivors adopted a much more violent strategy, greatly increasing the raids and building fortified outposts along the Peloponnese and coasts.
The ‘helots’ (Spartan slaves) that outnumbered them ten to one, were encouraged to run away to these outposts which put pressure on sparta to defend the homefront.
This phase of the war ended with the 50-year Peace of Nicias, which never really went into full effect, with both belligerents raiding each other through proxies from the onset.
Eventually directly in 415 BC, the Athenians devised a plan they believed would bestow upon themselves, an overwhelming advantage -- the conquest of the resplendently wealthy city-state of Syracuse, on the island of Sicily which, along with Athens and Carthage, controlled the lion’s share of Mediterranean trade, led by the young charismatic Athenian statesman Alcibiades.
The expedition ended in disaster, with Athens losing over 10,000 hoplites and two-thirds of her Navy. Ships could be rebuilt, but the 30,000 of her professional oarsmen could not be replaced.
This was followed by further disasters. Sparta freed 20,000 Athenian slaves from the city's silver mines. Athens then raised the tribute from her vassals, which caused widespread revolt in Ionia, for which this final stage of the war is famed.
When this war broke out it seemed to at least one Greek, an Athenian aristocrat named Thucydides, that it would be different, that it would be, as one modern scholar has suggested, ‘a war like no other ’. Thucydides’ account of this war is at once analytic and philosophical, poignant and emotional.
His treatment of how two powerful states and their allies became locked in conflict has provided generations of historians and political scientists with an introduction to the subject of war and peace, war and violence, in general the ways of great powers.
Yet much of the modern treatment of the Peloponnesian War continues to examine the war much as Thucydides did – as a military and political conflict that unsuspecting readers might think took place in a social and cultural vacuum.
This is where the current book is different.
The author very candidly remarks, “This book does not answer that question through a strategic account of the conflict’s various campaigns. Much less is it a political study of the reasons that caused the Spartans to fight against Athens.
Fine narratives in English by George Grote, George Grundy, B. W. Henderson, Donald Kagan, John Lazenby, Anton Powell, Geoffrey de Ste. Croix, and others cover those topics. So there is no need for another traditional history of the Peloponnesian War.
Instead, how did the Athenians battle the Spartans on land, in the cities, at sea, and out in the Greek countryside?
What was it like for those who killed and died in this horrific war, this nightmare about which there has been little written of how many Greeks fought, how many perished, or even how all of it was conducted?
The book’s aim, therefore, after a brief introduction to the universal events of the Peloponnesian War, is to flesh out this three-decade fight of some twenty-four hundred years past as something very human and thus to allow the war to become more than a far-off struggle of a distant age.
This book’s chapters are for the most part organized not by annual events but by the experience of battle: “fire” (the ravaging of the land), “disease” (plague), “terror” (coups and irregular fighting), “armor” (hoplite warfare), “walls” (sieges), “horses” (the Sicilian expedition), and “ships” (trireme fighting). These chapter themes are also interwoven with a loose ongoing narrative of the war, again with the understanding that each chapter draws on illustrations taken from the entire twenty-seven-year conflict.
No other struggle can provide such military lessons for the present as the Peloponnesian War. Of course, it was a Balkans-type mess—but also a conflict involving two great superpowers, as well as a war of terror, of dirty fighting in a Hellenic Third World, of forcing democracy down the throats of sometimes unwilling states, and of domestic and cultural upheavals at home brought on by frustrations of fighting abroad.
Most recommended for history buffs.
Author: Victor Davis Hanson
Publisher: Random House Trade Paperbacks; Annotated edition (12 September 2006)
Language: English
Paperback: 416 pages
Item Weight: 471 g
Dimensions: 15.52 x 2.21 x 23.34 cm
Country of Origin: USA
Price: 1385/-
“Was Athens—or Greece itself—destroyed by the war? An entire industry of classical scholarship once argued for postwar Hellenic “decline,” and the subsequent tide of fourth-century poverty, social unrest, and class struggle as arising after the Peloponnesian War. Victorians, in turn, felt the loss was more a “what might have been,” a conflict that had ended not just the idea of Athens but “the glory that was Greece” itself and the Hellenic civilizing influence in the wider Mediterranean…”
From 431 to 404 a war raged across the Greek world from Sicily to the eastern Aegean, today ’ s modern Turkey, now known as the Peloponnesian War.
Such violence was not an extraordinary feature of Greek life, as Homer’s great poems tell and as the philosopher Heraclitus soon after proclaimed (c. 500) – ‘war is the father of all things ’.
The war between Athens, ‘leader of the Delian League of allied city-states and colonies’ against Sparta, ‘leader of the
Peloponnesian League’ pitted a prevailing Navy against one of the most overriding infantry forces in history.
Preceding this clash, Athens had defeated a Persian invasion force, at the Battle of Marathon. A decade later a much larger Persian invasion force suffered key setbacks and defeats at Thermopylae, where 300 Spartans distinctively fought to the last man.
Then at Salamis, the Persians were dealt a major naval defeat against the Athenian Navy and in conclusion at Plataea the Persian army was defeated on land, before downsizing and ultimately abandoning the campaign.
For the next half-century, both states followed an anti Persian policy and supported any anti Persian activities in the eastern Mediterranean, allowing for an sporadic peace to exist between Athens and Sparta. In order to fight the Persians at sea, the Athenians formed the Delian League by exercising progressive control over the members of the league.
Athens renovated this coalition into an empire, exacting tribute from its members. From the money extracted from her client states, Athens built herself into a city, which was the envy of the Hellenistic world.
And a fleet of 300 triple banked galleys each of these triremes was manned by a crew of a hundred and seventy professional oarsmen.
The city-state of Corinth had been the overriding maritime power prior to the Persian Wars. And as Athens’ power grew, her Navy outnumbered the Corinth fleet three-to-one and began to inflame rebellion in their colonies and intrude on its trade routes in a sequence of small conflicts lasting 15 years, known as the first Peloponnesian War.
Sparta opposed Athens and defeated the Athenian army in one non decisive engagement, while Athens continued to expand her naval power. One significant development during this period was the rebuilding of Athens’ walls on a grand scale, with an elongated causeway connecting Athens with the port city of Piraeus, allowing Athens to be completely supplied by sea, if an invading army would destroy the surrounding countryside and farmland.
This antagonistic period ended with the so-called ‘30 year’s peace’ between the two city-states, which would last for less than half of its intended duration. Despite this peace, antagonism between Athens and Corinth continued and in 431 BC Corinth productively convinced Sparta and the Peloponnesian League to declare war on Athens, with the goal of ending the swelling Athenian Empire.
The first phase of the second Peloponnesian War, commonly referred to as plainly the Peloponnesian War is known as Archidamian War. Here, Sparta pursued a policy of pillaging the countryside around Athens.
In an attempt to provoke a pitched battle, the Athenians had anticipated the Spartan strategy and had organized a continuous flow of grain shipments from Egypt and colonies on the Aegean and Black Sea coasts. The Athenian strategy was to barricade the Peloponnesian Peninsula from any trade and supplies, while opportunistically raiding Sparta's allies.
Initially the Athenians seemed to be maintaining the upper hand in this asymmetric war of attrition that had been carefully planned for years by the Athenian statesman Pericles.
The population from the surrounding countryside poured in behind the safety of the Athenian walls in the early stages of the war. This had been taken into account in advance and wealthy Athens had more than enough food flowing into the crowded city to feed everyone.
What had not been taken into account were the tainted grain shipments carrying plague, which speedily spread through the overloaded city.
Initially the city was pliant, inspired by the magnetic rhetoric of Pericles. An estimated one in four Athenians succumbed to the plague, including Pericles and his sons, before it had run its course.
At the height, mercenaries refused to fight for Athens and even the Spartans ceased to campaign near Athens for fear of catching the plague.
Ironically the extraordinarily planned Athenian blockade of the Peloponnese had protected Sparta and its allies from receiving any of the plague-tainted grain. The Athenian survivors adopted a much more violent strategy, greatly increasing the raids and building fortified outposts along the Peloponnese and coasts.
The ‘helots’ (Spartan slaves) that outnumbered them ten to one, were encouraged to run away to these outposts which put pressure on sparta to defend the homefront.
This phase of the war ended with the 50-year Peace of Nicias, which never really went into full effect, with both belligerents raiding each other through proxies from the onset.
Eventually directly in 415 BC, the Athenians devised a plan they believed would bestow upon themselves, an overwhelming advantage -- the conquest of the resplendently wealthy city-state of Syracuse, on the island of Sicily which, along with Athens and Carthage, controlled the lion’s share of Mediterranean trade, led by the young charismatic Athenian statesman Alcibiades.
The expedition ended in disaster, with Athens losing over 10,000 hoplites and two-thirds of her Navy. Ships could be rebuilt, but the 30,000 of her professional oarsmen could not be replaced.
This was followed by further disasters. Sparta freed 20,000 Athenian slaves from the city's silver mines. Athens then raised the tribute from her vassals, which caused widespread revolt in Ionia, for which this final stage of the war is famed.
When this war broke out it seemed to at least one Greek, an Athenian aristocrat named Thucydides, that it would be different, that it would be, as one modern scholar has suggested, ‘a war like no other ’. Thucydides’ account of this war is at once analytic and philosophical, poignant and emotional.
His treatment of how two powerful states and their allies became locked in conflict has provided generations of historians and political scientists with an introduction to the subject of war and peace, war and violence, in general the ways of great powers.
Yet much of the modern treatment of the Peloponnesian War continues to examine the war much as Thucydides did – as a military and political conflict that unsuspecting readers might think took place in a social and cultural vacuum.
This is where the current book is different.
The author very candidly remarks, “This book does not answer that question through a strategic account of the conflict’s various campaigns. Much less is it a political study of the reasons that caused the Spartans to fight against Athens.
Fine narratives in English by George Grote, George Grundy, B. W. Henderson, Donald Kagan, John Lazenby, Anton Powell, Geoffrey de Ste. Croix, and others cover those topics. So there is no need for another traditional history of the Peloponnesian War.
Instead, how did the Athenians battle the Spartans on land, in the cities, at sea, and out in the Greek countryside?
What was it like for those who killed and died in this horrific war, this nightmare about which there has been little written of how many Greeks fought, how many perished, or even how all of it was conducted?
The book’s aim, therefore, after a brief introduction to the universal events of the Peloponnesian War, is to flesh out this three-decade fight of some twenty-four hundred years past as something very human and thus to allow the war to become more than a far-off struggle of a distant age.
This book’s chapters are for the most part organized not by annual events but by the experience of battle: “fire” (the ravaging of the land), “disease” (plague), “terror” (coups and irregular fighting), “armor” (hoplite warfare), “walls” (sieges), “horses” (the Sicilian expedition), and “ships” (trireme fighting). These chapter themes are also interwoven with a loose ongoing narrative of the war, again with the understanding that each chapter draws on illustrations taken from the entire twenty-seven-year conflict.
No other struggle can provide such military lessons for the present as the Peloponnesian War. Of course, it was a Balkans-type mess—but also a conflict involving two great superpowers, as well as a war of terror, of dirty fighting in a Hellenic Third World, of forcing democracy down the throats of sometimes unwilling states, and of domestic and cultural upheavals at home brought on by frustrations of fighting abroad.
Most recommended for history buffs.