Rather than a chronological telling of the 30-year war between Athens and Sparta, Hanson instead explores the major issues of the war including plague, tactics, naval power, and diplomacy. This is far more interesting than General X fought General Y with result Z, rinse and repeat.

A truly superior telling of history.

Erudite, original look at the Peloponnesian War. Instead of a straightforward account of the events (Thucydides covered that), Hanson breaks down the war into strategies, technologies, and tactics. The prose could be more economical.

I really enjoyed listening to this, but I have some previous knowledge of the time and places. VDH does a lot of comparisons and refers to many other aspects of the Peloponnesian War, other historical conflicts and modern wars, the geography and government of ancient Greece, etc. The techniques, tools, and methods of warfare were the most interesting parts for me. Military history buffs will eat it up.

Narration by Bob Souer was straightforward, although a bit speedy for a non-fiction book. One of the very few audiobooks that I actually had to slow down a bit.

A well researched history which at times seemed a summary of Thucydides. The author went beyond the retelling however, and tied in cultural and political events to give a broader sense of the city states involved, and how their times shaped the ongoing conflict. At times hard to follow as it jumped around. All in all, a decent read and good intro to the events.

For a layperson like myself this was an easy-to-read and fascinating introduction to the Peloponnesian War. Unorthodox in its approach, it was not strictly chronological. As the subtitle indicates, it tells HOW the two enemies fought this war. The title is taken from Thucydides, the historian, who wrote extensively on the war. He called it a "war like no other." Each chapter treated a theme: Why the war was fought; the Spartans' ultimately unsuccessful scorched earth policy in Attica; outbreak and extent of disease; hoplite warfare; growing importance of horses and cavalry in warfare; naval warfare, then the author's conclusions. I liked the analogies the author drew between incidents then and in subsequent warfare through the years. I was introduced to new names of military and naval leaders such as Brasidas; Archidamus; Nicias. I didn't realize the extent of Alcibiades' treachery. The man was certainly the quintessential amoral opportunist! Now I've learned about the ruthless Lysander, who finally defeated the Athenian fleet at Aegospotami [Goat Rivers]. For an expert in ancient Greek history, this book might be simplistic but it filled the bill excellently for me. The index was top-notch. Highly recommended.

Solid read on the Peloponnesian War. Hanson does not try to cover the war from a linear history perspective. Instead, he covers the war from a thematic standpoint, talking about the role of sieges, cavalry, and sea power, and their impact on the ultimate outcome.

Summary: An account of the Peloponnesian War tracing the history, the politics, the strategies, key figures, battles, and how the war was fought.

The war went on for twenty-seven years toward the end of the fifth century BC. One of the first great works of history by Thucydides chronicled the battle. Both Athens and Sparta experienced horrendous losses culminating in the near total destruction of the once-great Athenian naval power at Aegospotami in 405.

Victor Davis Hanson, a noted classical scholar, renders an account both of the history of the war but also who fought it and how they fought. The two principle powers were quite different. Sparta was an oligarchy, Athens a democracy. Sparta had a more powerful land army. Athens was a sea power with a protected port and good walls allowing them to endure siege as well as project their power. To begin, Sparta invaded every year or two overland, ravaging the countryside but exhausting itself while the population of Attica sheltered in Athens. Very few Athenians died in battle but the city was eviscerated by plague resulting from crowded and unhygienic conditions. Meanwhile the Athenian navy raided the coastal cities of Sparta. They fought ten years to a draw ending with the temporary Peace of Nicias.

The peace lasted until 415 when Athens decided to mount an attack on Sicily, a Spartan ally, stirred up by charismatic general Alcibiades. A diffident landing followed by an inconclusive siege gave time for Syracuse to arm and be reinforced. In 413 they defeated Athens navy and then chased down the land forces for a crushing defeat. Still Athens rebuilt while Sparta, aided by Alcibiades, who had changed sides, and material help from Persia, finally built a navy to rival what was left of the Athenian navy. They fought a series of battles in Ionia culminating in the utter defeat at Aegospotami in 405, and Athens surrender to Sparta, led by Lysander.

War has always been gruesome. Hanson describes the particular gruesomeness of war in this time, whether it was destruction by fire or the ravages of disease, which took Athens singular leader Pericles. War unravels any war ethic. Hanson chronicles the killing of civilians and captives, especially in later stages of the war. He considers the hoplites and the vulnerabilities of their armor to thrusts to the groin and neck, and lightly armored fighters with spears or armors. Hoplites were mostly fitted to fight other hoplites, and often suffered relatively light losses. They need mounted forces to protect their flanks. The lack of horses was a key factor in the defeat at Syracuse. Siege warfare had not yet been mastered. Siege towers and catapults emerged after these wars. Mostly, they built siege walls, rams, and tried to penetrate walls and gates with rams.

Ultimately the war hinged on the trireme, the three-tiered rowing vessel. The impasse between the two powers ended when Alcibiades, rejected by Athens, persuaded the Spartans that only by becoming a sea power could they defeat Athens. The defeat at Syracuse pointed the way. The trireme depended mostly on slaves, up to 200 per vessel in three banks of rowers. A rammed trireme could quickly sink with the likely death of all. This happened to 170 of 180 triremes of the Athenians at Aegospotami.

The fall of Athens resulted from a variety of unforeseen errors. Pericles was an unparalleled leader, but with no able successor. Alcibiades was brilliant but never trusted, and often absent at key moments. The Sicilian venture spelled the beginning of the end, depleting both manpower and treasury. The Athenians ignored Alicibiades, once again on their side, exposing themselves to surprise attack at Aegospotami.

Hanson traces the errors that arise from both hubris and the “fog of war.” These wars, like many were filled with folly. The protracted conflict inevitably deteriorated to greater and greater brutality. Mediocre leadership cost the lives of thousands. The inadequacies of the technology of war led to innovation and more effective ways of killing. Alliances end up feeding the allies. Eventually both Persia and Thebes become the real threat.

It all began with the decision of Sparta to challenge the growth of Athenian power. A venture intended to last a few months turned into a 27 year conflict. Such are often the illusions of war. Hanson uses the lens of one protracted war to challenge us to ask the same questions about war in our own day.

This book really gives ou a lot to think about. Ultimately the price of the Peloponnesian war was much higher than anyone could have anticipated, but at each point in the conflict, both sides felt they had committed too much to quit. There were also several points whereby the war could have come to a negotiated truce but the temptation to keep fighting to win it all was too great. I think this book would appeal to anyone who likes military history or classical history. Th author assumes that the reader is familiar with the basics of the Peloponnesian War which I think was a mistake. I would have preferred that he outline the major events at the start of the book and then break it down thematically. In any event, this book gives you a lot to think about and makes you wonder if we have learned anything over the last 2,500 years.

Classicist Dr. Victor Davis Hanson examines the Peloponnesian War as a human tragedy. Biological Warfare, disease, political miscalculation, and hubris all drove vibrant civilizations to self-destruction.

A War Like No Other: How the Athenians & Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War by Victor Davis Hanson

The author is quite an expert in his field and a master historian; if not, he has fooled me. I reviewed Donald Kagan's The Peloponnesian War several years ago, and his narrative is different than Hanson's, telling the war more as a story (or re-telling of Thucydides' account) than a wider overview. Hanson's is the most thorough and detailed. The 27+ year Peloponnesian War is an inexhaustible source for historians writing about the arts, cultural history, disease, architecture, military tactics, and all sorts of topics. Hanson examines several aspects as well as the broader interpretations of the war throughout history.

I chose to review this book after previously reviewing books I felt were in the same vein. In Graham Allison's Destined for War: America, China, and Thucydides's Trap; the mutual destruction of Athens and Sparta are central to the author's thesis warning of possible outcomes of great power rivalries. Mike Duncan's The Storm Before the Storm looked at how Rome descended to an empire from a republic, led over time by the increasing violation of norms and mores such that Rome lost sight of its previous self. Richard Miles' Carthage Must Be Destroyed looks at Rome's quests during the later Punic Wars and the transformation a society can make as it guards itself against extinction while spending whatever it can to destroy its enemy. All of these find echoes in Hanson's A War Like No Other, and Hanson also makes comparisons to more modern conflicts involving the United States as he appears to be writing for an American audience. Book flap reviews and the Introduction show the author trying to use modern political conflicts in the United States to sell the book--ie: the USA as Athens. Comparing Athens to U.S. coastal elites and Sparta to "red state" conservatives is crass.

My main takeaway from the book is simply the title-- while all wars have similarities, there are distinctions about the Peloponnesian combatants that make it incomparable to anything that modern Americans may be aware of. The ethical debates and contexts of 5th century Athens hardly resemble anything easily relatable in modern contexts. The scope of the war is beyond what most can imagine-- one in 25 in the Athenian Empire died in the war, compared to one in 50 in the U.S. Civil War. 400,000 U.S. soldiers (0.3 percent of the population) died in World War II, whereas Athens lost many multiples of that in various stages of the war. One is better off comparing the Peloponnesian War to wars of fiction--Star Wars: The Clone Wars-- to anything else.

Setting aside the author's attempts to make it interesting for the modern reader, he does an outstanding job examining multiple aspects of the war. Its cultural and political impact within Athens, the enormous devastation of plagues (largely ignored by Thucydides), the eventual application of Greek science to warmaking and construction, the loss of multiple generations of Athens' finest politicians, generals, philosophers, and more. As both sides sought to end the war, it was ultimately the Persians who benefited. There were no true winners.

Writing in 2021, I enjoyed his examination of the effects of plague on the population-- the disease itself is unknown in modern times and killed far more than any battles. The plague changed the morals of Athens as people began to become more licentious and Athens' works of art became darker. Much of Hanson's description of Athens and Sparta invading and razing neutral and subject cities in order to keep them from becoming threats is shocking to the modern reader-- as is the slaughter of Helots, the slaves, etc. The plundering of Platea. The practice of fomenting rebellion in aligned states as a way to weaken and undermine cities. Slaves would be freed in one society while freed peoples would become enslaved. The ill-conceived invasion of Syracuse, itself a strong democracy, was perhaps one turning point as it undermined Athens' message that it was waging a war of ideals against undemocratic Sparta. The war itself undermined democracy as it was found that quick decisions regarding strategy and resources required a central authority rather than being made collectively among city-states in a time when communication was slow. The picture is of Athens hollowing itself out within a few decades in order to destroy its enemy. The erosion of trust and the low value placed on life, generally, is quite evident in the book.

I give it 4 stars out of 5 as it would have been better to examine events at face value without trying to compare things to very recent events in United States history.

I enjoyed this book, I didn't really know anything about the Peloponnesian War and this author did a great job of researching not only the big battles and events but also what the regular people of the time went through, which is what intrigues me more about history. Too bad this author is a Trump cultist or I'd be more likely to seek out more of his work. Sigh.....

Having enjoyed another book by Victor Davis Hanson, The Soul of Battle, I picked this one up when a copy was put up for sale at the Hayward, Wisconsin Public Library over the Memorial Day weekend. Since reading Thucydides freshman year at Grinnell College, the history of the Peloponnesian War has held interest. This account was no disappointment. Indeed, compared to others, it was original.

The originality of Hanson's book is that he doesn't summarize Thucydides and the Oxyrhinchos Historian. He assumes some background on the part of the reader and proceeds instead to detail the war in terms of its practice, focusing on its innovations. Thus one learns about siegecraft, hoplite battle, trireme tactics--precisely the kinds of details that Thucydides assumed his readership familiar with. Doing so, A War Like No Other serves as a useful adjunct to the normal high school or college reading assignment.

Beyond that, Hanson writes with an intention of exploring and exploding common misconceptions of the decades-long conflict between the ancient democratic imperialists of Athens and the oligarchical traditionalists of Sparta. One, of course, is the usual exaggeration of the goodness of Athens during its "golden age" from the defeat of Persia until at least the plague during the war. Although a radical democracy in ways quite different than ours, Athens was also, by the standards of its time, an imperialist superpower and bully, maintaining its far-flung commercial interests by means of tribute and an unmatched fleet. Sparta, however, while the bully of the Peloponnese, was the advocate of what today would be termed "national self-determination." A land power, it felt increasingly threatened by Athenian innovations and self-aggrandizing encroachments and became, with Thebes and Corinth, a leader of liberation movements throughout the Greek-speaking world extending from the Black Sea to Egypt to Asia Minor to Italy and Sicily. Of course, it wasn't as simple as that moralistic calculus might imply. Athens really did generally promote a kind of democracy in that its client poleis tended to favor egalitarianism while Sparta's notions of self-determination tended to mean oligarchical rule.

The irony of the war is (1) that innovative, proto-capitalist Athens lost against reactionary Sparta and (2) that Sparta won by adopting many of the innovations which they, and their proponents like Plato, originally decried. The consequence of the Athenian defeat, moreover, were unintended. Sparta, long in decline, ended up becoming a virtual client of Persia before its defeat at the hands of formerly-allied Thebes and Athens, after a period of dictatorship, returned to democratic power to ally with its former Theban enemies in overthrowing oligarchies established by the Spartiates. Meanwhile, military innovations introduced by the war were perfected to the north and the whole hellenic order of things was overthrown by the Philip and his son Alexander.

Hanson's focus, however, is primarily with things military and the myths he attacks are both ancient and modern. A primary one is that of hoplite warfare, a form of warfare identified with the virtues of a yeoman citizenry. In fact, as he shows, very little hoplite battle was conducted during the Peloponnesian war. Calvary, light infantry and marines were coming to the fore and the fighters were increasingly the lumpen, slaves and mercenaries. Further, as in almost all wars, the real misery, quantitatively speaking, was more from the externalities of conflict than from the direct exercise of it. Far and away the greatest dying on Athens' part occurred during its plague and resulted from the Periclean strategy of avoiding infantry contests with the invading Spartans.

Hanson, a farmer himself, brings to his book much information about the ancient economics of warfare. How much did a trireme cost to build and maintain exactly? How much the hoplite panoply? How easy was it, really, for the occupying Spartans to devastate the Attic countryside? Were did the food come from?--the money?