The 9/11 Commission, at a difficult time in the nation’s life, achieved something that might previously have seemed impossible. The people of the United States of America were convulsed with grief, reeling with shock, after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; but the members of the commission calmly and coolly looked at the situation that the country faced after 9/11, undistracted by the feelings of panic that had seized so many Americans. In a country that had been torn by partisan political division, Democrats and Republicans – conservatives, liberals, and moderates – worked together productively for the greater good. The 9/11 Commission Report, crafted in the wake of tragedy, stands of evidence of the great things that Americans can still do, when we trust the better angels of our nature.

For the benefit of those who are not old enough to remember those times, it may be helpful to recall just how fear-ridden the country was in the wake of those attacks. When a celebrity music telethon was held, to raise money toward relief and rebuilding in the wake of the attacks, the musicians played in an undisclosed location, as if otherwise the terrorists would surely find the location and fly a hijacked jet plane into it. When President George W. Bush threw out the first ball at a Texas Rangers baseball game, the first game played after the attacks, the crowd cheered their hearts out, as if relieved that a hijacked plane hadn’t been flown into that ballpark in Arlington, Texas. In those days, it was routine for the passengers on an airline flight anywhere in the U.S.A. to break into applause once the plane had landed safely.

And in my home state of Maryland, some politicians were seriously suggesting that Baltimore’s own World Trade Center, on the city’s waterfront, be “protected” by parking the old naval frigate U.S.S. Constellation in front of the building. Left out of those calculations, evidently, was the question of how a wooden warship from 1854, its masts reaching perhaps three stories into the air, could “protect” a 30-story building. The time after 9/11 was, in short, a time when clear thinking was often being squeezed out by fear.

Seen against that background, The 9/11 Commission Report is doubly impressive. The ten-member commission, chaired by Republican Governor Thomas Kean of New Jersey, with Democratic Representative Lee Hamilton of Florida as vice-chair, conducted exhaustive research in order to present their Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the report’s subtitle). The report’s first chapter, “’We Have Some Planes,’” provides a harrowing, in medias res recounting of the events of September 11, 2001. From there, the commission looks back to the very beginnings of the ideological conflict that led to the attacks – as the commission authors put it, “The Foundation of the New Terrorism.”

From there, the commission examines the long sequence of events that led to 9/11 – counter-terrorism efforts by the U.S. intelligence agencies, al-Qaeda’s initial attacks against American targets abroad, U.S. responses to those attacks, and finally al-Qaeda’s planning and execution of the 9/11 attacks. The commission is carefully bipartisan in apportioning responsibility for the U.S. intelligence failures that led to the attacks, saying of the U.S. Congress, for example, that “Congress had a distinct tendency to push questions of emerging national security threats off its own plate, leaving them for others to consider. Congress asked outside commissions to do the work that arguably was at the heart of its own oversight responsibilities” (p. 107). There are 535 members of Congress. Would not any member of Congress from the pre-9/11 years, in his or her heart of hearts, find truth in that statement?

In the bipartisan spirit in which the commission worked, both the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations come across as concerned about Islamist terrorism – but as one problem among many, and not necessarily as a priority. One of the most sympathetic figures to emerge from The 9/11 Commission Report is former counterterrorism coordinator Richard A. Clarke, who spoke for so many years about the importance of taking seriously al-Qaeda’s threats of a massive attack against the American homeland. It is a telling indicator of the frustration that Clarke felt that “In May or June [2001], Clarke asked to be moved from his counterterrorism portfolio to a new set of responsibilities for cybersecurity. He told us that he was frustrated with his role and with an administration that he considered not ‘serious about al Qaeda’” (p. 205).

A chapter that returns to the actual day of the attacks as they unfolded at the World Trade Center site in New York is appropriately titled “Heroism and Horror,” and contains plenty of both. Amid the heroism being demonstrated by members of the various public-safety agencies responding to the attacks – FDNY, NYPD, PAPD – there is the shock of learning that the sheer scope of the devastation revealed the communications difficulties within as well as among those agencies. For example, the commission reports that “To our knowledge, no FDNY chiefs outside the South Tower realized that the repeater channel was functioning and being used by units in that tower. The senior chief in the South Tower lobby was initially unable to communicate his requests for more units to chiefs either in the North Tower lobby or at his outdoor command post” (p. 300).

The 9/11 Commission Report looks forward as well as back from the events of that terrible day, providing a long list of well-considered recommendations for changes in future policy. Characteristic in that regard is the commission’s finding concerning the coordination and distribution of terrorism-related intelligence: “In each of our examples, no one was firmly in charge of managing the case and able to draw relevant intelligence from anywhere in the government, assign responsibilities across the agencies (foreign or domestic), track progress, and quickly bring obstacles up to the level where they could be resolved. Responsibility and accountability were diffuse” (p. 400).

The commission made many recommendations. Some were acted on fully and promptly; others were acted on only partially; still others were ignored altogether, notwithstanding the commission’s regular and energetic remonstrances to the government. Nonetheless, The 9/11 Commission Report stands as a powerful reminder of the good that Americans can do, even under the most difficult and tragic of circumstances, when they put aside day-to-day disagreements and work for the good of all.

Today, September 11, 2021, is the 20th anniversary of the day American was forever changed.
A day the people, all over the world, remember. You ask people, of a certain age bracket, where they were when they heard about the planes and the towers and the Pentagon, and they can tell you.
At work.
Driving.
At home.
In Class.
At the office, watching it as it was happening outside my window....

To honor the events of that day - heroes we lost, the innocent victims who didnt do anything, the people who stood up to the hijackers and say "Not today and not with this plane. Let's Roll" - I spent the day reading and finishing this book.

First, the honest part - it is long and dry in spots. There are chapters that are going to be dated - it was published 17 years ago- and will outline things that are almost a normal part of our lifes. TSA airport screenings. Heighten security measures to prevent future attacks. The need to combine intelligence and investigative resources into a cohesive group, so there is no 'This is our data, and we dont share'. The need to find and capture Bin Laden and to eliminate the non-state terrorists groups in the world.
Another thing that has to be remembered is dates. For example, 1993 is almost 30 years ago to us now; at the time this report, it was 11 years. That the Clinton Administration ended 21 years ago - but it was still fresh and raw at the time of 9/11. That the threat of Saddam and Iraq was still present - and not a neutered and dead ruler as he is now. So yes, it is going to wrong or outdated at times.
And the last 2 chapter can be skimmed - it is an outline of what changes/ improvements are needed. At this point, these are standard operating procedures. (Well, maybe not the Border issue. Still a hot topic).

The Good news - the beginning part of the book is a History lesson. In the path of Bin Laden to global threat, in US policy failings to recognize the growing threat of Post Cold War terrorist. An in-depth outline of the planes on that day. And a chapter on the heroic deeds of PAPD, FDNY, NYPD, and others at the Twin Towers, and the brief, but positive review of how the Pentagon rescues and recovery was a case study in positive things.

Would I recommend this book - maybe. It is a tough one - remember, we are talking about sudden deaths of thousands of people. And then you have to factor in the loves of those who have to deal with the aftermath - the 1st responders who are suffering still today, the soldiers who gave their time, their body and in some cases, their lives in America's Longest War.
So, it is not a feel good book. (Side note: if you are looking for a feel good book about that same day, I would recommend "The Day the World Came to Town: 9/11 in Gander, Newfoundland" by Jim DeFede. It is the story of about what happened to the planes who couldnt land in NYC, and were diverted to Canada. And how the Canadians - the great people they are - welcomed them and made them feel at home for a brief period of time).

But - I would say you should read parts of it. Maybe the chapters on the what the Passengers and first Responders did that day.

The hottest thing a girl can do is read this book.

The "final report" what a farce! The official expolanation for collapse is admitted to have a low probability of occurrence and bldg 7 is not even mentioned once! Read DRGriffin to make sense of the propaganda.

I thought the report was wonderful. The authors let you know that elements of the government disrupted them. Since its initial release additional classified portions have also been declassified due to citizen and government request. This book is very important for people to understand the buildup of terrorism and how our government prepared and reacted, and why we have the national security structure we have today.

I expected this to be unbearably soulless and sycophantic and badly written, and so was surprised to find that most of it (the first nine chapters) wasn't just 'good enough for government work' but was really well crafted and successfully balanced a ton of sources (as in, like, a thousand) and respected the somber subject that occasioned its writing by not sentimentalizing the victims or even really vilifying the perpetrators. Then the last four chapters - offering justification for the wars and the Patriot Act and Homeland Security and extraordinary renditions - just sucked the life right out of it. (Seriously, the difference in voice and tone and style here makes me think that the whole thing wasn't written by the same person (and that the first nine chapters were ghostwritten (probably by Michael Crichton)).) So, with incredible detail, the Report offers a narrative about what happened on 9/11, a pretty robust effort at contextualization to help explain why 9/11 happened, and a series of recommendations specifying what the commission thinks should be done about it. As someone who is, apparently, way more naive and way less cynical than I thought I was, there was a lot I found surprising here, stuff I never knew or don't remember or wasn't told about when I was thirteen. Like, for instance: half the hijackers (in four groups at three airports) were flagged for addition screening, were additionally screened, and were then let onto the planes; the Clinton administration was considering killing bin Ladin in the late nineties only to balk at each opportunity (on one occasion, it seems, because Clinton couldn't afford to risk the public scrutiny that would have surely come had he engaged in a military action immediately following the Lewinsky furor and thus recreate the premise of the movie Wag the Dog which had just come out); and, tragically, there was so much confusion on the ground on the day of the attacks that it seems some people walking down from their offices after the planes struck were instructed to go back up. But maybe the most surprising (impressive?) part about the Report was its awareness of itself as a narrative. I don't mean this in the postmodern sense of self-awareness, but rather in the way Adam Curtis refers to the story his documentaries tell as a narrative. It's an awareness of the Schrodinger's paradox nature of reportage - by which I mean that the act of reporting collapses reality into the interpretation the report offers. If you're of a conspiratorial bent this probably sounds pretty juicy (as in, the Government is, by writing this, inventing the reality it wants us to believe (also, if you think that 9/11 was a conspiracy perpetrated by the Government, then you need to go lie down)), but I only mean to remark on the self-awareness thing because it seems especially generous and objective in such a report to allow for the possibility of parallel truth and to recognize the inherent weakness of narrative (although, I'll add, that's all we've got). It seems dumb to me to end by saying that 'every American should read this.' On a list of things every American should read this Report ranks pretty low. But the sentiment behind that statement - that this is an important historical document about a era-defining event that more people should know more about - bears out. Stick to the first nine chapters and try not to cry.

Absolutely ridiculous.

What was left to read after it was hollowed-out to store my throwing-stars was substandard investigating, political jargon, and black flag waving.

I know there were a couple of one stars on this book but I thought this was a masterpiece, and I thought it was very interesting and everyone should be able to read it at least once in their life because it’s important to read about the mistakes of humanity! That being said, I still enjoy the story about flight 93 and how they kicked the terrorist butts! Shows the courage and cowardice of the human race

America before and after 9/11. No conspiracy, facts only. Today only lunatics and hypocrites insist on the 'inner job'.

The history is interesting, but functionally, this book is not the best. Most of it is redacted. Of course I understand why it’s redacted— but I don’t think it’s worth it to read at this point in time

This how to make propaganda when you have means to do so:
* Publish a report, alongside an encyclopedia of terrorism (Facts on File, 2002, 2007)
* No mention of Guantanamo Bay throughout the book.
* No mention of Abu Ghraib throughout the book.
* No mention of previous brutal interventions by the United States in the area that lead to an anti-west mentality throughout the region.

Some part of the report is about Islam, and the history of religion in the middle east, radicalization and Islamic thought. As an attempt to create/manufacture knowledge (aka Ideology) and open a way for Islamophobia. Overall this is a one-sided and racist view of the situation, published by "United State government national commission on terrorist attacks" and signed by a bunch of white men.

One of the chapters seems to try to answer an absorbed but typical question of "why do they hate us?" - The nature of the chapter and question is wrong. It's so unfortunate that some Americans get their cultural education about other parts of the world through crap like this. No wonder we have to deal with racism, Xenophobia, and Islamophobia.

Now if you feel bad that you looked at this book, don't immediately go and pick up "Messages to the World" by Bin Laden. I suggest you start with looking at works of Mark Lombardi, and maybe read "Interlock: Art, Conspiracy, and the Shadow Worlds of Mark Lombardi" that is influenced by "Interlock: The untold story of American banks, oil interests, the Shah's money, debts, and the astounding connections between them" by Mark Hulbert.