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Very good, I guess I don't have as much to say, the book is clear and factually intensive. This book also made a lot of sense of what cognitive science and linguistics are (were) in intellectual history, and the particular aesthetic of the (strong) social sciences, this kind of ugly mixture of logical-mathematical models and qualitative evidence and theorizing....
Pinker demonstrates that he is a very strong expository writer (the best?), although perhaps nothing ever becomes wholly transparent without also becoming enigmatic....
But he, like Fodor, whom he internally quotes, is too hygienic, there is a too-perceptible longing for order, which, if it doesn't make the writing shallow (it is, after all, science exposition), nonetheless makes me uneasy....
On Sapir-Wharf: He gives it short shrift. What he says, IIRC, serves to refute a very vulgar and individualistic version, namely, that thought is conducted in language (rather than "mentalese"). But the stronger version of S-W that I want to insist on is social, that what we can express affects the kinds of conversations we have (ever try to have a conversation with someone and it gets derailed by puns or unintended double-entendres or whatever?) and so, in the long-term, shapes our lives. (It feels like people can live their whole lives without sitting down and thinking about what matters, Buddhism reveals this. It doesn't cancel out.) Because what you're encouraged to do by your friends, you often do; what is salient to them is what they transform in order to make their encouragements. But what's salient is a function of the actual language they speak, even if it is mostly about thought--and that's only one example. And what to make of people who claim that they have slightly different personalities in different languages? They're just mistaken? Really? Or what about nominative determinism--if that is even somewhat true, then it seems like similar mechanisms should be activated by the way a language sounds and feels, which associations are heavy in it, and which light. This feels extremely obvious to me.... And of course the different saliences of ideas matter, or else why do we feel like we learn from parapraxis, why are dreams pun-shaped?
In the updates at the end (a feature of the book for which I am very grateful and which makes me thankful Pinker is how he is, something I wish that all books included), he metions that S-W is coming back into vogue. Well, exactly what has changed? He said something that seems to suggest that S-W can mean many things, and maybe he was talking about a narrow version... I would have liked more clarity on that. Similarly, the updates included how he broke from Chomsky, or has disagreements with Chomsky. I had heard him talk about this elsewhere before reading the book, so I was surprised that the text of the book seemed to just be laying out the Chomskyan view simply. The updates say that he focused on more basic insights, or those which were likely to be evergreen... still it left me a little confused.
The stuff about descriptivism requires more thought, it remains a tangled issue....
Pinker demonstrates that he is a very strong expository writer (the best?), although perhaps nothing ever becomes wholly transparent without also becoming enigmatic....
But he, like Fodor, whom he internally quotes, is too hygienic, there is a too-perceptible longing for order, which, if it doesn't make the writing shallow (it is, after all, science exposition), nonetheless makes me uneasy....
On Sapir-Wharf: He gives it short shrift. What he says, IIRC, serves to refute a very vulgar and individualistic version, namely, that thought is conducted in language (rather than "mentalese"). But the stronger version of S-W that I want to insist on is social, that what we can express affects the kinds of conversations we have (ever try to have a conversation with someone and it gets derailed by puns or unintended double-entendres or whatever?) and so, in the long-term, shapes our lives. (It feels like people can live their whole lives without sitting down and thinking about what matters, Buddhism reveals this. It doesn't cancel out.) Because what you're encouraged to do by your friends, you often do; what is salient to them is what they transform in order to make their encouragements. But what's salient is a function of the actual language they speak, even if it is mostly about thought--and that's only one example. And what to make of people who claim that they have slightly different personalities in different languages? They're just mistaken? Really? Or what about nominative determinism--if that is even somewhat true, then it seems like similar mechanisms should be activated by the way a language sounds and feels, which associations are heavy in it, and which light. This feels extremely obvious to me.... And of course the different saliences of ideas matter, or else why do we feel like we learn from parapraxis, why are dreams pun-shaped?
In the updates at the end (a feature of the book for which I am very grateful and which makes me thankful Pinker is how he is, something I wish that all books included), he metions that S-W is coming back into vogue. Well, exactly what has changed? He said something that seems to suggest that S-W can mean many things, and maybe he was talking about a narrow version... I would have liked more clarity on that. Similarly, the updates included how he broke from Chomsky, or has disagreements with Chomsky. I had heard him talk about this elsewhere before reading the book, so I was surprised that the text of the book seemed to just be laying out the Chomskyan view simply. The updates say that he focused on more basic insights, or those which were likely to be evergreen... still it left me a little confused.
The stuff about descriptivism requires more thought, it remains a tangled issue....