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April 17,2025
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The prevailing thought on rhetoric is that it is either: (1) only a matter of style or form, or, worse, (2) an attempt at coercion, which is always something frowned upon. Richard Weaver's Ethics of Rhetoric helpfully cuts through the confusion and highlights the central role of rhetoric in society. His main contention is that, while rhetoric can be, and often is, abused, rhetoric seen in its true light is not simply a matter of technique or style, but that it has its own ethic. In other words, Weaver argues that HOW we argue--just as equally as WHAT we argue for--is a moral, value-based act which moves towards some particular end. All rhetoric, he argues, will have one of three consequences: (1) "[i]t can move us toward what is good," (2) "it can move us toward what is evil," or (3) "it can, in hypothetical third place, fail to move us at all."

Every chapter develops different aspects of this full view of rhetoric, including analyses of Edmund Burke's and Abraham's Lincoln's rhetorical tendencies (and the impact those tendencies have), an examination of the arguments advances in the Scopes trial, the rhetorical use of grammar, Milton's "prejudices," the appeal to ultimate terms, and others.

As an aside: in light of the current state of politics, and of the current-day Republcian party, Weaver's comments on political rhetoric in the early 20th-century are enlightening. He argues that the conservatives of his day were going the way of the American Whig party. He traces this back to (surprisingly) Edmund Burke and his reliance on the "argument from circumstance." Here is what Weaver had to say on the topic: The American Whig type poitlical philosophy "turns out to be, on examination, a position which is defined by other positions because it will not conceive ultimate goals, and it will not display on occasion a sovereign contempt for circumstances. . . The other parties take their bearing from some philosophy of man and society; the Whigs take their bearings from the other parties. Whatever a party of left or right proposes, they propose (or oppose) in tempered measure. Its politics is then cautionary, instinctive, trusting more to safety and to present success than to imagination and dramatic boldness of principle. It is, to make the estimate candid, a politics without vision and consequently without the capacity to survive." Going on, he concludes: "'The political parties which I call great,' Tocqueville wrote in Democracy in America, 'are those which cling to principles rather than to their consequences, to general and not to special cases, to ideas and not to men.' . . . [A] party which bases itself upon circumstance cannot outlast that circumstance very long; that its claim to make smaller mistakes (and to have smaller triumphs) than the extreme parties will not win it enduring allegiance; and that when the necessity arises, as it always does at some time, to look at the foundations of the commonwealth, Burke's wish will be disregarded, and only deeply founded theories will be held worthy. . . Let it be offered as a parting counsel that parties bethink themselves of how their chieftains speak."

Memorable quotes:
"There is, then, no true rhetoric without dialetic, for the dialectic provides that basis of 'high speculation about nature' without which rhetoric in the narrower sense has nothing to work upon."

"Rhetoric moves the soul with a movement which cannot finally be justified logically. It can only be valued analogically with reference to some supreme image."

"Without rhetoric there seems no possibility of tragedy, and in turn, without the sense of tragedy is to keep the human lot from being rendered as history. The cultivation of tragedy and a deep interest in the value-confronting power of language always occur together. The Phaedrus, the Gorgias, and the Cratylus, not to mention the works of many teachers of retheoric, appear at the close of the age of Greek tragedy. The Elizabethan age teemed with treatises on the use of language. The essentially tragic Christian view of life begins the long tradition of homiletics. Tragedy and the practice of rhetoric seem to find common sustenance in preoccupation with value, and then rhetoric follows as an analyzed art."

"the duty of rhetoric is to bring together action and understanding into a whole that is greater than scientific perception."

"So rhetoric at its truest seeks to perfect men by showing them better versions of themselves, links in that chain extending up toward the ideal, which only the intellect can apprehend and only the soul have affection for."

"In a manner of speaking, Milton always writes from a 'prejudice,' which proves to be on inspection his conviction that as a Christian and as a political and moral preacher, that, as the good has been judged, the duty of a publicist is to show it separated with the utmost clearness of distinction from the bad. Accordingly, Milton's expositions, if one follows them intently, cause one to accept one thing and reprobate another unceasingly."

"An ethics of rhetoric requires that ultimate terms be ultimate in some rational sense. The only way to achieve that objective is through an ordering of our own minds and our own passions."
April 17,2025
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The Ethics of Rhetoric by Richard M. Weaver (1995)
April 17,2025
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Weaver's book is not just foundational for the field of rhetorical studies - it's actually still quite good, with lots of practical advice and uncanny observations about the way we talk, communicate, and live. There is very little fat to be trimmed in these analyses of a broad range of topics, from Plato's Phaedrus to Lincoln's arguments from definition to the various ways in which science (both social and technical) gets communicated to lay audiences. There are times when Weaver veers into what eventually seem like personal observations or takes on various political topics or situations, and these are really the main area of complaint with the book, but this, to me, feels very minor overall. In the broader scope, Weaver's book is not only a comprehensive discussion of the art of rhetorical criticism, but it is a thoughtful demonstration of this art in action, thus making this book a complete take on the act, just as he notes the Phaedrus is in the opening chapter.
April 17,2025
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A wonderfully challenging book. I have thoroughly grown in my understanding of language. It was a difficult journey of understanding, but a path I am glad that I took. Highly recommend if you’re looking for some classical rhetorical education.
April 17,2025
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I sometimes get the uneasy feeling when reading Richard Weaver that I'm only picking up half of what he's saying. If 50 percent is the baseline, I fear my understanding of The Ethics of Rhetoric is below average. In many ways, this is Weaver's least accessible book, owing not to Weaver's writing and analysis, which are typically excellent, but because the primary subject of the book and the topics he explores are of less general interest than the content of his other books.

The general thesis of the book is that the way that people argue is indicative of their personal ethics. Weaver introduces this idea in the first chapter by analyzing Plato's Phaedrus, in which he makes his case that dialectic (the logical process of determining what is true) and rhetoric (the process of persuading) are essential to each other (rhetoric not being truly rhetoric without dialectic, and dialectic being nothing but neutered theory without rhetoric). He centers his case on analogizing rhetoric with the Phaedrus, which contains three speeches on love. The initial speech, extolling the virtues of the non-lover, Weaver analogizes to pure dialectic. The second speech, extolling the depravity and selfishness of the ignoble lover, being pure rhetoric, and the proper combination of dialectic and rhetoric being found in the case of the unselfish, noble lover. Overall, this is a very similar case that Weaver would later make in Visions of Order: The Cultural Crisis of Our Time, although in the latter book Weaver's analysis is much clearer for the layman.

Weaver then explores variations on this theme throughout the rest of the book. For instance, in the second chapter Weaver notes how rhetoric and dialectic affected the Scopes Trial in Dayton, Tennessee, noting that the defense relied on rhetoric and the prosecution on dialectic, a strategy that was weighted heavily in the prosecution's favor, at least in terms of the courtroom battle. In surveying these different legal strategies, Weaver is able to point out how the defense's rhetoric could have been used against itself, so while the prosecution was intent on winning the case, it lost the larger battle of public opinion.

The most interesting two chapters, in terms of the implications of Weaver's theory, explore the argumentation of Edmund Burke and Abraham Lincoln. While Burke is considered, and rightly so, the conservative par excellence, Weaver makes the case that his method of argumentation (what Weaver calls "the argument from circumstance") was decidedly unconservative, relying as it did on specific circumstances rather than on principles. By comparison, Weaver notes that Lincoln consistently argued from "definition," or an identified principle, which is more appropriate for a conservative. A lot of commentators have taken from this that Weaver was saying that Burke was not a conservative, but I don't know that that is accurate. What Weaver seems to be saying is that, regardless of what Burke's principles were, he didn't argue like a conservative. And since the point of Weaver's book is that the way we argue reveals our principles, he claims that Burke is not appropriately considered the model for conservatives.

Also interesting is the final chapter, in which Weaver explores "god terms" and "devil terms," words that are used in contemporary language to either lend their subject automatic virtue or to bring them automatic derision. Among the "god terms" Weaver identified, "progress" and "science" are two of the most interesting, as he notes that both words are used to denote authority or virtue when used in combination with a person or an idea. Weaver doesn't condemn either progress or science, but he rather questions the validity of automatically assuming that something called "progressive" actually indicates progress, and he questions the collectivizing of "science" into a sentient being - as if all scientists have gotten together and determined what an entity called science believes - rather than using the term as a signifier of a multiplicity of scientists pursuing research in multiple ways with sometimes divergent conclusions. Weaver's "devil terms" include the word "un-American," which sparks an interesting discussion, though the negative implications of that term have obviously waned since the book was published in 1953. One thing that hasn't changed is that Weaver notes that terms like "Nazi," "fascist," and "Communist" are used as pejoratives to condemn people or ideas, but are frequently used incorrectly by people who seek to demonize other people, and who often do not know the definitions of the terms they use to do so. This situation has obviously not improved since Weaver's time.

These chapters of more general interest are sandwiched around chapters of more specific interest ("Milton's Heroic Prose," "The Spaciousness of the Old Rhetoric") or chapters of a more technical nature ("Aspects of Grammatical Categories," "The Rhetoric of the Social Science.") This gives the book an overall feel of being for a rhetorical specialist, which in some ways it is (Weaver's concept of "god terms" and "devil terms" has been influential in rhetorical circles ever since). While anyone can benefit by reading this book, the reader who is knowledgeable about rhetoric and read in ancient philosophy (certainly more than I am on either count) will get the most out of this book.
April 17,2025
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Enjoyed reading this quite a bit. It does seem old-fashioned, though, in its neo-Platonism and its form, but, my, it seems so enjoyable and applicable. I love the connotation/denotation bit quite a lot, and naturally, I’m inclined towards the power of poetic language. It’s sad that this has fallen out of favor because things like chivalry and the power of rhetoric to improve someone’s life are things that I so desperately want to believe in.
April 17,2025
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There are several good manuals on the art of rhetoric. Aristotle's and the Ad Herrenium are, of course, two of the best you'll ever read. But when it comes supplemental discussions on the meaning, purpose, and even ethics of rhetoric, the list of good books are fewer. Weaver's book is a brilliant must-read even if you're not into rhetoric at all. Whether he's discussing the interrelationship of dialectic and rhetoric or how an undue reliance on adjectives is a defect, his essays will help you at least be a better thinker, if not a better speaker regardless of whether you wanted to be one or not. One of his best insights in the whole book is that the way a person argues reveals their philosophical worldview.
April 17,2025
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An excellent book. The way that we speak & use language shapes the way we think about reality; it is good to be aware of the ethical & moral implications of this.
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