I've been reading the essays "Persons, Character, and Morality" and "Moral Luck" on and off again for the past two and a half years, and they still contain much mystery, inspiration and wisdom.
Title looked interesting, it’s a subject I’m fascinated with. But the writing is a little too complex for me, not totally incomprehensible, but I think I’d have to really -study- it to comprehend it, rereading sentences many times, with frequent references to a dictionary and the SEP. And I’m just too lazy for that.
The notorious pessimist. Mark Jenkins had us read this in his 400 lvl moral philosophy class and juxtapose it with the work of Joseph Nagel. Both philosophers are phenomenal yet disparate - they compliment each other really well for discussion.
For Williams, moral luck is, in part, a confrontation to Kant's rational categorical imperative. Much of the argument hinges around a hypothetical situation where someone accidentally, and by no fault of his own, kills a child. Kant says we should, rationally, feel no guilt... yet, Williams says: we do. Which, of course, begs the question: wtf?
He's a great writer and utterly hilarious at points. I recommend to anyone thinking about moral philsophy. I'd recommend Mr. Nagel too.
I am not qualified to really review this classic of moral philosophy by Bernard William's since moral philosophy is not my area. It would suffice if I just say what I find interesting in this work.
The most celebrated of this collection of essays is of course Williams's original essay on moral luck which suggests a person's deliberations in life is connected to both intrinsic and extrinsic luck.
This collection of essays contains not only the celebrated moral luck essay but also some other essays of original and fascinating topics. In "Persons, Character, and Morality", Williams discusses the conflict that the selfless abstraction demand of Kantianism impartiality, and, also of Utilitarianism's maximal utility have with a person's character that features individual's life projects and concerns that he finds worth living. This conflict between morality and personal character bears on the discussion of moral luck which suggests an agent's introspection and deliberation in life project is not always based on moral considerations alone .
There are also essays on pratical necessity and a person's character. "Practical necessity" and "Ought and Moral Obligation" discuss deliberation based on practical necessity which reveals one's own powers and incapacities in the circumstances and external limits available to oneself. Again, luck seems to factor in even if unrelated to moral necessity.
In "Conflict of Values", Williams discusses Isaiah Berlin's idea of a plurality of values with values not irreducible to each other. The resolution of a conflict of values brings to attention of the commensurability of values and utility as a possible currency to assess all values. But there is no reason one has to accept utility as an arbiter of value conflict if one does not think appealing to another value is a proper way to resolve value conflict. Further there may not be a universal currency for the arbitration of conflict. Williams think it is also a mistake to think value conflict can be resolve by constructing an ethical theory using some rational calculus systematising moral beliefs as if value conflict is a logical affliction. William's and Berlin's reasoning are quite correct. If each value is different, there just can't be an universal currency or calculus to compute how to resolve value conflict by weighing one against the other. This means value conflict can't be resolved by moral reasoning. Answers are to be sought outside of moral calculus.
"Politics and Moral Character" is an essay on integrity. What kind of character or level of integrity one wants in a politician? A politician may find himself having to do unpalatable acts in political activities such as special pleading, misleading statements, breaking promises, temporary coalition with unrespectable political party, perhaps even for preventing worthy political projects from not being actualised. The unpalatable acts may not be necessarily morally abhorrent but at least not tasteful. Williams thinks you want a politician who would be reluctant to do such acts when it is necessary in order to expect him to have much chance of not doing them when unnecessary. Certainly a very insightful observation.