https://www.respublica.gr/2022/02/pos...

3 3/4 stars

This book contains an expanded form of the argument found in "minds brains and programs" (1980) which answers a few of the immediate objections to what is called the Chinese Room argument / thought-experiment. The key take away is that whilst computation is a necessary feature of brains, it is not a sufficient feature of minds.

I’ll definitely need to read this one again—lots of big concepts. I’m so glad to have read this finally as I am really fascinated by the idea of AI and whether it could be conscious or not; shows like Westworld or Humans always make me curious about these ideas. Ultimately, I feel like I am leaning toward Searle's arguments as seeming the most plausible to me but am eager as always to learn more about this topic! And, I am really excited to understand the Chinese Room Argument a little bit better!

"Tak napríklad Chomského hledání univerzální gramatiky vychází z predpokladu, že jsou-li jisté vlastnosti ve všech jazycích a jsou-li tyto vlastnosti určeny obecnými vlastnostmi lidského mozku, pak v mozku musí existovat úplný komplexní systém pravidel univerzální gramatiky. Daleko jednodušší hypotézou by naproti tomu byl predpoklad, že fyziologická struktura mozku určuje možné gramatiky bez meziroviny pravidel nebo teorií. Tato hypotéza není jen jednodušší, existence univerzálních vlastností jazyka určených vrozenými vlastnostmi mozku totiž naznačuje, že lze vystačit s neurofyziologickou rovinou popisu."

Genius in its simplicity. My favorite book in the last 2 years with Karl Popper's books: The Poverty of Historicism and Open Society and Its Enemies I/II.

Excellent book!!!!

A good survey of the philosophy of mind, this book is an interesting contrast to the pragmatic approach of  Richard Rorty, whom Searle has often criticized. It covers all of the bases, such as: Do machines think? Do people think like computers? Is there free will? Originally given as lectures, the chapters show a clear, logical progression.

This book was too expensive. But I'm glad I bought it anyway. Heard about Searle as a computer science major and a phil major, so I just had to pick up this book.

John Searle wrote this book for the Reith Lectures, which are intended to make standard philosophical questions/problems accessible to an "wide" audience, that is anyone willing to follow along and stick with the problem. The problem that Searle attempts to resolve is that of the mind/body dichotomy in philosophy. To get at this, Searle analogies the mind/body problem against the question of whether or not digital computational programs are capable of consciousness. Searle uses "common-sense" to resolve these philosophical conundrums that is to say that there is no gap of the mind/body because the mind is in the body and that unless a system resembles the human brain it is incapable of consciousness. While Searle's conclusions are convincing, his methods are less so. The first half of the book works to deals with the analogy of digital computation and consciousness to get at the mind/body spilt and works quite well, whereas the latter half of the book seeks to provide "answers" to help the social sciences resolve their inquiries of trying to make sense of the human brain and its intentionality. What I mean by this is that Searle attempts to definitively resolve the questioning of how bodies work with his common-sense explanation of "they just work." I was less convinced and amused by this half and lost engagement with the book after chapter three. Additionally, for those who have an awareness of affect studies, critical race studies, and gender and sexuality studies, Searle's conclusions and dismissal of how desire/intentionality operate within the body are best described as lackluster. I do find his analysis on digital computation and consciousness to be intriguing (even if I disagree with his outcome) and would recommend for the first three chapters alone.

Turing posits that should a machine succeed in masquerading as a human in the realm of online discourse, we should acknowledge its capacity for intelligence. However, Searle imagined being alone in a room, following a program to respond to Chinese characters slipped under the door. It is vital to note that Searle possessed no understanding of the Chinese language. Nevertheless, he followed the programmed instructions, employing the art of manipulating symbols and numerals, just as a computer would. Consequently, he dispatched aptly fashioned strings of Chinese characters beyond the door, instigating a perplexing scenario.Those dwelling outside were falsely perceiving the presence of a proficient Chinese speaker within the confines of Searle's confinement. They remained unaware if the occupant within the room meticulously followed the instructions on the cards or had, in fact, acquired the ability to fluently converse in Chinese.
Thus, Chatgpt is like Searle's Chinese Room. It acts conscious but isn't truly conscious. So, the Turing Test falls short.

I do not totally agree with his conclusion that brains cause minds. It is a too rough and inexact statement. He appears reluctant to accept that mind does cause reaction in the brain, he gets around this by brain causing mind in the first place and so there is no problem if there is the appearance of the inverse. Now I do not deny that brain and mind are connected in some way and they interact. His argument is something on the lines of: a certain arrangement of molecules generate something of metaphysical proprieties (mind), that can not be described by standard cause effect models. Yet mind is still inherently not metaphysical because it is bound to the arrangement of the atoms and exerts cause - effect relation twords the atoms.
Why do people reject metaphysical entities as a soul...? It revolves a lot of problems described in the last 3 chapters !? I guess the existence of something as a soul brings forth a theological discussion..

My prime interest in reading this was actualy the arguments against AI. You do not need brain causes mind to attack AI and the author uses other tools also.

Very clear and very powerful. I think his criticisms of contemporary philosophy of mind hit the mark with astounding clarity.