This book is really more about what constitutes a mind than about different kinds of minds, and about the questions that need to be answered to determine whether something or somebody - an animal, an unborn child, a robot, whatever - actually has what we would think of as a mind or not. He talks about the differences between sentience and insentience and conscious and unconscious, and where and how to make the distinction between them.

(I originally published this review in 1996 in American Scientist)

At one point in his new book Kinds of Minds Daniel Dennett notes that “we (humans), in contrast are believe alls. There is no limit, apparently to what we can believe”(p 44). In Kinds of Minds Dennett is out to convince us that “mindfulness”is an attribute which we may justifiably apply to non-human entities, and that in so doing we will gain a more accurate view of our own minds. Should we believe him?

Dennett’s approach to “mind”is evolutionary. That is, he assumes first that humans have minds and second that there haven’t always been minds. Hence, natural selection must account for our possession of “mindfulness.” Of course, Dennett’s rhetoric to the contrary, one needn’t accept these initial assumptions. He states, “Now, it certainly does not follow from the fact that we are descended from robots that we are robots ourselves. After all, we are also direct descendants of fish, and we are not fish...So something made of robots can exhibit genuine consciousness, because you do if anything does”(p 23-24). What is the reader to make of such a statement? Ignoring whether “mind”and “genuine consciousness” are related, does it follow that we are not robots because we are not fish? Logically, no. Dennett’s assertions that humans have minds while grains of sand, plants, and autonomic nervous systems don’t are just that--assertions.

The reader is not helped by the fact that Dennett does not define “mind” during the first third of the book. This lack of a definition imperils Dennet’s third assumption that natural selection can operate on “mindfulness.” Natural selection can produce structural changes in a species over time, say make the average length of a beak longer, and these changes can affect an organism’s potential behaviors. Yet, no scientist would take seriously the claim that natural selection operates on a concept such as “liberty” (although clearly, concepts do experience their own selection pressures). Is “mind” an ability or a linguistic concept? Definitions do matter.t

If one manages to stay with Dennett past the first third of Kinds of Minds there are certain rewards. Dennett does eventually, vaguely define mind as an “expectation generator” or an “information processor.” Further, he proposes a system, his “intentional stance,” for comparing mind-like behaviors across entities. If we say that a human chess player makes a particular move because he or she believes it will eventually produce a desired result (i.e. victory), why not also ascribe such beliefs and motivations to a computer chess player? And aren’t choices made on the basis of beliefs toward a desired goal the hallmarks of “mindfulness?” In short, an intentional stance makes non-human minds possible.

The common measuring stick provided by the intentional stance allows Dennett to propose a progressive taxonomy of mind-like behaviors. This taxonomy contains four stages: 1) hard-wired response patterns (a grouping he terms “Darwinan”), 2) behaviors selected directly via reward and punishment (“Skinnerian”), 3) behaviors selected by considered rewards and punishments (“Popperian”), and 4) behaviors which make use of culturally transmitted tools (“Gregorian”). Explicit thought or reflection, says Dennett, is only possible in Gregorian creatures who possess the cultural tool of language.

However, there are many types of thinking, and unfortunately, that presented by Dennett in Kinds of Minds strikes this reviewer as peculiarly sloppy. Consider, for example, the just mentioned taxonomy of “mind-like” behaviors. Aside from the fact that Dennett’s taxonomy casts a progressive shadow over evolutionary history, Dennett makes several dubious claims in support of this taxonomy. “We human beings,” he writes, “have the capacity for quick, insightful learning--learning that does not depend upon laborious training” (p133). For example, in psychological experiments, whereas non-human animals require hours of training, humans can “usually just be told what is desired of them.” Such a statement blithely ignores human cognitive development and the years of laborious learning most human subjects bring with them to psychological experiments.

In conclusion Kinds of Minds is a frustrating book. Should we accept Dennett’s claims that non-human entities have minds? Why not. We are left, though, no closer to understanding the fundamental differences between human and non-human pyschological processes.

Clearly argued, but I grow tired of philosophers, even ones so empirically and scientifically oriented as Dennett, arguing for human uniqueness. Ultimately, it's a back-patting endeavour which gives rise to nice arguments but nothing radical, nothing at all. Relying on morality as one thread -- when should we care about "pain and suffering" -- is just so self-serving.

The evolution of the human brain is a mystery, but in a different way from how it's usually argued. There's simply not enough evolutionary time for it to be what it is if it is really so uniquely complex. Or stated in another way, the human brain is uniquely unique and the chimp brain is uniquely unique and the bonobo ... you get the idea. Unless we want to claim some sky-bully touched us with its finger and made us special -- and I know Dennett has absolutely no interest in that -- any argument about the specialness of the human brain really truly has to address its realistically constrained evolution. Which is not shitty, half-assed evolutionary psychology, not what Dennett is doing here and a lazy way to pose as if you are doing this kind of work. I want to hear more about what chimps and bonobos and gorillas and orangs are capable of, in realistic contexts, and how that positively relates to what we are capable of. Because of human chauvinism, negative comparisons are easy to construct, and for that reason are just not interesting or insightful.

Carl Safina's Beyond Words is really, really good. I'm not going to be satisfied with a book that considers these questions that doesn't try harder.

Very short, concise account of Dennett's approach to the mind and how it relates to other creatures. It is very well explained, however not that strongly argued. It is certainly written as an addendum to Consciousness Explained, however it might be better to read this first. In fact, I'd say its a great introduction to anyone who interested in a materialist philosophy of mind, or generally, cognitive science. It explains the big problems, and what he opines to be the best approaches. He gives no consideration to non-materialist approaches, its more of an explanation of his view than and argumentation for it.

Nevertheless, I always enjoy Dennett's style and thought process. I read this in a day (traveling), would recommend it highly. It gives a great tour through philosophy methods and ethology findings, resulting in a greater understanding of human consciousness and animal minds (or protominds).

Like most Dennett books, it is chalk full of mental fiber and powerfully intuitive thought experiments that effortlessly make his points for him. Dennett gets so many points for eschewing abstruse 'philoso-speak' although here, I wanted a bit more structure.

The book lacks a central agenda and thesis, and I think that this is the reason why I didn't like it as much as I might have—although I may simply be a grinch and unwilling to accept "there are many kinds of minds" as a satisfactory thesis, where other readers might be happy to do so.

Thinking back on the text, I seem to have a hard time pinning down exactly what all those clever remarks and thought experiments were...perhaps I am at fault here, but I suspect that Dennett's conversational tone has gone too far here, wanting structure. He spends so little time with each experiment, it is easy to misplace them.

Some interesting things here and a fair bit of review.

What stuck out to me:
- Dennett emphasizes the idea that human intelligence is closely linked to our ability to externalize our thoughts. Not our optimization power as a species, the connection there is obvious, but, I think, the actual structure and function of our brains. I think this is similar to David Deutsch's idea of cognitive artifacts. Anyway, I'll to think/read more on the topic.
- Suffering remains mysterious to me, and this reminded me why.

I once said to a friend that though I find my sympathies lying in a completely different school of thought when it comes to matters of mind and human subjectivity, I really admire Dennett because he goes the furthest in this direction of reducing and naturalizing, of incorporating science and taking seriously the different kinds of minds by focusing his attention on the more general phenomenon of life rather than just the specific phenomenon of humanity. To many, I think his unflinching materialism is much more appreciable than the halfway houses you find in analytic philosophy of mind. And my friend noted that it's like Spinoza: while many disagreed with Spinoza's thought, they admired him for taking rationalism to its furthest limits. Analogously, Dennett takes naturalism and physicalism to its limits in the philosophy of mind, and the outcome is undeniably educational, even if its not my cup of tea.

Although I do not necessarily agree with all that Dennett stated in this book, I have to say that he stated it exceptionally well. This was an accessible, high level philosophical book detailing the conception of animal minds vs. human minds. Each philosophical concept he put forward he carefully defined and explained with often amusing examples.

The ideas that he came up with himself (i.e. The Tower of Generate and Test, mamataxis, etc.) were novel and interesting without being too difficult to grasp. I enjoyed the quotes at the beginning of each chapter. Although the book was dense in its content, it never strayed too far from what is easily grasped with a bit of mental effort. I'd recommend this alongside Species of Mind which addresses several small flaws in some conclusions that he draws.

Read it in one long sitting and enjoyed it very much. I was a big fan of Dennett as a teen and I'm trying to revisit some of his writings and ideas. The concepts he proposes are always well explained in the sense that it is understandable to the general reader, which I highly appreciate in philosophical works. I'm not expert enough to judge the proposed ideas ... but sometimes I have the feeling Dennett dismisses certain ideas a bit too shruggingly (cf. qualia eliminativism) even though I can think of serious rebuts. On the other hand, these more razor-type philosophers always helped to advance the field by making others reconsider their higher-order ideas (Dennett: chmess) and throw out certain esoterica.

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Natura umysłów to wyjaśnienie jak różnią się umysły innych żywych istot od ludzkiego, a także jak złożony jest ten nasz, w oparciu o najnowszą wiedzę z zakresu filozofii, neuronauki, kognitywistyki i biologii ewolucyjnej. Wszystko jest napisane tu prosto i logicznie, jak na taką, popularnonaukową książkę przystało, choć więcej tu jest pytań niż odpowiedzi jak zrozumieć świadomość, kiedy się ona rodzi i jak przejawia. To wczesne dzieło Dennetta, co mogą potwierdzić jego fani, szczególnie ci, którzy czytali opasły tom Świadomość. Jednak Naturę umysłów warto znać, bo wnosi dużą dawkę wiedzy, która może być przydatna, albo służyć jako zbiór ciekawostek, którymi można się pochwalić w towarzystwie...jak kto woli. Książka jest napisana przystępnie, znaki zapytania w niej są frapujące i pełne kokieterii ze strony autora, bo choćby nie wiem jak się zarzekał jest naukowcem pełną gębą. Gdyby był tylko filozofem śmiem twierdzić książkę czytałoby się gorzej. Na pewne sprawy w tej książce musimy sobie sami odpowiedzieć, choć nie jest to proste. Całość jest bardzo dobrą pozycją popularnonaukową, która niejednemu z nas przybliży temat umysłów i świadomości, a innych zmusi do szukania dalej i głębiej w tym temacie. Lubię takie książki i polecam szczerze. Warto zapoznać się z tym esejem!!!
Książka kupiona w księgarni @takczytam.poznan

Daniel Dennett sets out to make us think about minds in a different way after having read his book, and he certainly succeeds in what he set out to do. I found that this book does what a good philosophy book should do; it doesn't try to give any definite answers, but it is challenging most peoples' current conceptions towards the subject. I've seen a lecture with Dennett before, and found it stimulating and interesting despite the fact that I didn't agree with him on all accounts. Kinds of Minds is the first book by Dennett that I've read, and it met my expectations.