I listened to the audiobook.

Although I expected the book to be different I really enjoyed it. It deals with topics such as the idea of the intentional stance, the importance of speed in our understanding of consciousness and intelligence, functionalism, a simple hierarchy for classifying minds and pain and suffering, offering interesting views and arguments.

Definitely an interesting read if you are interested in the discussion of consciousness or animal rights.

Some ideas I found interesting on this book are:

- The distinction between the physical, design and intentional stance and their usefulness on prediction (even if we apply them to things that are not designed of are not agents).
- A mind might have to be at least as speed as the events it acts onto be considered sentient
- Language might be the defining characteristic of human mind. There is no equivalent internal stream of consciousness in other animals
- Dissociation may help us explain the difference between human-like experience of suffering and non human suffering
- Pain as time✕intensity might not make a lot of sense since an agent might prefer 5 seconds of intense pain instead of a year of low pain.

Dan Dennett wrote a fairy tale. No really.

It begins a long time ago, in a galaxy far far away (think about it). And it's a beautiful story about minds...all kinds of minds.

Dennett tell us a story through space and time that explains not only the evolution of minds from simple molecules, but of the evolution of minds in the developing human. Along the way he tackles intentionality and representation, and the importance of relative time frames and language. Not only does he explain difficult philosophical concepts, but he explains them in such an easy accessible manner that before you realize it's happened, you've learned a concept that philosophy students spend countless hours studying.

Dennett is masterful at storytelling, and in this book his style of writing really shines.

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A few quibbles.

His story is mostly told from the standpoint of evolution, and I think it's dangerous to overgeneralize both evolved functionality and behavior from an evolutionary standpoint. It's a difficult story to tell, precisely because so much of it is dark to us.

Dennett believes, and makes a strong case for, the fact that language is absolutely necessary for thought and representation. That without words you can't have concepts, and without concepts there is nothing going on, on the inside. I spend a lot of time thinking about the relationship between language and consciousness, and I think Dennett certainly makes some very valuable points, but the fact is...we have no idea what it's like to be a creature of our prospective intelligence, but without a way to create structured symbols to represent concepts. Also, from a neurophysiological standpoint, I'd argue representation IS possible without language, though it's a degraded form of it.

But I will say, even with as much as I've read in this field, Dennett surprised me with a few examples and arguments that might have to make me rethink some concepts in Philosophy of Mind/consciousness that I took for granted.

Thank you Dan, always a pleasure.

Raises very potent questions but answers almost none. Dennett is content with showing 3-4 potential ways of looking at any question and then telling us that to go beyond is a challenge even for modern science.

The arguments are smooth and the book gives a good evolutionary understanding of the way we frame thoughts and ascribe consciousness. The model of mind that Dennett has created is a bit dated for me, but I enjoyed the long range perspective he brought into it. the section on dogs was probably the best part for me.

PS. References to Susan Sontag is becoming overwhelming in books I read and I guess I will end up ordering one of her books soon.

"This book began with a host of questions, and -- since this is a book by a philosopher -- it ends not with the answers, but, I hope, with better versions of the questions themselves." p 168.

This is an important caveat for those hoping, upon picking up this book, to find a definite and unblurred demarcation between "conscious" or "sentient" beings. Dennett offers no quick and easy answer, but he does offer a compelling perspective in which to view this question under a different light.

The crux for consciousness is on natural language and its ability to represent internal and external objects within the mind. This is not an entirely new concept; the idea that symbols are the hallmark of consciousness is implicit in the very idea of consciousness... there cannot be an "I" to suffer if the organism experiencing pain is incapable of representing the concept of "itself" as the one experiencing the suffering. Without a concept of self, a concept necessarily reliant on symbolizing, then it cannot be legitimately said that an organism is suffering... it is merely pain. We do not recoil in horror at inflicting pain on "lesser" animals (e.g. crabs, spiders, etc.) since we are unquestionably certain that we are not harming a conscious being.

The morally imperative difference between sensitivity to pain and sentience of suffering is contingent on the development of an organism being capable of reflecting on the pain it endures with a yearning for relief, a despair of its current state, a bitter regretting of the foolish actions that led it to this crisis. Such sentience is contingent on the ability to internally symbolize the being experiencing pain as "myself". It is only with the introduction of "I" that morality becomes a key component. (This is, obviously, a vast oversimplification... I'm not condoning rampant torturing of "non-sentient" organisms. Dennett advocates a gradient of "sentience", one which is not readily discernable at present, but he provides many thought experiments to test your intuitive notions that certain creatures are endowed or bereft of this magical X quality. Read the book for the subtleties.)

The development of symbols, being capable of internalizing the external world, allows for representation of the environment within the mind. And the fascinating characteristic of symbols is the ability to re-represent them, to not only be capable of thinking about objects when they are not present but to think about the thinking itself. This sort of bootstrapping takes the creature from mere thinking about the environment (including the self) to thinking about the thinking itself. Symbols of the external world now become concepts which may be thought about in their own right in an ever-increasing hierarchy of representation, re-representation, re-re-representation, etc.

Symbols are the prerequisites of language, the ability to convey meaning in the absence of what is being referred, and allowing a culture to form. Symbols may also be "off-loaded" onto the environment in the form of tools, books, and other artifacts. We alleviate the cognitive burden of keeping everything in mind by off-loading these symbols and then manipulating them to perform cognitive feats that would be impossible (or at least extraordinarily difficult) otherwise. Try multiplying a couple three digit numbers (385 x 924) without the use of paper. By off-loading symbols we can manipulate them and incorporate the product. We need not off-load only to the environment outside ourselves, but can do so within the echo chamber of our minds. This ability to represent and re-represent is a characteristic of the human mind and a (seemingly) unique feat in the animal kindgom. And due to this off-loading outside ourselves we impinge our minds to the environment, we store our minds outside ourselves, and so where, really, does the "I" exist?

لم يزدتي هذا الكتاب الا المزيد من التساؤلات..
لازال العقل شي محير
متى تكون واين مكانه
لكن الكتاب فعلا مثير

Dennett jest Francuzem, nawet jeśli o tym nie wie. Co w połączeniu z byciem filozofem daje nieznośnie mętny wywód i wnioski, z którymi trudno się zgodzić. Na przykład, że zwierzęta nie myślą, ponieważ nie posiadają języka takiego jak ludzki. Nie jest to wystarczający argument, nawet sam autor na koniec przyznaje, że nie jest. Ake, jest dobrze rozumiem, potrzebuje go, żeby wyjaśnić przepaść ewolucyjną między człowiekiem a, dajny na to, kotem.

2,5*

Examines the nature of consciousness and intelligence across different species, challenging traditional views on what it means to be sentient. Dennett's central thesis explores the idea that consciousness is not a singular trait but exists on a spectrum, shaped by evolutionary processes and varying degrees of complexity.

Daniel Dennett är en skicklig författare av lättförståeliga vetenskapliga texter. Inte helt olikt Steven Pinker använder han sig flitigt av humor för att förmedla kunskap till läsaren (även om Pinker är snäppet vassare på detta). Mycket av det som står i boken är intressant, men som helhet lyckas den inte charma mig. Möjligtvis dras den med problemet att själva syftet är lite oklart? Är boken menad att vara en översikt över befintlig forskning på området, eller är den snarare en längre personligt hållen essä (om än fullpackad med referenser) i vilken Dennett resonerar fritt? Givetvis kan svaret vara båda. Men av någon anledning, som jag inte riktigt kan sätta fingret på, så får jag en något flyktig känsla när jag läser.

Very eloquently explained

My third dennett book. The are very interrelated so this should be read first, then Consciousness Explained, finally Darwin's Dangerous Idea. I love them all and stand in awe of Dennett with each work.

Basically, this book is an overview of how consciousness evolved. Beginning with the simplest self-replicating molecules and moving all the way up to human consciousness and all of its subjective experience. Most interesting is his explanation of 'the intentional stance', an explanatory view lets us examine mindless organic things in the same way that we look at mindful things like chimps and people.
Fascinating