I've reached the conclusion that you can't actually go wrong with one of the Dialogues. With that in mind, Cratylus has, I think, lost some of its charm with age. A great deal of the fanciful etymologies (and more than likely, at least a little satirical) are, of course, related to Classical Greek. Without a deep knowledge of Classical Greek, a lot of the humour is gone.

Nonetheless, there is still a lot that's fun here. The general poking at etymology can be enjoyed for its own sake and a clear philosophy of language is sketched out and worthy of some chewing.

[Outside the Potts residence. JEREMY, JEMIMA, SOCRATES]

SOCRATES: Good day, young friends. May I inquire whether your father is at home?

JEMIMA: I’m sorry, Daddy is out.

JEREMY: He’s trying to sell an invention.

JEMIMA: Can we help you, Mr…?

SOCRATES: Socrates. My unworthy name is Socrates.

JEREMY: The Socrates?

JEMIMA: The one who appears in Cratylus?

JEREMY: Daddy’s been reading it to us at bedtime for the last week.

SOCRATES: Has he indeed! And what did you all think of it?

JEMIMA: He said you had some good counterarguments to the arbitrariness of the signifier.

JEREMY: Yes, he ripped out all the pages from de Saussure’s Cours de linguistique générale.

JEMIMA: And put them in the kitty litter.

SOCRATES: The kitty litter?

JEREMY: I think “kitty” is derived from κίνημα τίγρης, “motion of the tiger”. A cat is fast like a tiger, you understand.

JEMIMA: And “litter” comes from λιτότητας, “part”. It is the most important part of looking after a cat.

JEREMY: We’ve been studying your methods very closely.

SOCRATES: I see you have! And what other discoveries have you made, little philosophers?

JEMIMA: Well, we liked the bit about primitive names. We wondered if we could make up a primitive name of our own. A word whose signification follows from its sound.

SOCRATES: And did you succeed?

JEREMEY: We certainly did! Do you want to know what it is, Mr. Socrates?

SOCRATES: Nothing would please me more.

JEREMY AND JEMIMA: It’s… Chitty Chitty Bang Bang!

SOCRATES: Χιττι Χιττι…?

JEREMY AND JEMIMA: Βανγ Βανγ!

SOCRATES: I see! How extremely ingenious of you! Yes, the appropriateness of the name is manifestly evident. A few more examples like this, and I might even start to believe in my foolish idea…

JEMIMA: And that’s not all! We made up a song too! Based on your theory!

SOCRATES: Did you really?

JEREMY: Would you like us to sing it to you?

SOCRATES: I would be honored.

JEMIMA: Alright, Mr. Socrates, here it is. We invented it for Daddy’s girlfriend. She’s also a big fan of your work.

JEREMY AND JEMIMA:

Toot sweets sound like what they are
So do lollies in a lollypop jar
Gingerbread men have a gingerbread sound
We've found
Sugar plum cinnamon and lemon tart
Tell you what they are right from the start
And your name does the same for you
By coincidence, Truly Scrumptious
You're truly truly scrumptious
Scrumptious as a cherry peach parfait
When you’re near us
It's so delicious
Honest Truly, you're the answer to our wishes
Truly Scrumptious
Though we may seem presumptuous
Never, never, ever go away
Our hearts beat so unruly
Because we love you truly
Honest Truly, we do

SOCRATES: I did not know every one of the charming barbarian words you used, but I found your song both moving and philosophically engaging. And now, I fear I have presumed on your hospitality long enough…

JEREMY: Oh no, Mr. Socrates! Won’t you stay to tea?

JEMIMA: Mr. Russell is coming. I’m sure you’d enjoy talking to him.

SOCRATES: I’m sorry, dear children, but I must get back to the fifth century B.C. I need to tell Hermogenes and Cratylus about my new discoveries.

[He departs]

JEREMY: Now what?

JEMIMA: I think we should play a little trick on Mr. Russell. I don’t like the way he looks at Truly.

JEREMY: An apple-pie bed?

JEMIMA: No, we did that last time. He’ll be expecting it.

JEREMY: I know. Let’s refute axiomatic set theory.

JEMIMA: Wizard idea, Jeremy!
____________________________________

GRATUITOUS CROSS-PROMOTION

People who enjoy reading about kitty litter may also want to check out this review by Not.

Nezaobilazno delo za razumevanje odnosa između reči i stvari. 

U ovom Platonovom dijalogu, sukobljene su dve strane – konvencionalistička i naturalistička. Prvu zastupa Hermogen, koji brani tvrdnju da reči proističu iz dogovora između ljudi, da su reči konvencija, dok drugi pogled, koji zastupa Kratil, predsavlja uverenje da je svaki predmet dobio tačno ime koje mu po prirodi stoji. Medijator i sudija i porađalac ideja je, normalno, Sokrat. U razgovoru sa Hermogenom zaključuje kako je ime, između ostalog, oruđe koje služi za podučavanje i razlikovanje stvari – ono što je čunak za tkanje, to je ime za stvar. Zbog toga stvari treba imenovati načinom i sredstvima koja one imaju po prirodi, a ne kako se nekome prohte. Sokrat čvrsto stoji iza toga da ime ima prirodnu ispravnost i da se ne može nametnuti. Dakle, ono što je bitno za pojam, mora da bude sadržano u imenu, inače je neistinito. Mada, kaže Sokrat u raspravi sa Kratilom, u proučavanju stvari ne treba početi od imena, već od njih samih – izvan samog imena treba tražiti istinu. A istina je tu, mora biti tu: u suprotnom, ukoliko se sve stvari samo preobražavaju i ništa ne ostaje onako kako je bilo, nema ni govora o spoznaji, pa ni o razumu. Ako se menja sama ideja spoznaje, promeniće se u neku drugu ideju koja sa spoznajom veze nema. 

Ono što mene zanima je (a na umu mi je sad Velimir Hlebnjikov) je nad-jezik, jezik zvezda, ptica, božanstava, zaumni jezik koji, u svojoj onomatopejičnosti, biva dostupan svima. Zvuk koji znači – kao što je svima izmišljena reč „bubu” nešto okruglačasto, a „kiki” nešto oštro. Odnos zvuka i jezika je divna misterija i neodgovorivo pitanje. Zašto Bušmani imaju kliktave glasove, a Havajci samo osam suglasnika? Otkud Č laponcima? Zašto je ubiški jezik imao 84 konsonanta i kako su govornici ovog jezika doživljavali sopstvenu verbalnu muziku? Zašto nekad reči lepog značenja zvuče ružno, a ružne lepo? Kako govorimo jezik, a kako nas jezik govori?

Sve sa čim i dan-danas muku mučimo, bilo je i kod Platona. Cela zapadna filozofija je, što reče Vajthed, niz fusnota Platona. Filozofska azbuka. Tu je, pa ko hoće, nek se počasti opismenjavanjem. Za reč, za pojam, za stvar, za biće.

my mental well-being is a joke to plato

Cratylus takes the position of Heraclitus, that all things are in motion and flux. Words then become conventional signs, as it were, that point to something else. There is a measure of prior knowledge that is required for the sign to mean anything substantial and there is a measure of relativity involved in language.

Hermogenes takes the position that words, like art, is imitative, that is imitated a thing, so if it is a sign, it’s a sign of the thing signified and is therefore substantially true. There are of course derivative names and primary ones but whence comes the primary? From Daemons or the gods? What if the original “name giver” made some errors so there is still internal consistency but it’s slightly incorrect like the geometrician who makes a slight error in his first principles. All subsequent proofs are consistent internally but therein lies a measure of error.

Socrates ultimately points us to the Good, the Beautiful itself. The pure Forms that are constitutive of all reality, and which all things participate in to share their essence with. Eternal and unchanging, even letters, and then ultimately words, names, sentences, all participate in their corresponding eternal forms.

I think this dialogue is severely underrated. There is something extremely unsettling about this dialogue and I believe it’s because it’s so peculiarly ancient (pre-modern) in its outlook. But it’s important to know that language and the origin thereof was taken extremely seriously and all good grammarians and philosophers were apt to give an account of the same.

“But, Cratylus, I have long been surprised at my own wisdom, and doubtful of it, too. That’s why I think it’s necessary to keep re-investigating whatever I say, since self-deception is the worst thing of all. How could it not be terrible, indeed, when the deceiver never deserts you even for an instant, but is always right there with you?” —Socrates

Socrates gives Hermogenes a brief lesson on mythological etymology.

After pages and pages of spurious 5th century etymologies, I wish in this case that philistines like Karl Popper were correct in their estimation of Plato being a proto-Stalinist, but unfortunately for the defender of the so called “Open Society”, Stalin’s Marxism and Problems of Linguistics has very little in common with this dialogue. The only redeemable trait here is the practically comedic stubbornness of Cratylus in his fixation on the impossibility of falsity in speech:

CRATYLUS: In my view, one can neither speak nor say anything falsely. SOCRATES: What about announcing something falsely or addressing
someone falsely? For example, suppose you were in a foreign country and someone meeting you took your hand and said, “Greetings! Hermogenes, son of Smicrion, visitor from Athens,” would he be speaking, saying, announcing, or addressing these words not to you but to Hermogenes— or to no one?
CRATYLUS: In my view, Socrates, he is not articulating them as he should.
SOCRATES: Well, that’s a welcome answer. But are the words he articulates true or false, or partly true and partly false? If you tell me that, I’ll be satisfied.
CRATYLUS: For my part, I’d say he’s just making noise and acting pointlessly, as if he were banging a brass pot.

Ακόμη ένα πλατωνικό έργο, με σκοπό να μας παρουσιάσει το μεγαλείο και την εξυπνάδα του Σωκράτη. Οι διάλογοι είναι οι κλασικοί: "Ω Σωκράτη δίδαξε μας γιατί είμαστε γκασμάδες και αδαείς" και ο Σωκράτης διδάσκει, και οι συνομιλητές του λένε:"μα πόσο δίκαιο έχεις". Δηλαδή ένας δεν βρέθηκε να του ανταπαντήσει; Κανένας δεν είχε αντεπιχείρημα; Τέλος πάντων...
Σαν βιβλίο παρουσιάζει βέβαια ενδιαφέρον, και είναι ότι πρέπει για την σημερινή εποχή, όπου βλέπουμε πόσο έχει ξεπέσει η ελληνική γλώσσα. Και ότι ο καθένας ονοματίζει το καθετί κατά το δοκούν και όπως τον συμφέρει.

σ.σ. έχω διαβάσει την μέτρια μετάφραση των εκδόσεων "Κάκτος" και όχι δαύτη.

By far one of the most complex Socratic dialogues, Cratylus delves into the topic of linguistic philosophy. Given that this field has only started thriving in the 20th century, it is safe to say that Cratylus was ahead of its time. It discusses the hypotheses of names as tags compared with names as keys. The first means that names are merely given to things without thought to etymology or phonology while the second presumes that names are chosen due to representational quality. While it might seem at first like Socrates favours the idea of names as keys, the dialogue quickly shifts to a discussion of names as tags, showing that neither theory can completely explain names (names here refers to any word that plays a non syntactical role in a sentence). A large part of the dialogue focuses on the names of the Greek Gods as well as some common greek nouns and analyzing how their name fits their meaning. I imagine this section must’ve been hell to translate. However, the translator of the editor that I read (Reeve) brilliantly shows the phonetic translation of the original greek, making the text easy to follow. If you’ve ever heard of the bouba-kiki effect, you’re gonna love reading this dialogue as it also talks about the concept of sound symbolism. While some arguments in the book would be considered weak by modern standards due to easily rejected assumptions, this dialogue is still a wonderful read. It offers the reader a point of view of Plato’s philosophy that steers away from the traditional moral/ethical discussions and focuses on a topic that is still being hotly debated to this day. This is an excellent dialogue and definitely one of Plato’s best. 5/5

Même si cela peut passer inaperçu, Cratyle apparaît et parle dès le début du livre (avant même Socrate) !

sócrates usa la cuestión de la creación de la realidad del lenguaje para dar razón que éste no pertenece a un concepto real/natural, y que la convencionalidad social del lenguaje no es tampoco su solo creador (y aquí es bien interesante que sin querer también describe la falacia de la democracia), sino que existe una parte de la naturaleza de la que las cosas reciben su nombre, últimamente refiriéndose a los dioses dando a los humanos las primeras palabras como herramienta; también es interesante que ya hace referencia a Heráclito y su tesis de la realidad en constante cambio aplicada al lenguaje, hace que el análisis se vuelva muy complicado y siento que para el final ya aterriza en un concepto que engloba la ciencia como un proceso del lenguaje buscando constantes en el mundo transitorio, y en la edición que estoy leyendo lo que sigue es, precisamente, la ciencia. <3

girl what??